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Doe No. 3 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80232 (S.D. Fla. 2008)


Case Snapshot

FieldDetail
Full captionJane Doe No. 3 v. Jeffrey Epstein
CourtUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, West Palm Beach Division
Docket9:08-cv-80232-KAM
FiledMarch 5, 2008
District judgeKenneth A. Marra
Magistrate judgeLinnea R. Johnson
PlaintiffJane Doe No. 3, a survivor who alleged that Epstein sexually assaulted her when she was 16
DefendantJeffrey Epstein
JurisdictionDiversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, with a later federal claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2422
Principal claimsSexual assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and coercion or enticement to sexual activity
TrialNo trial occurred
DispositionSettled and dismissed with prejudice on June 25, 2010
Public settlement amountNot disclosed in the reviewed court filings

Key Takeaways

  • Jane Doe No. 3 alleged that she was 16 when she was recruited to provide a paid massage at Jeffrey Epstein’s Palm Beach residence and was sexually assaulted during that encounter.
  • She alleged that Epstein paid her $200 and also paid the person who brought her to the residence.
  • Judge Kenneth Marra refused to dismiss the sexual assault and battery claim. He also allowed the federal coercion and enticement theory to continue after requiring a more definite statement identifying the underlying alleged criminal conduct.
  • Doe filed a second amended complaint asserting sexual assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a civil claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 based on an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422.
  • The case was coordinated with numerous other Epstein survivor lawsuits for discovery and shared procedural motions. It was not converted into a class action, and Doe retained her individual case and claims.
  • Epstein moved for summary judgment in May 2010. The parties settled before the court decided that motion.
  • The action was dismissed with prejudice on June 25, 2010. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the confidential settlement.

Survivor Reading Note

This article discusses allegations of child sexual abuse, sexual assault, commercial sexual exploitation, and trauma. Jane Doe No. 3’s legal pseudonym is preserved. Personal information appearing in litigation papers is not repeated when it is unnecessary to understand the case.


Overview

Jane Doe No. 3 filed this federal civil lawsuit against Jeffrey Epstein on March 5, 2008. She alleged that Epstein sexually assaulted her at his Palm Beach residence when she was 16. The original complaint sought more than $50 million and pleaded Florida claims for sexual assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The litigation lasted more than two years. During that period, Doe amended her complaint, survived a significant motion to dismiss, participated in coordinated discovery with other survivors, and defended against multiple procedural and discovery motions. Epstein eventually moved for summary judgment against her federal claim. Before that motion was adjudicated, the parties reported that they had reached a settlement.

On June 25, 2010, the parties filed a stipulation dismissing the case with prejudice. Judge Marra entered a final order closing the action, denying pending motions as moot, and retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. The public dismissal papers did not reveal the amount or substantive terms.


Parties and Counsel

Jane Doe No. 3 was a Florida resident who sued under a pseudonym because the complaint concerned alleged sexual abuse while she was a minor. The pseudonym belongs to this docket and should not be assumed to identify the same person as a numbered Doe in another case.

Jeffrey Epstein was the sole defendant. Doe sued him personally for alleged conduct at his Palm Beach residence.

Doe was represented at different stages by attorneys associated with Herman & Mermelstein and later Mermelstein & Horowitz, including Jeffrey M. Herman, Stuart S. Mermelstein, and Adam D. Horowitz.

Epstein’s publicly listed counsel included Robert D. Critton Jr., Michael J. Pike, Jack Alan Goldberger, and other attorneys who appeared or withdrew during the litigation.


Allegations in the Complaint

The original complaint alleged that Epstein used wealth, influence, and payments to gain access to economically vulnerable teenage girls. Doe alleged that a recruiter offered girls money to provide massages at Epstein’s Palm Beach residence. The version released in the EFTA corpus redacts the recruiter’s identity, so this article does not attempt to reconstruct it.

According to Doe, the recruiter offered her money to massage Epstein and transported her to the residence. Doe alleged that she was taken upstairs to a room containing a massage table. She said Epstein entered wearing a towel, masturbated, and sexually assaulted her during the massage.

Doe alleged that Epstein paid her $200 after the encounter and also paid the recruiter. She described suffering trauma, shock, confusion, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, and lasting psychological and emotional injuries.

These were allegations. Epstein disputed liability, challenged the pleadings, pursued discovery, and later moved for summary judgment. Because the case settled, no jury determined the disputed facts.


Claims and Requested Relief

The original complaint contained two Florida tort claims:

  • sexual assault; and
  • intentional infliction of emotional distress.

After amendment, Doe pleaded three counts:

  • Sexual assault and battery. Doe alleged intentional and offensive sexual contact and apprehension of such contact.
  • Intentional infliction of emotional distress. She alleged that Epstein’s conduct toward a minor was intentional or reckless, extreme, and outrageous.
  • Coercion and enticement to sexual activity. She alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 and sought the civil remedy available under 18 U.S.C. § 2255.

The second amended complaint alleged that Epstein used a means or facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, or entice Doe, while she was under 18, to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which a person could be criminally charged. It identified possible underlying Florida offenses and referenced Epstein’s June 30, 2008 guilty pleas in Palm Beach County.

Doe sought compensatory damages, punitive damages on the state claims, costs, attorney fees under the federal statute, and other relief. She demanded a jury trial.


February 2009 Pleading Decision

On February 12, 2009, Judge Marra issued an opinion addressing Epstein’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint and request for a more definite statement.

For the sexual assault and battery count, Epstein argued that the complaint did not provide enough specific facts. Judge Marra rejected that argument. The court held that Doe had alleged enough facts to give Epstein fair notice of the claim and that further detail could be developed through discovery.

For the federal coercion and enticement count, the court again refused to dismiss the claim. It agreed, however, that the pleading needed to identify whether Doe relied on alleged prostitution or another criminal offense as the predicate conduct. Judge Marra directed her to provide a more definite statement.

The court also corrected a statutory citation. Doe’s amended complaint had mistakenly cited 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in its request for relief. The court struck that reference and substituted 18 U.S.C. § 2255.

This was not a finding that Epstein committed the alleged acts. It was a pleading decision determining which claims could continue and what additional information Doe had to provide.


Second Amended Complaint

Doe filed her second amended complaint on February 27, 2009. It retained the principal factual allegations and clarified the federal count as the court required.

The revised pleading alleged that Epstein could have been charged under specified provisions of Florida law, including statutes addressing prostitution related conduct and lewd or lascivious offenses. It also alleged that his conduct violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422 and that § 2255 supplied a civil remedy for the resulting injuries.

The second amended complaint remained an accusation requiring proof. Epstein answered and asserted defenses. The federal theory later became the subject of his summary judgment motion.


Coordinated Discovery With Related Cases

On May 14, 2009, Judge Marra coordinated this action with other Epstein survivor cases for discovery and procedural motions affecting multiple cases. The order designated Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80119, as the lead docket for shared filings.

The coordination order included Doe No. 3’s case and several other actions. It required common discovery motions to be filed only in the lead case, permitted case specific substantive motions to remain in each survivor’s individual docket, limited Epstein and common witnesses to one deposition each, and allowed documents relevant to multiple cases to be produced once.

The order was an administrative measure intended to reduce duplication. It did not merge the survivors, allegations, claims, settlements, or docket identities. Documents from the coordinated proceedings sometimes display several captions and docket numbers. Researchers should confirm which filing applies to which plaintiff before attributing facts.


Privacy and Court Access Disputes

The case involved competing privacy and public access concerns. Doe used a pseudonym to protect her identity as a person alleging childhood sexual abuse. Epstein sought information necessary to defend the case and filed motions concerning the use of Doe identities in captions and third party subpoenas. Related survivors opposed public disclosure and sought protective relief.

Separate disputes concerned Epstein’s requests to file information about the federal criminal matter and nonprosecution arrangement under seal. In July and August 2008, Judge Marra denied two sealing requests. The court emphasized the presumption that judicial records are public and found Epstein’s generalized confidentiality arguments insufficient, particularly because significant information about the plea arrangement had already entered the public record.

Those rulings concerned Epstein’s proposed sealed submissions. They should not be read as authorization to expose a survivor’s identity. This article preserves Doe No. 3’s pseudonym.


Epstein’s Summary Judgment Motion

In May 2010, Epstein asked for summary judgment on the federal § 2255 claim. His motion argued that the version of § 2255 in force when the alleged conduct occurred should govern. He further argued that Doe could not establish a predicate violation of § 2422 and that the older version of § 2255 allowed only a minor, rather than an adult survivor suing later, to file the claim.

The motion also relied on Epstein’s characterization of Doe’s deposition testimony and other discovery. Those descriptions were advocacy by the defense. They were not findings by the court and should not be treated as established facts.

The parties settled before briefing produced a merits ruling. On June 11, 2010, Epstein filed an agreed notice stating that the settlement made the summary judgment motion moot. Judge Marra ultimately denied all pending motions as moot when the case was dismissed.


Settlement and Dismissal

The June 11, 2010 notice expressly stated that the parties had reached a settlement. On June 25, they filed a stipulation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) dismissing the action with prejudice. Each party agreed to bear its own attorney fees and costs.

Judge Marra entered the final dismissal order the same day. The order:

  • dismissed the action with prejudice;
  • denied all pending motions as moot;
  • retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement; and
  • directed the clerk to close the case.

Dismissal with prejudice ended Doe No. 3’s claims in this action and prevents the same dismissed claims from being refiled. It did not constitute a trial verdict or judicial finding about the truth or falsity of the underlying allegations. The public filings reviewed for this article do not disclose the settlement amount, payment schedule, release language, confidentiality provisions, or other substantive terms.


Procedural Timeline

DateEvent
March 5, 2008Doe No. 3 filed her original complaint against Epstein.
May to August 2008The parties litigated service, default, sealing, and a requested stay connected to Epstein’s criminal proceedings.
July 25, 2008Judge Marra denied Doe’s request for entry of default because service had not been completed under the applicable rules and gave her additional time to serve Epstein.
September 22, 2008Doe filed an amended complaint.
September 29, 2008The court entered a scheduling order, referred discovery matters to Magistrate Judge Johnson, and referred the case to mediation.
October 6, 2008Epstein moved to dismiss portions of the amended complaint and requested a more definite statement.
February 12, 2009Judge Marra denied dismissal of the challenged claims but required clarification of the federal count and corrected the § 2255 citation.
February 27, 2009Doe filed her second amended complaint.
April 2, 2009Epstein filed an answer and affirmative defenses.
May 14, 2009The court coordinated discovery and common procedural motions with related Epstein survivor cases.
2009 to 2010The parties conducted extensive discovery and litigated motions involving documents, interrogatories, depositions, protective relief, and third party witnesses.
May 6, 2010Epstein filed a motion for summary judgment directed to the federal count.
June 11, 2010Epstein filed an agreed notice stating that the parties had settled and the summary judgment motion was moot.
June 25, 2010The parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice, and Judge Marra entered the final dismissal order.

Evidence and Filing Index


Legal Significance

The February 2009 opinion is the most significant merits related ruling in this docket. Judge Marra held that the sexual assault and battery allegations satisfied federal notice pleading requirements. He also declined to dismiss the § 2422 theory, while requiring Doe to identify the alleged predicate criminal conduct more clearly.

The case also documents the court’s effort to manage a large group of individual Epstein survivor suits through coordinated discovery. The order reduced repeated depositions and document production while preserving each survivor’s separate case and substantive motions.

The sealing decisions are relevant to the history of the Epstein criminal resolution. Judge Marra rejected attempts to keep related information from public view when the proponent failed to overcome the presumption of access. At the same time, Doe’s identity remained protected through her pseudonym.

The settlement prevented a ruling on Epstein’s summary judgment arguments. Researchers must not describe those arguments as accepted law or resolved facts.


Fact Check

Checked September 10, 2026. The available docket materials identify the case as Doe No. 3 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80232-KAM, filed March 5, 2008, in the Southern District of Florida. They show a settlement followed by dismissal with prejudice on June 25, 2010.

This case is distinct from:

  • Doe No. 2 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80119;
  • Doe No. 4 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80380;
  • Doe No. 5 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80381;
  • Doe No. 6 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80994; and
  • the later cases involving Doe Nos. 101, 102, and 103.

The May 2009 order coordinated discovery. It did not make the cases interchangeable. Doe numbers, allegations, documents, and settlement histories should remain attached to their exact docket numbers.


Questions Still Unanswered

  • What financial amount and nonfinancial terms were included in the settlement?
  • Did the agreement contain confidentiality, nondisparagement, cooperation, or document preservation provisions?
  • Which evidence developed during discovery would have been admitted at trial?
  • How would the court have resolved Epstein’s summary judgment arguments concerning §§ 2255 and 2422?
  • What records were produced through the coordinated discovery process but never filed publicly?
  • Did the settlement restrict later use of testimony or evidence in other Epstein proceedings?

Limitations

This article relies principally on the court filings preserved in the EFTA corpus and the public federal docket history. Some documents contain redactions, sealed material, incomplete optical character recognition, or filings copied across coordinated dockets.

The complaints state Doe’s allegations. Epstein’s motions state his defense positions. Neither should be mistaken for a trial finding. The case settled before the summary judgment motion was adjudicated, and the substantive settlement agreement is not included in the reviewed public record.

No article devoted specifically to docket 9:08-cv-80232 was located among the identified EpsteinWiki sleuth Substack sources during the source check. No unrelated Substack article has been added as filler.


Related EpsteinWiki Pages


Sources

Previous Doe No. 2 v. Epstein, No. 08-cv-80119 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
Next Doe No. 4 v. Epstein, No. 08-cv-80380 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
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