Doe No. 6 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80994 (S.D. Fla. 2008)

UpdatedSeptember 9, 2026

ByEpsteinWiki

Doe No. 6 v. Epstein was a civil lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in September 2008. The plaintiff, identified publicly only as Jane Doe No. 6, alleged that Jeffrey Epstein sexually assaulted her at his Palm Beach residence in 2004, when she was approximately thirteen years old. She asserted Florida claims for sexual assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, along with a federal civil remedy claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 based on an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

The case generated a substantive pleading decision, extensive coordinated discovery, disputes involving survivor privacy and Epstein’s Fifth Amendment claims, and an unresolved summary judgment motion. United States District Judge Kenneth A. Marra refused to dismiss the challenged state and federal claims in February 2009. He required Doe No. 6 to identify more specifically the criminal conduct underlying her federal enticement theory. She filed an amended complaint doing so, and Epstein answered while invoking the Fifth Amendment and asserting numerous affirmative defenses.

Epstein moved for summary judgment on the federal count in May 2010. Before the court ruled, the parties reported that they had settled. Epstein withdrew the motion, and the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice. Judge Marra closed the case on June 25, 2010 while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. There was no trial, verdict, public damages award, or judicial finding that the alleged assault occurred.

Snapshot

Field	Information
Case	Jane Doe No. 6 v. Jeffrey Epstein
Case number	9:08-cv-80994-KAM
Court	United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Division	West Palm Beach Division
Complaint filed	September 10, 2008
Complaint entered on docket	September 11, 2008
Closed	June 25, 2010
Plaintiff	Jane Doe No. 6, proceeding under a pseudonym
Defendant	Jeffrey Epstein
Initial district judge	Daniel T. K. Hurley
District judge after transfer	Kenneth A. Marra
Magistrate judge	Linnea R. Johnson
Plaintiff’s counsel	Jeffrey Marc Herman, Stuart S. Mermelstein, and Adam D. Horowitz
Epstein’s principal civil counsel	Robert Deweese Critton Jr. and Michael James Pike, with Jack Alan Goldberger also appearing
United States amicus counsel	Assistant United States Attorney Ann Marie C. Villafana
Core allegation	Sexual assault at Epstein’s Palm Beach residence in 2004, when Doe No. 6 was approximately thirteen
Claims	Sexual assault and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; civil remedy under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 based on alleged coercion or enticement under 18 U.S.C. § 2422
Relief requested	More than $50 million, compensatory and punitive damages, statutory relief, attorney fees, costs, and a jury trial
Key pleading ruling	Counts I and III were not dismissed; a more definite statement was required for Count III
Later dispositive motion	Epstein moved for summary judgment on Count III in May 2010
Resolution	Settlement followed by dismissal with prejudice
Public settlement amount	Not established in the reviewed record
Trial or verdict	None
Docket	CourtListener docket

Key Takeaways

Doe No. 6 alleged that she was approximately thirteen when another girl recruited her to provide a paid massage at Epstein’s Palm Beach residence in 2004.
She alleged that Epstein sexually assaulted her during one encounter and paid her afterward.
The original complaint asserted two Florida tort claims and a federal civil remedy claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255.
Epstein moved to dismiss Count I and Count III or, alternatively, require more specific allegations. He did not target Count II in that motion.
Judge Marra denied dismissal of Count I and held that the complaint supplied enough factual notice under federal pleading rules.
Judge Marra also denied dismissal of Count III but required Doe No. 6 to specify whether she relied on alleged prostitution or another criminal offense and to identify the applicable offense.
The amended complaint cited Epstein’s 2008 Florida guilty pleas and listed Florida statutes that she alleged could have applied to the conduct involving her.
Epstein invoked the Fifth Amendment in his answer and asserted twenty affirmative defenses in the amended answer. Those were defense positions, not court findings.
Discovery in this case was coordinated with other Epstein survivor cases. Shared disputes included anonymity, intrusive sexual history requests, third party contacts, document production, and Epstein’s Fifth Amendment claims.
In May 2010, Epstein sought summary judgment only on the federal count. He relied in part on selected excerpts from Doe No. 6’s deposition and statutory arguments concerning the version of Section 2255 in effect in 2004.
The summary judgment motion was withdrawn after the parties reached a settlement. The court never ruled on it.
The settlement amount and private terms are not disclosed in the reviewed public filings.

Case Overview

Doe No. 6 was part of the first major group of pseudonymous federal civil actions filed against Epstein in South Florida during and after the resolution of his Palm Beach criminal case. Her suit was initially assigned to Judge Daniel T. K. Hurley. An October 7, 2008 transfer order, EFTA02742600, reassigned it to Judge Kenneth A. Marra, who was handling related Epstein cases. The matter was also referred to Magistrate Judge Linnea R. Johnson for discovery proceedings.

The action began as an individual lawsuit. In May 2009, the court consolidated it with related actions for discovery and common procedural matters, using Doe No. 2 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80119, as the lead docket. Consolidation did not merge Doe No. 6’s claims with those of other plaintiffs. Her complaint, answer, summary judgment motion, settlement, and final dismissal remained on her individual docket.

The most important individual rulings were Judge Marra’s February 12, 2009 pleading decision and the June 25, 2010 final dismissal. Coordinated discovery orders also affected the evidence available to the parties, but they must be distinguished from decisions on liability.

The Plaintiff and Her Privacy

The complaint used the name Jane Doe No. 6 to protect the plaintiff because the filing described alleged sexual assault and abuse of a minor. Later filings argued that public identification could expose the plaintiffs to psychological harm, unwanted disclosure, stigma, and retraumatization.

The public record establishes no basis for identifying Doe No. 6 by name. This article does not attempt to infer her identity from age, dates, workplaces, acquaintances, deposition excerpts, or other fragments in the docket. Details that could needlessly increase reidentification risk are omitted when they add little to understanding the legal record.

The number six was a litigation label. It does not establish that she was the sixth person harmed, the sixth person known to investigators, or the sixth person to file any Epstein related claim. It should not be combined with other numbered Doe cases to speculate about identity.

Background

Doe No. 6 filed her case shortly after Epstein entered Florida guilty pleas on June 30, 2008. The federal nonprosecution agreement between Epstein and the United States Attorney’s Office became part of later motion practice because Epstein argued that continuing civil discovery exposed him to potential federal prosecution if the government concluded that he had breached the agreement.

Doe No. 6 was not a party to that agreement. Her lawsuit sought civil remedies for alleged harm to her. It was not the Crime Victims’ Rights Act litigation challenging how federal prosecutors handled the agreement, although the two legal tracks shared historical context and involved some overlapping lawyers and victims’ rights issues.

The complaint alleged conduct in 2004. It therefore raised questions about which versions of federal statutes applied, whether a federal predicate offense could be established, and whether a plaintiff who had reached adulthood shortly before filing could use the earlier version of Section 2255. Those questions later became the focus of Epstein’s summary judgment motion, but they were never decided because the parties settled.

The Original Complaint

Doe No. 6 filed her original complaint, EFTA02742589, on September 10, 2008. The docket entered it on September 11. The pleading alleged that she was a Florida citizen and resident and that Epstein was a New York citizen and resident.

The complaint invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. It alleged that a substantial part of the relevant conduct occurred in the Southern District of Florida.

The pleading described the action as one for damages exceeding $50 million. It demanded a jury trial on all claims eligible for jury determination. These were requests by the plaintiff, not a court valuation or award.

Factual Allegations

According to the complaint, Doe No. 6 was approximately thirteen years old in 2004. It alleged that another girl recruited her to provide a massage for money at Epstein’s Palm Beach residence. Doe No. 6 alleged that she was brought to the property, taken upstairs to a room containing a massage table, and directed by Epstein to undress and give him a massage.

The complaint alleged that Epstein sexually assaulted her during the massage, engaged in sexual conduct in her presence, and paid her afterward. The original filing contains additional detail, but reproducing graphic allegations involving a person who was allegedly thirteen is unnecessary to understand the claims or rulings.

These statements were allegations in a civil complaint. Epstein disputed liability, and the case ended without a trial or factual verdict.

Alleged Recruitment Pattern

The complaint alleged that Doe No. 6’s experience occurred within a broader recruitment system. It claimed that young girls recruited other underage girls to provide massages for approximately $200 to $300 at Epstein’s Palm Beach residence.

The pleading further alleged that Epstein sought economically disadvantaged girls from western Palm Beach County because the offered money could be attractive and because he perceived them as less likely to report misconduct or be believed. As to Doe No. 6 specifically, the complaint alleged that another girl recruited her and that she understood the proposed activity to be a paid massage.

Later, Epstein relied on selected deposition testimony to argue that all communications before the visit occurred between Doe No. 6 and the other girl, not directly between Doe No. 6 and Epstein. That distinction formed part of his challenge to the federal enticement predicate. The court never resolved the competing legal implications of those facts.

Alleged Harm

Doe No. 6 alleged that the encounter caused confusion, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, and severe psychological and emotional injuries. Count I described the injuries as severe and permanent. Count II alleged continuing mental anguish and pain.

The complaint sought compensation for those alleged injuries and punitive damages on the state claims. It also sought remedies authorized by the federal civil statute. The record reviewed for this article contains no trial level damages assessment and no public settlement amount.

The allegations of harm should not be expanded beyond what Doe No. 6 placed in the public filings. Her private medical history, treatment, and later experiences are not necessary to document the litigation.

The Three Claims

The complaint presented three distinct legal theories arising from the same alleged encounter:

Count I alleged sexual assault and battery under Florida law.
Count II alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress under Florida law.
Count III sought the federal civil remedy provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2255 based on an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422.

The claims had different elements and potential defenses. Epstein’s first dismissal motion addressed Counts I and III. Count II was not challenged in that motion and remained pending.

Count I: Sexual Assault and Battery

Count I alleged that Epstein intentionally created a reasonable fear of imminent offensive sexual contact and intentionally inflicted harmful or offensive contact. It characterized the conduct as unlawful, willful, and malicious.

Epstein argued that the allegations were too general because the complaint did not describe the precise contact or statements in greater detail. Judge Marra rejected that position. He held that Doe No. 6 had supplied enough factual content to give Epstein fair notice of the claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.

The ruling allowed Count I to proceed into discovery. It did not find that an assault or battery occurred and did not award damages.

Count II: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Count II alleged that Epstein acted intentionally or recklessly and that alleged sexual abuse of a minor was extreme and outrageous. It further alleged that he knew or should have known the conduct would cause severe emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard of that probability.

The original dismissal motion did not seek dismissal of Count II. Judge Marra’s February 2009 opinion summarized the allegations but did not decide whether the count had been proved or whether later affirmative defenses applied.

The count remained unresolved when the case settled. No public merits judgment addressed it.

Count III: Federal Civil Remedy

Count III invoked 18 U.S.C. § 2255, which supplied a civil remedy for personal injuries caused by violations of specified federal criminal statutes. Doe No. 6 relied on 18 U.S.C. § 2422, the coercion and enticement statute.

The original complaint alleged that Epstein used a facility or means of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice her, while under eighteen, to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which a person could be criminally charged. It sought actual and compensatory damages, costs, attorney fees, and other relief available under Section 2255.

The civil count did not itself constitute a federal criminal prosecution. To prevail, however, Doe No. 6 would have needed to establish the elements of an enumerated federal predicate violation and resulting personal injury. The parties disagreed about the applicable statutory version and whether the facts could satisfy Section 2422(b).

The Demand for More Than $50 Million

The original and amended complaints described the action as seeking damages in excess of $50 million. The state counts requested compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and other relief. The federal count requested the remedies available under Section 2255, including attorney fees.

The figure was a demand in a pleading. It was not a verdict, judgment, neutral valuation, or documented settlement payment. Because the parties settled privately and the public stipulation contains no amount, the reviewed record does not establish what Doe No. 6 received.

Epstein’s Initial Motion to Dismiss

On October 14, 2008, Epstein filed a motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement, EFTA02742605. The motion targeted Count I and Count III under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(e).

For Count I, Epstein argued that the complaint used legal labels without specifying what he allegedly said or did, what created fear of imminent harm, or what contact constituted battery. For Count III, he argued that the complaint did not adequately identify whether it relied on subsection (a) or subsection (b) of Section 2422, the interstate commerce facts, or the underlying criminal conduct.

He asked the court to dismiss the two counts or require Doe No. 6 to provide greater detail. The motion was advocacy by the defense, not a judicial finding that the allegations were deficient.

Doe No. 6’s Opposition and the DOJ Letter

Doe No. 6 joined a response filed on behalf of Jane Does 2 through 7. The opposition, EFTA02742616, argued that the complaints satisfied federal notice pleading rules and that further specifics could be obtained through discovery.

The opposition also referred to a July 10, 2008 letter from Assistant United States Attorney Ann Marie C. Villafana. A copy of a related victim notification was filed as EFTA02742614. Judge Marra declined to consider the letter when deciding the motion because it was not referenced in or attached to the complaint. A court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ordinarily limits its review to the pleading and properly considered materials.

The redacted letter stated that the recipient was an individual whom the United States had been prepared to name as a victim of an offense enumerated in Section 2255. It also reproduced a nonprosecution agreement provision stating that identified victims would have the same rights to proceed under Section 2255 as if Epstein had been federally tried and convicted of an enumerated offense. The letter described the intended position as neither greater nor lesser than that counterfactual position. Because the name is redacted and the court excluded the letter from its pleading analysis, the document must be reported with both limitations intact.

Epstein filed a reply, EFTA02742627, maintaining that the allegations did not give enough detail to frame a response.

The February 12, 2009 Opinion

Judge Marra issued an Opinion and Order on Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement, EFTA02742643, on February 12, 2009. He granted the motion in part and denied it in part.

The court denied dismissal and a more definite statement for Count I. It also denied dismissal of Count III, but granted the request for a more definite statement limited to the ambiguity in the federal count. Doe No. 6 had to file another complaint clarifying whether she alleged prostitution or another criminal offense and identifying that offense.

The decision applied a pleading standard. The court accepted well pleaded allegations as true for purposes of the motion. It did not assess witness credibility or decide liability.

Why Count I Survived

The opinion distinguished assault from battery under Florida law and reviewed the elements of both torts. Judge Marra then rejected Epstein’s argument that the complaint needed heightened factual detail.

The court identified allegations that Epstein directed Doe No. 6 to remove clothing and provide a massage, sexually assaulted her, engaged in sexual conduct in her presence, and intentionally inflicted harmful or offensive contact. In the court’s view, those allegations gave fair notice of the claim and grounds supporting it.

The result was procedural. Count I survived the motion and could proceed. Survival at the pleading stage does not mean the claim was proved.

Why Count III Required Clarification

Judge Marra held that Count III sufficiently alleged use of a facility or means of interstate commerce. He stated that more detail about that element could be obtained through discovery.

The court nevertheless found paragraph 28 ambiguous because it did not make clear whether Doe No. 6 claimed that she had been enticed to engage in prostitution or another criminal sexual activity. If she relied on another offense, the complaint did not identify it. The court held that Epstein was entitled to enough specificity to prepare a responsive pleading.

The court denied dismissal and ordered a more definite statement. This outcome differed from dismissal with or without prejudice because the federal theory remained alive subject to clarification.

The Amended Complaint

Doe No. 6 filed an amended complaint, EFTA01104135, on February 27, 2009. A filing error briefly produced a mismatched entry, which counsel struck and corrected. The operative amended complaint preserved the three claims and the central factual allegations.

To answer the court’s direction, the amended Count III added that Epstein had entered Florida guilty pleas on June 30, 2008 for conduct allegedly involving the same plan or scheme. It identified provisions of Florida Statutes §§ 796.07, 798.02, and 800.04 that Doe No. 6 alleged could have supported criminal charges involving the conduct described in her case.

The amended pleading again demanded a jury trial and damages exceeding $50 million. Its statutory allegations remained claims by the plaintiff. The court did not issue a later merits ruling holding that any listed Florida offense had been committed against her.

Epstein’s Answer and Fifth Amendment Invocations

Epstein answered the amended complaint on April 2, 2009 and later filed a first amended answer and affirmative defenses, EFTA02743058, on June 10, 2009. The amended answer denied some allegations, stated that he lacked knowledge and denied others, and invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination in response to many paragraphs.

The answer argued that an invocation of the privilege should be treated as a specific denial. An invocation is not an admission. In civil litigation, courts may address the permissible consequences of silence in context, but the answer itself did not prove or disprove the underlying allegations.

The case settled before a jury could resolve the conflicting positions.

Epstein’s Affirmative Defenses

The amended answer asserted twenty numbered affirmative defenses. Among other positions, Epstein alleged actual consent, implied consent, and willing participation. He claimed that he reasonably believed or had been told that Doe No. 6 was eighteen and that she said she was eighteen or older. He disputed causation, invoked limitations, challenged punitive damages, and argued that Count I failed to state a claim.

For Count III, Epstein argued that Doe No. 6 could not prove a predicate act under Section 2255, that the version of the statute in effect in 2004 controlled, that the presumptive minimum would be $50,000 rather than the later $150,000 figure, and that later amendments could not be applied retroactively. He also raised due process, equal protection, vagueness, ex post facto, and rule of lenity arguments.

These defenses were Epstein’s legal and factual positions. They were not findings that Doe No. 6 consented, represented herself as an adult, lacked injury, or failed to satisfy federal law. She alleged that she was approximately thirteen. The court never adjudicated the defenses.

Epstein’s Motion to Stay the Civil Case

On March 25, 2009, Epstein filed a motion to stay or continue the action, EFTA02742684, until late 2010. He argued that the Florida criminal matter and the federal nonprosecution agreement created an ongoing risk of prosecution and forced him to choose between civil defense and the Fifth Amendment privilege.

The motion asserted that federal prosecutors had questioned whether his conduct in defending the civil cases complied with the agreement. Epstein contended that discovery responses could be used to allege a breach and asked the court to pause the civil actions until the agreement expired.

Doe No. 6 opposed the request. After discovery consolidation, the court terminated her individual stay motion and treated the issue through the lead case. The individual docket therefore should not be described as containing a ruling that accepted Epstein’s claims about the agreement.

The United States as Amicus

Judge Marra requested the United States’ position on the coordinated stay requests. Assistant United States Attorney Ann Marie C. Villafana entered an appearance as amicus on May 29, 2009.

In its response to the stay motions, EFTA02742956, the government opposed Epstein’s effort to halt the civil litigation. It argued, among other things, that the private plaintiffs were pursuing their own cases, that the litigation was not a government device for obtaining criminal discovery, and that protective measures could address particular problems if they arose.

The government’s filing was an amicus position, not evidence proving Doe No. 6’s allegations. Its significance lies in showing how the nonprosecution agreement affected the civil discovery dispute.

Consolidation for Discovery

On May 5, 2009, Doe No. 6 informed the court that she consented to discovery consolidation in a response to the order to show cause, EFTA02742819. Judge Marra entered an order on May 14 consolidating the related cases for discovery and common procedural filings.

The lead docket was Doe No. 2 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80119. After consolidation, discovery motions and procedural filings affecting multiple cases were supposed to be filed only there. The court repeatedly struck duplicate filings placed on each individual docket.

The arrangement explains why Doe No. 6’s docket contains filings captioned with several plaintiffs or later orders striking documents from her individual case. It did not combine the plaintiffs’ factual allegations or legal claims into one action.

Discovery Disputes

Before consolidation, Epstein moved to compel responses to document requests and interrogatories. The dispute included requests for extensive information about the plaintiffs’ sexual histories and the identities of other people allegedly involved in sexual conduct or misconduct.

Doe No. 6 and other plaintiffs argued that Federal Rule of Evidence 412 should inform the discovery process and that highly intrusive sexual history inquiries required a strong showing of relevance. Their joint opposition concerning interrogatories, EFTA02742825, emphasized privacy, the risk of embarrassment, and the limited relevance of sexual conduct involving third parties.

The consolidated discovery process also addressed Epstein’s Fifth Amendment objections to producing documents and answering questions. Some objections were sustained and others rejected based on the particular request. Those discovery rulings controlled access to evidence but did not determine liability.

Protection of Doe No. 6’s Identity

Epstein sought to require the pseudonymous plaintiffs to place their identities in the case captions and third party subpoenas. Doe No. 6 and the other plaintiffs opposed that request, arguing that disclosure would reveal alleged childhood sexual abuse to employers, acquaintances, and communities.

Their filings proposed alternatives for authenticating records and conducting discovery without publicly associating each plaintiff’s name with Epstein and the alleged abuse. They relied on declarations concerning psychological harm and the sensitive nature of the allegations.

The privacy dispute demonstrates that pseudonymity was not merely cosmetic. It affected subpoena practice, contacts with third parties, public access, and the risk that ordinary discovery could expose a survivor’s identity.

Doe No. 6’s Declaration About an Investigator

In July 2009, Jane Does 2 through 7 sought a protective order concerning contacts by investigators working for Epstein. The motion for protective order, EFTA02743136, alleged that investigators had contacted former employers, former partners, and other people to ask personal questions.

Doe No. 6 submitted a short declaration, EFTA02743135. She stated that an investigator had visited a former employer and asked personal questions about her. The filing argued that such contacts risked revealing her status as a plaintiff alleging childhood sexual abuse.

The declaration proves what Doe No. 6 reported under declaration. It does not, by itself, establish the investigator’s motive. The motion characterized the contacts as harassment and intimidation, but that characterization remained a party allegation. The individual filing was later struck because consolidated motions were required to appear only on the lead docket.

Fifth Amendment Discovery Rulings

In the coordinated cases, Epstein asserted the Fifth Amendment in response to interrogatories and requests for production. Magistrate Judge Johnson held that some questions could furnish a link in a chain of potential criminal evidence and allowed the privilege, while requiring responses or production for other requests.

The August 4, 2009 discovery decision appears in the EFTA collection beginning at EFTA01387837. It addressed categories including employee identification, transportation providers, telephone information, travel, surveillance material, and prescription medication records.

The ruling illustrates the practical effect of Epstein’s criminal exposure on civil fact gathering. It did not grant a blanket privilege over every subject, and it did not rule on whether Doe No. 6’s allegations were true.

Epstein’s Motion for Summary Judgment

On May 6, 2010, Epstein filed a thirty-three page motion for summary judgment, EFTA02743248, directed to Count III. Unlike the earlier dismissal motion, this filing relied on discovery materials, including selected pages from Doe No. 6’s February 2010 deposition.

Epstein asked the court to decide three principal issues in his favor. First, he argued that the version of Section 2255 in effect in 2004 applied. Second, he argued that Doe No. 6 could not prove a predicate violation of Section 2422 because the previsit communications occurred with another girl rather than with Epstein. Third, he argued that the earlier statutory language allowed only a person who was still a minor to file suit and that Doe No. 6 had reached eighteen shortly before filing.

He also argued that the earlier statute provided a $50,000 presumptive minimum rather than the $150,000 minimum adopted in 2006 and that applying the later language would be impermissibly retroactive.

These were arguments for judgment, not judicial conclusions. Doe No. 6 did not lose Count III on summary judgment because the motion was withdrawn before decision.

The Deposition Material Cited by Epstein

Epstein’s motion attached selected excerpts from Doe No. 6’s deposition and presented them as undisputed facts. According to the motion, she testified that she visited the Palm Beach residence once in August 2004, learned about the paid massage through other girls, and had no telephone, text, email, or computer communication directly with Epstein before the visit.

The defense used those excerpts to argue that Epstein himself had not used a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce her within the meaning of Section 2422(b). It also argued that there was no interstate travel theory under Section 2423.

Selected deposition excerpts are evidence cited by an advocate, not a complete neutral account of the testimony. The court did not rule on whether the excerpts established the absence of a predicate violation, whether agency or other legal theories applied, or whether factual disputes remained.

Statutory Version Dispute

Section 2255 changed in 2006. The earlier version referred to any minor who was a victim of an enumerated offense and provided a deemed minimum of $50,000. The 2006 amendment referred to any person who, while a minor, was a victim and increased the deemed minimum to $150,000.

Epstein argued that applying the amended language to alleged 2004 conduct would improperly increase liability and that the older text barred a suit filed after the plaintiff turned eighteen. His motion relied on statutory text, legislative history, retroactivity principles, and constitutional arguments.

The court did not decide those questions. The settlement prevents the motion from being cited as a ruling that the old statute controlled or that Doe No. 6 lacked a federal claim.

Settlement and Withdrawal of Summary Judgment Motion

On June 11, 2010, Epstein filed a notice of withdrawal, EFTA02743291. It stated that the parties had reached a settlement and that his summary judgment motion was therefore moot. The filing said Doe No. 6 agreed with the notice.

This document is important because it establishes that the dispositive motion ended through settlement, not adjudication. No response brief or judicial ruling resolved Epstein’s statutory and factual arguments.

The notice does not disclose the settlement amount or full terms. It should not be used to infer that either side conceded the merits.

Stipulation and Final Dismissal

On June 25, 2010, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, EFTA02743305. They agreed that each side would bear its own attorney fees and costs and that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.

Judge Marra entered a final order of dismissal with prejudice, EFTA02743307, the same day. He dismissed the action, denied pending motions as moot, retained enforcement jurisdiction, directed the clerk to close the case, and ended the litigation.

Dismissal with prejudice ordinarily prevents refiling the same action. It does not substitute for a verdict. The order contains no finding that the allegations were true or false and no damages determination.

What the Settlement Establishes

The public record establishes four limited facts about the resolution:

Doe No. 6 and Epstein reached a settlement.
Epstein withdrew his summary judgment motion as moot.
The parties agreed to dismissal with prejudice and to bear their own fees and costs.
The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.

The reviewed filings do not establish the payment amount, release language, confidentiality provisions, cooperation terms, or any admission or denial included in the private agreement. Those details should not be guessed or borrowed from another plaintiff’s settlement.

Procedural History

Date	Event	Direct record
September 10, 2008	Doe No. 6 filed the original complaint	EFTA02742589
October 7, 2008	Case transferred from Judge Hurley to Judge Marra	EFTA02742600
October 14, 2008	Epstein moved to dismiss Counts I and III or obtain a more definite statement	EFTA02742605
October 31, 2008	Doe plaintiffs opposed the dismissal motions	EFTA02742616
November 10, 2008	Epstein filed a reply	EFTA02742627
February 12, 2009	Court denied dismissal and required limited clarification of Count III	EFTA02742643
February 27, 2009	Doe No. 6 filed the operative amended complaint	EFTA01104135
March 25, 2009	Epstein moved to stay the case	EFTA02742684
April 2, 2009	Epstein answered and asserted affirmative defenses	EFTA02742771
May 5, 2009	Doe No. 6 consented to discovery consolidation	EFTA02742819
May 14, 2009	Court consolidated related actions for discovery and common procedure	Docket record reproduced in EFTA00226891
May 29, 2009	United States opposed the coordinated stay requests as amicus	EFTA02742956
June 10, 2009	Epstein filed an amended answer with twenty defenses	EFTA02743058
July 29, 2009	Doe No. 6 joined a protective order motion and filed a declaration concerning investigator contact	EFTA02743136 and EFTA02743135
August 4, 2009	Magistrate judge decided coordinated Fifth Amendment discovery issues	EFTA01387837
May 6, 2010	Epstein moved for summary judgment on Count III	EFTA02743248
June 11, 2010	Epstein withdrew the motion after settlement	EFTA02743291
June 25, 2010	Parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice	EFTA02743305
June 25, 2010	Court entered final dismissal and closed the case	EFTA02743307

Evidence Index

EFTA file	Document	What it establishes	Limitation
EFTA02742589	Original complaint	Initial allegations, claims, jurisdiction, requested relief	Pleading allegations, not findings
EFTA02742600	Transfer order	Reassignment from Judge Hurley to Judge Marra	Procedural only
EFTA02742605	Motion to dismiss	Epstein’s challenges to Counts I and III	Defense advocacy
EFTA02742614	DOJ victim notification exhibit	Contents of a government communication submitted with briefing	Court declined to consider the referenced letter for the pleading ruling
EFTA02742616	Joint opposition	Plaintiffs’ notice pleading arguments	Plaintiff advocacy
EFTA02742627	Epstein’s reply	Defense response supporting dismissal or clarification	Defense advocacy
EFTA02742643	February 2009 opinion	Count I survived; Count III survived but required clarification	Pleading ruling, not merits adjudication
EFTA01104135	Amended complaint	Clarified federal predicate allegations	Allegations remained disputed
EFTA02742684	Motion to stay	Epstein’s claims concerning the NPA and Fifth Amendment risk	Motion, not a ruling
EFTA02742771	Initial answer	Epstein’s responses and defenses	Later amended
EFTA02742819	Doe No. 6 response	Her consent to discovery consolidation	No liability finding
EFTA02742825	Opposition to compelled interrogatory answers	Plaintiffs’ objections to sexual history discovery	Advocacy concerning discovery
EFTA02742956	United States response	Government’s opposition to staying coordinated civil cases	Amicus position
EFTA02743058	Amended answer	Fifth Amendment invocations and twenty affirmative defenses	Defenses were not adjudicated
EFTA02743135	Doe No. 6 declaration	Her report of an investigator contacting a former employer	Does not independently prove motive
EFTA02743136	Protective order motion	Plaintiffs’ allegations about investigator contacts and privacy risk	Party allegations; individual copy later struck under consolidation rules
EFTA01387837	Coordinated discovery ruling	Particular Fifth Amendment objections sustained or rejected	Discovery ruling only
EFTA02743248	Summary judgment motion	Epstein’s federal statutory arguments and selected deposition evidence	Withdrawn without decision
EFTA02743291	Notice of withdrawal	Settlement reached and summary judgment motion withdrawn	No settlement terms
EFTA02743305	Stipulation of dismissal	Settlement, prejudice, fees, and retained jurisdiction	No amount or admission
EFTA02743307	Final order	Case closed with prejudice; pending motions moot	No merits findings

Allegations, Arguments, Rulings, and Resolution

Category	Proper characterization
Doe No. 6’s allegations	She was approximately thirteen; another girl recruited her for a paid massage; she was taken to Epstein’s Palm Beach residence; Epstein sexually assaulted her; the encounter caused serious psychological and emotional harm
Epstein’s factual positions	Consent or implied consent; a belief or representation that she was eighteen; other causes of injury; no direct electronic communication by Epstein before the visit
Epstein’s legal arguments	Counts were insufficient; discovery should be stayed; Fifth Amendment protections applied; the earlier Section 2255 controlled; no federal predicate could be proved; only a current minor could sue under the earlier text
Court rulings	Counts I and III were not dismissed; Count III needed limited clarification; related cases were consolidated for discovery; individual duplicate filings were redirected or struck; particular discovery objections were resolved
Matters never decided	Whether the assault occurred; liability on any count; validity of the twenty defenses; whether Count III survived summary judgment; damages; settlement amount
Final resolution	Private settlement and dismissal with prejudice

Keeping these categories separate prevents a motion from being mistaken for a finding and a settlement from being mistaken for a verdict.

Legal Significance

The February 2009 opinion is the clearest individual legal contribution of the case. It applied federal notice pleading principles to a complaint alleging childhood sexual assault and rejected Epstein’s demand for more graphic detail in Count I. The court held that the factual allegations already gave enough notice to proceed.

For Count III, the court drew a narrower line. It found the interstate commerce allegation sufficient at that stage, but required Doe No. 6 to identify the criminal sexual activity underlying the federal enticement theory. The ruling shows the difference between facts that may await discovery and information required to frame a responsive pleading.

The later summary judgment motion raised substantial questions about statutory retroactivity, the meaning of the pre 2006 word minor, and the connection required between a defendant and the use of interstate facilities. Because settlement prevented a decision, those questions are part of the case history but not precedent from this case.

Relationship to the Nonprosecution Agreement

The federal nonprosecution agreement entered the Doe No. 6 record through Epstein’s motion to stay and the United States’ amicus response. Epstein argued that the agreement left him exposed to prosecution if the government considered his conduct a breach. The government opposed using that possibility to pause private survivor litigation.

The agreement also mattered to the broader historical context because it contemplated civil remedies for identified victims while resolving federal charging exposure. Doe No. 6’s lawsuit nevertheless remained her own civil action. The court did not use this case to decide whether prosecutors violated victims’ rights when negotiating the agreement.

That issue was litigated separately in the Crime Victims’ Rights Act proceedings. Conflating the cases would overstate what Doe No. 6’s docket decided.

Relationship to Other Epstein Survivor Cases

Doe No. 6’s case was coordinated with Doe No. 2, Doe No. 3, Doe No. 4, Doe No. 5, Doe No. 7, C.M.A., and later filed actions. The group shared discovery disputes because the complaints alleged overlapping locations, personnel, recruitment practices, and patterns.

Doe No. 2’s docket became the administrative center for common discovery. This is why important rulings affecting Doe No. 6 may appear under a lead caption or a multi case caption rather than solely under No. 9:08-cv-80994.

Coordination does not mean evidence concerning one survivor automatically proves another survivor’s allegations. Each complaint and disposition must remain tied to the correct plaintiff and docket.

Fact Check

Claim: Doe No. 6 received a $50 million judgment.

False. She demanded more than $50 million. The case ended through settlement, and no public judgment awarded that amount.

Claim: Judge Marra dismissed Doe No. 6’s federal claim in February 2009.

False. He denied dismissal but required a more definite statement identifying the alleged criminal sexual activity supporting Count III.

Claim: The court ruled that Epstein assaulted Doe No. 6.

False. The pleading opinion accepted allegations as true only for deciding the motion. No factfinder decided liability.

Claim: Epstein won summary judgment on Count III.

False. He filed the motion, but withdrew it after settlement before the court ruled.

Claim: Epstein’s answer established that Doe No. 6 consented or said she was eighteen.

False. Those were affirmative defenses. Doe No. 6 alleged she was approximately thirteen, and the court never resolved the conflict.

Claim: The public record identifies Doe No. 6.

False. She proceeded under a pseudonym. Public fragments should not be assembled to reverse identify her.

Claim: Discovery consolidation merged all survivor cases into one lawsuit.

False. Consolidation governed shared discovery and procedure. Doe No. 6 retained her own case and settlement.

Claim: The settlement amount is public.

Not established. The stipulation confirms settlement but does not state an amount or attach the agreement.

Questions Still Unanswered

What were the financial and nonfinancial terms of the settlement?
Did the settlement include confidentiality, cooperation, enforcement, or release provisions not reflected in the public stipulation?
What complete evidence was obtained in discovery concerning Doe No. 6’s alleged 2004 encounter?
How would Doe No. 6 have answered Epstein’s summary judgment arguments if the motion had remained pending?
Would the court have applied the pre 2006 or post 2006 version of Section 2255?
Could the alleged recruitment through another girl satisfy Section 2422(b) under an agency, causation, attempt, or other theory?
How would the court have interpreted the older statute’s use of the word minor when the alleged conduct occurred during childhood but suit was filed shortly after adulthood?
What evidence existed regarding the relationship between the recruiter and Epstein?
What limits did the final consolidated protective orders place on investigator contacts and third party subpoenas?
Were any later settlement enforcement proceedings conducted privately or under seal?

The reviewed public record does not supply reliable answers. These gaps must remain identified as gaps rather than filled with inference.

Research and Source Limitations

This article relies primarily on court filings reproduced in the EFTA evidence collection and public docket metadata. Optical character recognition produces occasional errors in names, dates, section symbols, docket numbers, and captions. The analysis therefore prioritizes filing stamps, document numbers, court orders, and repeated docket information.

Some relevant discovery documents were filed under the lead case after consolidation. Their application to Doe No. 6 was verified through multi case captions and the consolidated docket, but shared orders should not be treated as findings unique to her.

The public EFTA record reviewed for this article does not contain the complete private settlement agreement or a settlement amount. A targeted search completed on September 9, 2026 did not locate a directly relevant and verifiable EpsteinWiki sleuth Substack article focused on Doe No. 6 or case 9:08-cv-80994. This does not prove that no such article exists.

Statutes have changed since 2008. The statutory descriptions here concern language quoted and argued in the historical case filings. This article is not legal advice about a current claim.

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PostedDecember 19, 2025

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