Norway’s Epstein Hearings on Foreign Ministry Culture and IPI Funding
Snapshot
Record review updated October 3, 2026
Stortinget’s hearings on control and culture in the foreign service brought former and serving ministers, senior officials and Norway’s aid agency before parliament on September 30 and October 1, 2026. The committee examined the government’s response to the Epstein files, oversight of the International Peace Institute, conflicts of interest and the relationship between diplomatic networks and public funding.
| Field | Verified position |
|---|---|
| Official case title | Kontroll og kultur i utenrikstjenesten, meaning control and culture in the foreign service |
| Parliamentary body | Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs |
| Hearing dates | September 30 and October 1, 2026 |
| Chair | Per-Willy Amundsen |
| Rapporteur | Jonas Andersen Sayed |
| Case opened | February 26, 2026 |
| September 30 written record | Published through the close of the hearing; marked not yet proofread |
| October 1 written record | Incomplete at the review cutoff; stops during Åsmund Aukrust’s questioning |
| Parliamentary outcome | Case remained under committee consideration; no completed plenary debate or decision shown |
| Separate investigation | An independent parliamentary inquiry commission was expected to report by January 31, 2028 |
The hearings create a public record of explanations, admissions, denials and contested institutional practices. Witness testimony and committee members’ questions must be distinguished from the findings of an audit, a completed parliamentary recommendation or a criminal judgment.
Why these hearings matter to the Epstein record
The committee’s published scope expressly connected the proceedings to information disclosed in the Epstein documents. Its inquiry extended beyond individual contact with Epstein to the administrative systems surrounding prominent diplomats, international organizations and aid recipients.
The five announced subjects were:
- What the government had done in response to the Epstein disclosures and to prevent similar problems
- How the earlier national audit of Norwegian support to IPI had been followed up
- Changes to grant controls, evaluation and measurement of results over the preceding two decades
- Whether the Foreign Ministry’s culture, hierarchy and rotation system made it vulnerable to favoritism, improper influence or corruption
- How networks and aid funding had been used in Norwegian campaigns for international positions
The International Peace Institute is a central institutional connection. The hearing placed Norway’s grant decisions and oversight alongside questions about IPI’s former president, Terje Rød-Larsen, and the ministry’s handling of concerns received in 2019. EpsteinWiki’s Rød-Larsen and Mona Juul article supplies the wider diplomatic background.
The hearings also added direct parliamentary testimony from Børge Brende, who discussed his later Epstein relationship and his earlier responsibility as foreign minister. His presence on the witness list does not give the same evidentiary status to every allegation raised in a question.
Who appeared and what is currently available
The September 30 programme and October 1 programme identify the invited panels. The written records establish which published exchanges can presently be examined.
| Day | Panel | Capacity listed for the hearing | Written-record coverage at cutoff |
|---|---|---|---|
| September 30 | Erik Solheim and Heikki Eidsvoll Holmås | Former development ministers | Published |
| September 30 | Jonas Gahr Støre | Former foreign minister | Published |
| September 30 | Børge Brende | Former foreign minister | Published |
| September 30 | Ine Eriksen Søreide | Former foreign minister | Published |
| October 1 | Nikolai Astrup and Dag-Inge Ulstein | Former development ministers | Published |
| October 1 | Anniken Huitfeldt | Former foreign minister | Published |
| October 1 | Anne Beathe Kristiansen | Former development minister | Published |
| October 1 | Gunn Jorid Roset | Director of Norad | Published |
| October 1 | Åsmund Aukrust | Development minister | Partly published |
| October 1 | Espen Barth Eide | Foreign minister | Scheduled panel; not yet present in the retrieved transcript |
Senior officials also answered questions. They included Foreign Ministry Secretary General Torgeir Larsen, Assistant Secretary General Kjersti Ertresvaag Andersen and Norad officials accompanying Roset. Their answers are identified separately where they supply information beyond a minister’s recollection.
The programmes contain scheduled times, which should not be used as precise video timestamps. For example, the September 30 written record shows Brende’s panel continuing until a break at 15:06, followed by Søreide’s session resuming at 15:16. The day closed at 16:19.
From the Epstein disclosures to a parliamentary control case
The committee correspondence archive records initial questions sent to Prime Minister Støre and Foreign Minister Eide on February 12, 2026, and the decision to open a separate case on February 26.
The first letter to Støre asked what investigations, measures and actions the government had initiated after the Epstein files. The corresponding questions to Eide addressed ethics, security-clearance relationships, external partners and the screening of aid recipients and their leadership.
| Date | Record or event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| 2007 to 2012 | Period examined in the earlier IPI grant audit | Established administrative findings predating the 2026 hearings |
| November 2019 | Foreign Ministry received information treated as an IPI warning | Later focus of questions about referral, investigation and information sharing |
| February 12, 2026 | Committee sent initial questions to Støre and Eide | Documentary beginning of this parliamentary inquiry |
| February 26, 2026 | Committee opened its own control case | Formal parliamentary scrutiny of foreign-service control and culture |
| February to May 2026 | Published letters and replies | Detailed written record preceding oral testimony |
| September 30, 2026 | First hearing day | Former ministers questioned about IPI, personal relationships and institutional controls |
| October 1, 2026 | Second hearing day | Further ministerial panels and evidence from Norad |
| October 3, 2026 | Article review cutoff | First-day record unproofread; second-day record incomplete |
| January 31, 2028 | Commission report deadline described by the chair | Expected next stage of the separate, broader investigation |
The chair’s opening explanation stated that the hearing had been designed to avoid obstructing the independent commission. He said the committee would be cautious about conclusions within the commission’s mandate and expected to return to the matter when its report was considered. That is a procedural plan, not a prediction of what the commission will find.
The earlier IPI audit and the limits of ministerial assurances
Document 3:12 for 2020 to 2021, published on June 3, 2021, examined the Foreign Ministry’s administration of NOK 58.2 million in grants to IPI during 2007 to 2012. It provides established audit findings against which the later ministerial explanations can be assessed.
The Office of the Auditor General found inadequate documentation, reporting, follow-up and conflict-of-interest assessments. It also strongly criticized administrative-expense support beyond the ministry’s guidance. The report distinguished missing project accounts from audited accounts for the organization as a whole. It should not be summarized as a finding that IPI had no audited financial statements.
The limits are equally important. The audit examined Norwegian grant administration. It did not independently trace how IPI spent every grant, investigate Epstein’s connections or determine whether particular people committed crimes. Its date range did not cover all subsequent IPI funding.
Innst. 167 S, dated February 15, 2022, records the committee’s unanimous support for the audit’s findings and recommendations. Stronger allegations in minority remarks should not be presented as collective committee conclusions. The March 1, 2022 plenary record shows that proposals for a criminal-law assessment and an expanded audit were rejected, while the report was unanimously appended to the parliamentary record.
The 2026 hearings therefore revisited a relationship already criticized through formal oversight. They also asked whether responses to that criticism, and to later warning signs, had been sufficient.
Solheim and Holmås on aid policy and ministerial responsibility
Solheim’s evidence combined a defense of Norwegian diplomacy with criticism of earlier financial practices. He said he had never knowingly met Epstein and had little involvement in IPI appropriations. He rejected the characterization of the ministry as generally corrupt or driven by favoritism, while later describing an overly forgiving approach to misuse of funds when he arrived in 2005.
His proposed answer was stronger financial expertise and accountability. He defended controls, reporting arrangements and repayment demands, while warning that fear of mistakes could also inhibit difficult peace diplomacy. He said unconventional contacts should be reported to superiors and must not produce private benefits.
Holmås’s answers on the division of responsibility are important for assigning accountability. He said his development portfolio did not include peace and reconciliation appropriations or responsibility for ministry-wide grant systems. When questioned about earlier parliamentary assurances and impartiality concerns surrounding IPI, he referred those matters to the foreign minister.
Both panels exposed the incentives surrounding a large aid budget. Solheim acknowledged pressure to classify eligible expenditure as aid, while denying that it consequently received weaker controls. Holmås acknowledged that aid could serve Norwegian foreign-policy aims and that political control had contributed to retaining administration inside the ministry. Those explanations help identify the institutional choices under scrutiny without attributing every Foreign Ministry decision to every development minister.
Støre on IPI oversight and conflicts of interest
Støre’s opening account condemned Epstein’s abuse and said that, as far as he could establish, he had never met or contacted him. He described government cooperation with investigations and the independent commission. His assertion that the disclosures did not show Epstein functioning as a partner in Norwegian foreign or development policy was a bounded government position, not a finding reached by the hearing.
On IPI, Støre accepted the Auditor General’s criticism while defending the strategic reasons for funding an institution offering United Nations expertise, access and peace-policy work. Committee members challenged whether political wishes had effectively determined approval before administrative scrutiny. He denied giving prior instructions and said officials had recommended the framework agreement, while accepting political responsibility for approving it.
The questions about Geir O. Pedersen’s impartiality brought the difference between formal assessment and trusted relationships into focus. Støre said he required Pedersen to assess his position and defended relying on that judgment despite the legal department’s concerns. He denied that familiarity with IPI’s leadership resulted in lighter scrutiny.
The Oslo-process archive exchange produced a more specific acknowledgment. Støre said the earlier approach to Rød-Larsen’s material had focused on employment status, whereas archival responsibility should have been assessed by the project and subject matter. That concession concerns how the archive question was framed. It is not an admission of deliberately concealing or destroying documents.
Brende’s admission and the disputed contact chronology
Brende’s opening statement contained an explicit admission about his public account of the relationship. He apologized for answering Aftenposten untruthfully in November 2025 when asked whether he had met Epstein. He said he had feared the contact would be interpreted as more extensive than it was and would damage the World Economic Forum before Davos.
Brende maintained that he first met Epstein in 2018, after leaving the Foreign Ministry, and described the contact as three dinners and exchanges by email and text. He said he should have investigated Epstein’s background and described his departure from the WEF and an external legal review. These were Brende’s explanations to the committee; his account of the review is not a substitute for its underlying evidence.
Hege Bae Nyholt challenged him about September 2017 correspondence between Rød-Larsen and Epstein concerning a Norwegian friend. Brende denied meeting Epstein then. Asked whether a meeting had been arranged while he was still foreign minister, he answered no. He also denied contact or attempted contact from Rød-Larsen around the date identified in the question.
The exchange leaves two different evidentiary points. The apology is a recorded admission of an earlier untruthful answer. The proposed identification of the unnamed Norwegian and the suggested 2017 meeting remained disputed. A committee member’s reading of an email does not establish that Brende attended an encounter.
Nyholt also questioned Brende about the later email exchange in which Epstein proposed replacing the United Nations with the WEF. Brende rejected the suggestion that he had pursued that goal and said his reply should have rejected the idea more directly. The hearing therefore documents both the question about the exchange and his denial of the interpretation placed on it.
Brende on IPI funding and the move to Norad
Brende’s account of IPI funding accepted responsibility for increases in his early ministerial period. He said additional funding supported the Independent Commission on Multilateralism, a United Nations reform project led by former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd.
He also described a 2015 independent review that identified overly ambitious work plans, weak measurement of results, too many events and insufficient financial transparency. He said the ministry continued supporting IPI but reduced annual funding to NOK 5 million in 2016 and kept it at NOK 5 million in 2017. His explanation was that the review combined criticism with a recommendation for continued cooperation.
The WEF funding exchange concerned a separate issue. Committee members questioned Norway’s support for projects involving the WEF during Brende’s government service. Brende disputed that he had allocated large Foreign Ministry sums to the organization and said the relevant forest initiative belonged to the Climate and Environment Ministry. The exchange should not be rewritten as a finding that Brende paid public money to Epstein or personally approved the grants being discussed.
Brende’s clearest proposed structural correction was that he should have transferred more grant administration to Norad. He defended diplomatic rotation for foreign-policy work but said financial oversight required continuity and specialist expertise. In follow-up answers he acknowledged that some peace and reconciliation funding or embassy functions could require separate consideration.
He also argued that support for think tanks should ideally be debated through ordinary foreign-policy appropriations rather than automatically classified as development aid. That was a policy recommendation, not a conclusion that the existing expenditure was unlawful.
Søreide and the handling of the 2019 IPI warning
Søreide’s testimony placed a warning received in November 2019 at the center of the oversight debate. She said officials handled it administratively, obtained legal advice and referred the matter through Norway’s prosecutorial authorities to the United States. She said she was informed afterward and did not direct the handling.
Her position had two parts. She would have preferred the ministry to have undertaken further inquiries in hindsight, but she questioned whether those inquiries would have resolved alleged conduct in the United States. She stressed that the ministry lacked police powers to investigate or question witnesses there.
Rapporteur Sayed pressed a separate question: why was the warning not supplied to the Office of the Auditor General when it examined the IPI relationship? Søreide defended the distinction between a possible US criminal matter and an audit of grant administration and impartiality during an earlier period. The committee’s challenge was whether that distinction prevented relevant information from reaching another oversight body.
Eide’s March 10 written reply supplies additional detail. It says the information passed through Riksadvokaten and Eurojust to US authorities, that the ministry did not conduct an independent investigation, and that it had received no information about the US follow-up. It also says the warning was not given to the national auditor.
The April 16 reply says it was not sent to the civilian security-clearance authority either. The ministry disputed the characterization of the warning as a human-trafficking allegation and said it concerned possible US immigration irregularities rather than directly identifying a Norwegian diplomat or close relation. That characterization is the ministry’s position. Committee questions used a different framing, and the underlying warning must be examined before resolving the disagreement.
The important unresolved issue is institutional handling. Referral to prosecutors, an audit of historical grants and assessment of diplomatic personnel involve different duties. Showing that one route was used does not establish that every potentially relevant administrative step was considered or completed.
Mona Juul, impartiality and the end of IPI grants
Søreide’s account of the grant decision clarified that 2018 was the final year of the regular Foreign Ministry grant support she discussed, which ceased from 2019. She attributed the decision to potential conflicts between Norway’s United Nations delegation and IPI when Mona Juul was to become UN ambassador and her husband remained IPI president.
That chronology matters. In her explanation, the regular-grant cutoff preceded the November 2019 warning. It should not be presented as a sanction imposed because of that warning or as proof that every later event-related payment ended. Huitfeldt was separately questioned on October 1 about funding for a 2023 Trygve Lie symposium.
Søreide described her friendship with Juul and said she had declared herself disqualified, or close to the threshold for disqualification, in appointment and personnel matters concerning her. A substitute minister, Jan Tore Sanner, was appointed in January 2018. She rejected the suggestion that the same assessment necessarily disqualified her in matters involving Rød-Larsen, with whom she said her relationship was much more limited.
Torgeir Larsen’s answer distinguished the ministry’s authorization responsibilities from the separate security-clearance authority. He said public information in 2019 prompted procedural steps and communication with that authority, and that Juul received a lower clearance level when cleared again in 2021. This was official testimony about the administrative process, not a published decision establishing the reasons for each clearance assessment.
The question running through these exchanges was whether personal familiarity, formal conflict rules and responsibility divided between authorities had left gaps in accountability. The hearing records competing explanations; it does not supply a final determination on that question.
October 1 on appointments, aid administration and political priorities
Astrup’s opening described efforts to reduce fragmentation, make aid results accessible and require written follow-up of evaluations. He denied personally encountering systemic favoritism or corruption, but identified weaknesses in rotation: officials making appointment decisions could later become subordinate to those affected, and specialist knowledge could be dispersed.
Ulstein’s evidence was more explicit about institutional vulnerability. Career ambitions, prestigious posts and access to influential international circles could create risks for both administrative and political leaders. He defended the 2019 transfer of grant administration to Norad as a response to structural risk, while saying he had not personally experienced misconduct. His position distinguished potential vulnerability from proven wrongdoing.
Huitfeldt’s questioning about IPI concerned approval of funding for a 2023 Trygve Lie symposium after regular support had ended. She described a departmental recommendation for a specific event providing Norway with a platform during UN high-level week. When pressed about a fresh partner assessment or inquiries into US follow-up of the 2019 warning, her answers did not establish which new assessment had occurred or what it found. She ultimately said she could not explain the earlier funding cutoff because it preceded her tenure.
Huitfeldt also disputed suggestions of patronage in diplomatic recruitment. Questioned about her own Washington appointment, she said others made that decision and explained that she had earlier asked whether Søreide herself wanted the Washington ambassador position. The exchange records a challenged appointment and her response, rather than a committee finding that party membership determined the outcome.
Kristiansen’s opening described the transfer of NOK 6.4 billion in grant administration to Norad, alongside the separate major Ukraine portfolio. She emphasized continuity, specialist competence and documentation, including relevant text and WhatsApp messages. She said she would have preferred further transfers and identified peace and reconciliation as an area still administered by the ministry. She distinguished these structural questions from IPI and personnel matters outside her development portfolio.
The published portion of Aukrust’s panel describes quarterly briefings he had requested from the Central Control Unit, stronger accounting requirements and continuing work on grant-management systems. Asked about other recipients’ undesirable connections, he did not guarantee that none existed; he emphasized whether an objectionable contact exercised influence over an organization. These answers must remain provisional coverage because the available record ends before his panel concludes.
Norad’s evidence on the controls now in place
Norad director Gunn Jorid Roset’s evidence supplied specific descriptions of present administrative safeguards. She said Norad managed NOK 34.3 billion in 2025, representing 58 percent of Norway’s aid budget, while some portfolios, including peace and conflict resolution, remained with the Foreign Ministry.
Roset said the same grant rules applied to Norad, the ministry and embassies, but control responsibility followed the portfolio. Norad could examine its own administration; ministry-administered grants remained the ministry’s responsibility. Norad also provided common manuals, templates and training.
The safeguards she described included:
- A twelve-month restriction on staff handling grant matters concerning a previous employer
- Written and archived conflict-of-interest assessments, including assessments reaching the director
- Additional integrity checks based on risk and the proposed partner, without a fixed financial threshold
- Requirements for recipients to prevent, report and address financial irregularities
- The ability to freeze agreements and demand repayment
Norad official Lisetta Trebbi said its reporting team had examined approximately 1,400 cases since 2011 and that about NOK 110 million had been disallowed and repayment demanded. She expressly excluded the separate systems for multilateral organizations and the Foreign Ministry’s own portfolio. These figures are not an estimate of all misuse of Norwegian aid, and a repayment demand is not the same as confirmed recovery.
A direct Epstein-related exchange tested the difference between continuing reform and a new response to the disclosures. Asked by Ove Trellevik whether Norad had independently revisited other projects because of the Epstein revelations, Roset did not identify such a retrospective review. She described ongoing professionalization and heightened attention to existing procedures.
She also declined to recommend that all embassy-administered aid be moved to Norad, describing that allocation of responsibility as a political decision. Her evidence supports a comparison of safeguards and institutional responsibilities, while leaving their adequacy open to scrutiny.
What the written correspondence adds
The 21-document correspondence collection extends from February 12 to May 4, 2026. It includes initial questions, substantive replies, follow-up questions and requests for more time. It is useful for testing broad oral descriptions against more specific administrative explanations.
| Documentary issue | Written position | Why the distinction matters |
|---|---|---|
| External networks | Eide’s March 10 reply acknowledged no systematic continuing check of every external contact and no consolidated overview of grant recipients involving current or former Norwegian politicians | A general ethics framework does not establish a complete map of relationships |
| IPI after the regular-grant cutoff | The April 16 reply identifies NOK 138,897 in 2023 and NOK 183,427 in 2024 for the Trygve Lie symposium, classified as procurement | Ending regular grants did not mean all later payments involving IPI stopped |
| Oslo-process archives | The March 19 reply reports collection, with consent, of five boxes from Rød-Larsen and Juul’s storage on March 14 | Document recovery and assessment of legal responsibility are separate steps |
| Government reform | Støre’s March 24 reply describes ongoing training and integrity measures while awaiting the commission’s broader findings | Continuing administrative work and completed conclusions must be distinguished |
The March 19 archive reply said the ministry knew of no equivalent written archival assessment from 2006 to the National Archives’ 2026 assessment. It also described further examination of documents before deciding whether a police report was appropriate. The reply does not establish that every recovered item was unlawfully held.
The other correspondence branches include questions about diplomatic passports and the boundary between parliamentary scrutiny and intelligence secrecy. Their inclusion shows the breadth of the inquiry; it does not independently establish an intelligence operation or misuse of a particular passport.
Culture, networks and international positions
The September 30 exchanges repeatedly exposed a difference between what ministers saw from leadership positions and what committee members wanted tested about the system. Several witnesses rejected descriptions of a generally unhealthy ministry culture. Members asked whether hierarchy, closed recruitment, familiar networks and dependence on senior officials could still discourage challenge or favor well-connected organizations.
Diplomatic networking was generally defended as part of the job. The contested issue was how to distinguish legitimate access used for public purposes from relationships producing private advantage, weaker checks or preferential treatment.
Søreide defended the campaign for Norway’s 2021 to 2022 Security Council seat, saying it used established policy and networks without new financial promises to secure votes. Questions about former ministers’ board roles at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue raised a different concern: whether donor relationships and political networks became intertwined. She said her position was unpaid, appointed by the organization’s board and not a Norwegian government assignment.
Those exchanges are useful because they identify the records needed to test the competing positions: appointment assessments, grant recommendations, written conflict evaluations, donor conditions, board mandates and evidence of how officials handled disagreement. A shared network alone does not establish an improper decision; an assurance of professional culture alone does not establish that every control operated effectively.
What the evidence establishes and what remains open
| Issue | Evidence currently available | Evidentiary limit |
|---|---|---|
| Epstein relevance | Committee scope and opening remarks expressly identify the disclosures | The hearing also covers broader aid and institutional questions |
| IPI oversight failures | Earlier national audit and parliamentary follow-up | Audit scope must not be expanded into findings about every later grant or Epstein transaction |
| Brende’s earlier denial | His recorded apology for an untruthful answer to Aftenposten | Does not establish participation in Epstein’s sexual crimes |
| Suggested 2017 contact | Committee questions and Brende’s denials | Does not independently identify an unnamed email reference or prove attendance |
| 2019 warning | Ministerial correspondence and Søreide/Larsen testimony about its handling | Does not determine the truth of every allegation or the outcome of US follow-up |
| Conflicts and appointments | Witness accounts, questions and descriptions of procedures | Individual appointments require their own underlying records |
| Current Norad controls | Roset and Trebbi’s descriptions of rules, processes and case totals | Descriptions of safeguards do not independently measure their effectiveness |
| Final parliamentary conclusions | Case remained at committee stage | No completed decision is established by these hearings alone |
| Complete second-day testimony | Partial October 1 written record and an official archive-video link | Eide’s oral evidence is not reconstructed from his scheduled appearance |
Record availability and source limitations
The September 30 transcript is explicitly marked not yet proofread. The October 1 transcript says contributions are being published progressively and that the remainder is under preparation. The retrieved second-day text stops during Aukrust’s questioning.
The full-page versions provide speaker-attributed Norwegian text and links to individual contributions. This article paraphrases that text in English. It does not present paraphrases as verbatim English quotations.
Official video archives exist for September 30 and October 1. The testimony summarized here is sourced to the written records; it has not been checked against the complete recordings.
The correspondence archive is a published collection, not proof that it includes every document held by the committee or every exhibit discussed orally. Some PDFs are scanned and require page-level inspection. The underlying 2019 warning and every attachment referred to in the correspondence were not independently examined for this article. The cutoff date matters because corrections and additional testimony may change the available record.
Open questions
- What does the completed October 1 transcript add, particularly the remainder of Aukrust’s questioning and Eide’s session?
- Will proofreading materially alter any statement relied upon in the first-day record?
- What conclusions and recommendations will the committee adopt, and how will they relate to the independent commission’s later work?
- What records explain the decision not to share the 2019 warning with other oversight authorities, and what follow-up occurred in the United States?
- How were the weaknesses identified in the IPI audit and earlier external reviews tracked through later grant decisions?
- Do contemporaneous appointment and conflict-of-interest records support the retrospective accounts given at the hearings?
- What evidence establishes the effectiveness of newer controls, beyond the existence of manuals, training and reporting channels?
- Can original correspondence, calendars or other contemporaneous records resolve the disputed 2017 contact question raised with Brende?
- Which distinctions between development funding, foreign-policy influence and personal institutional roles will the committee recommend making clearer?
Sources
- Official case page: procedural status, committee, rapporteur and hearing links
- Official hearing scope: the five announced areas of inquiry
- September 30 programme and October 1 programme: scheduled participants and panels
- September 30 complete-page transcript: the published first-day exchanges; not yet proofread
- October 1 complete-page view of the available transcript: the progressively published second-day text; incomplete at cutoff
- September 30 video archive and October 1 video archive: official recordings for further verification
- Committee correspondence archive: 21 listed PDFs, including February 12 questions to Eide and February 12 questions to Støre
- Eide’s February 24 reply: ethics, security and grant-administration explanations
- Eide’s March 10 reply: the 2019 warning, external contacts and grant-recipient information
- Eide’s March 19 reply: Oslo-process archival material and its recovery
- Støre’s March 24 reply: government follow-up, training and the commission
- Eide’s April 16 reply: warning characterization and circulation, audit scope and later symposium payments
- Document 3:12 for 2020 to 2021: the Office of the Auditor General’s IPI grant investigation
- Innst. 167 S and March 1, 2022 plenary proceedings: the earlier parliamentary treatment of the audit
- EpsteinWiki’s Brende profile, International Peace Institute article and Rød-Larsen and Juul article: related background entries