Michael Thomas

Snapshot
Michael Albert Thomas was the Bureau of Prisons employee who entered Jeffrey Epstein’s locked cell during breakfast delivery on August 10, 2019, found him hanging and began chest compressions. Hours earlier, Thomas and correctional officer Tova Noel had failed to conduct required inmate checks. Their paperwork nevertheless said those checks had occurred.
Thomas’s deferred prosecution agreement contains his admission that he knowingly and willfully completed materially false count and round slips. He was not convicted in this case. After he satisfied the agreement’s conditions, the court dismissed the charges on January 3, 2022.
His story connects two different questions: how prison staff failed to protect and monitor an inmate, and what the evidence establishes about that inmate’s death. The admitted record falsification is clear. It does not establish that Thomas killed Epstein, accepted a payment to harm him or helped another person enter his cell.
- Full name: Michael Albert Thomas, also identified in records as Michael Thomas and M. Thomas.
- Employer: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York.
- Regular position: Materials handler supervisor. He also worked overtime assignments supervising inmates.
- Relevant shift: Midnight to 8 a.m. on August 10, 2019, in the Special Housing Unit.
- Earlier involvement: Responded to Epstein’s July 23 emergency and subsequently observed him on suicide watch.
- Criminal case: United States v. Noel and Thomas, case 1:19 cr 00830, before Judge Analisa Torres.
- Charges against Thomas: One conspiracy count and three counts of making false records.
- Disposition: Deferred prosecution, documented compliance and dismissal. No trial verdict or conviction.
- Identity distinction: This article concerns the MCC employee. Records about other people named Michael Thomas should not be merged into his biography.
- Coverage date: October 11, 2026.
Key takeaways
- Thomas’s involvement extends beyond being named in a released file. It includes a signed incident memorandum, a lengthy sworn interview, a criminal indictment and a written admission.
- His regular assignment involved prison supplies, laundry and commissary work. He had correctional training and substantial experience working in the Special Housing Unit.
- He had already encountered Epstein during the July 23 emergency. He therefore knew Epstein had been placed on suicide watch before the fatal night.
- The midnight, 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. counts were not performed. Signed forms created the appearance that inmates had been checked.
- The more than 75 false round entries identified by prosecutors were attributed to Noel. Thomas separately admitted his own knowing falsification.
- Thomas acknowledged dozing off. His account did not establish the exact duration of his sleep.
- The employee documented as working 24 hours straight on August 9 was a different materials handler. The OIG report identifies Thomas as the employee who replaced him at midnight.
- Thomas’s emergency response does not erase his earlier duty failures. His earlier duty failures do not establish a homicide.
- The agreement required truthful cooperation and 100 documented hours of community service. It preserved the government’s ability to impose employment discipline.
- Newer phone records, inmate allegations and congressional testimony require separate evaluation. A claim appearing in an investigative file is not automatically a verified finding.
Why Michael Thomas matters
Thomas stood at the point where a prison’s paperwork and its actual supervision diverged. The forms represented that the Special Housing Unit was secure and its inmates accounted for. The required observations had not taken place.
When breakfast arrived, that gap became a medical emergency. Thomas was the person who opened Epstein’s cell and attempted resuscitation. His conduct before the discovery and his observations during it became central evidence.
Epstein’s death ended the possibility of trying him on the pending federal trafficking charges. The prison failures therefore affected more than one inmate’s safety. They also deprived survivors of the opportunity to see that prosecution reach a verdict.
His background and prison position
Thomas’s June 17, 2021 sworn OIG statement supplies his own account of his background. On transcript pages 10 through 14, he said he served on active duty in the Army from 1998 to 2006, briefly worked in a Target stockroom and entered Bureau of Prisons service on April 1, 2007.
He said his entire BOP career had been at MCC New York. He described holding correctional officer and materials handler positions and attending correctional officer training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in November 2007.
The indictment states that he began working as a materials handler supervisor around 2013 while continuing to take overtime correctional assignments. The distinction explains why reports alternately call him a guard, an officer and a materials handler.
The internal affairs referral identifies him as Michael Albert Thomas and gives his position as Materials Handler Supervisor, WS 04. A handwritten referral uses Material Handler Foreman. These are descriptions within the same administrative package, rather than evidence of separate people.
His position was outside the regular SHU staffing structure, but he was familiar with its work. The OIG reviewed a schedule showing 21 morning watch SHU assignments from May through August 2019, including 12 overtime shifts while Epstein was housed there in July and August.
What the Special Housing Unit required
The charging document’s description of MCC procedures explains the difference between an institutional count and an observation round. A count required two employees to physically observe and count inmates. An observation round required staff to check that inmates were present and alive.
Scheduled weekday counts occurred at 4 p.m., 10 p.m., midnight, 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. Count slips recorded the time, the number of inmates and the employees’ signatures. The Control Center compared the slips with the prison’s roster before clearing the institutional count.
SHU rounds were required at least twice an hour. Staff had to visit the tiers and observe the inmates, then record the checks. A matching head count on paper could not substitute for looking into the cells.
These duties were basic safety measures. They were especially significant for an inmate who had recently undergone suicide watch and psychological observation.
The July 23 emergency
Thomas’s July 23 memorandum, found on PDF page 521 and bearing the page identifier EFTA00049483, places him at Epstein’s earlier emergency. He wrote that the Control Center called for assistance at approximately 1:27 a.m.
On arriving at the SHU, he found Epstein on the floor of his cell in handcuffs. Thomas said he helped carry Epstein on a stretcher to the health services area, where Epstein was put in a suicide smock and placed under staff observation.
His later sworn interview, particularly pages 43 through 56, adds that he watched Epstein for approximately six or seven hours and spoke with him. Thomas said he was not the first employee to reach the original scene.
This is an important limit. He witnessed the response and subsequent observation. He did not claim to have witnessed the event that caused Epstein’s injuries.
What Epstein told Thomas about his cellmate
The July 23 discussion in Thomas’s interview records his recollection that Epstein said his cellmate, Nicholas Tartaglione, had tried to hurt or beat him. Thomas repeatedly said he could not recall the exact details.
Thomas said he did not believe the account, but also acknowledged that he did not know what had happened. He recalled that the allegation was known to a lieutenant.
The final OIG report describes conflicting accounts of the July 23 incident. Epstein initially suggested his cellmate had tried to kill him, later said he did not know what occurred and subsequently asked to be housed with the same cellmate. A disciplinary allegation of self mutilation was not sustained because the evidence was insufficient.
The incident led to suicide precautions. It should still be described with its evidentiary limits. Thomas’s recollection of Epstein’s statement does not prove that Tartaglione assaulted him.
Suicide watch, psychological observation and the cellmate requirement
The OIG’s final chronology states that Epstein was removed from suicide watch on July 24 and remained under psychological observation until July 30. These were different monitoring classifications.
Afterward, the Psychology Department directed that Epstein have an appropriate cellmate. On July 30, it communicated that requirement in an email sent to more than 70 MCC employees.
Thomas’s interview distinguishes his general knowledge from specific instructions. He knew inmates returning from suicide watch or psychological observation should have a cellmate. He said he did not remember anyone personally telling him that Epstein required one.
On August 9, Epstein’s cellmate was transferred to another institution. No replacement was assigned. The OIG identified failures across several staff and supervisory roles in communicating and carrying out the replacement requirement.
Thomas’s responsibility for overnight supervision should not be confused with the separate clinical decision to end suicide watch or the earlier management decisions about cell assignments.
Thomas’s actual overnight assignment
The indictment’s staffing account places Thomas on duty in the SHU from midnight to 8 a.m. on August 10. Noel had already been working there from 4 p.m. on August 9 and continued into an overnight overtime shift.
The indictment also states that Thomas did not work his regular shift on August 8 or August 9. He had worked an overtime SHU shift from midnight to 8 a.m. on August 9, then returned for the following night’s shift.
The August 10 daily assignment roster, on PDF page 969 and marked EFTA00049931, places Thomas on SHU post 2 and Noel on SHU post 1 during the midnight to 8 a.m. period. The roster marks Thomas’s assignment as overtime.
This establishes the relevant duty period. It does not establish that Thomas had been continuously working for the preceding 24 hours.
The 24 hour shift distinction
The OIG report’s staffing findings describe another materials handler who worked three consecutive shifts on August 9. That employee worked a midnight overtime assignment, a regular warehouse shift and an evening SHU assignment ending at midnight.
Thomas replaced that employee at midnight. They were different members of staff.
Noel’s May 2026 congressional interview identifies a different colleague as the person working a triple shift. On pages 39 and 40, she distinguishes that colleague from Thomas. The OIG report likewise distinguishes the material handler who worked 24 hours straight from Thomas, who replaced him at midnight.
Thomas and his lawyer described substantial overtime and fatigue. Those accounts support examining workload. They do not establish that Thomas personally worked a continuous triple shift before discovering Epstein.
The missed counts and false paperwork
Thomas’s sworn admissions on transcript pages 151 through 164 confirm that no SHU counts or rounds were conducted during his shift before Epstein was discovered. He acknowledged that the midnight, 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. counts did not occur.
The Control Center nevertheless cleared those institutional counts at approximately 12:49 a.m., 3:24 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. The signed slips conveyed that the SHU’s inmates had been accounted for.
There was also a numerical discrepancy. The midnight SHU slip listed 73 inmates, while later slips listed 72. Thomas could not explain the discrepancy or recall the relevant conversation about correcting the count.
The central failure was not limited to the numerical mismatch. Even a correct total could not establish that employees had physically observed the inmates. Thomas acknowledged knowing that his certifications were false.
Counts attributed to each defendant
The indictment charged six counts across the two defendants. Thomas was charged in four of them. The two earlier evening counts were charged to Noel alone.
| Scheduled count | Defendants charged | Thomas’s position |
|---|---|---|
| 4 p.m. on August 9 | Noel | Thomas was not assigned to this shift. |
| 10 p.m. on August 9 | Noel | Thomas’s overnight assignment had not started. |
| Midnight on August 10 | Noel and Thomas | One of Thomas’s three false record counts. |
| 3 a.m. on August 10 | Noel and Thomas | One of Thomas’s three false record counts. |
| 5 a.m. on August 10 | Noel and Thomas | One of Thomas’s three false record counts. |
The distinction prevents an inaccurate claim that Thomas was charged with every falsified count from 4 p.m. onward. His relevant assignment began at midnight.
The more than 75 false round entries
The OIG report attributes more than 75 false entries on the overnight round sheets to Noel. The entries represented that checks had occurred across the SHU’s tiers.
Thomas’s examination of those sheets, on transcript pages 154 through 156, records his identification of Noel’s initials. He said the signatures were not his, while acknowledging that both employees were responsible for conducting the rounds.
His later written agreement contains a broader admission concerning materially false count and round slips. That admission should be reported alongside the more specific evidence identifying who initialed the individual round entries.
It is inaccurate to present all 75 entries as 75 signatures made by Thomas. It is equally inaccurate to use Noel’s initials to erase Thomas’s own admitted conduct.
Sleeping and internet use
Thomas’s sworn statement on pages 195 through 200 acknowledges that he dozed off during the shift. He could not specify how long he slept. He said he did not know whether Noel slept and understood that sleeping at work was unauthorized.
The indictment alleged that both employees appeared to sleep for approximately two hours. It also alleged that Thomas briefly used the computer around 1 a.m., 4 a.m. and 6 a.m. to look at motorcycle sales and sports news.
The final OIG report supported its findings through video analysis, computer activity, records and interviews. Its conclusion was that required supervision had not occurred.
Computer use and sleep are relevant because they occupied time when inmates should have been checked. They do not identify the exact time Epstein died or establish Thomas’s knowledge of his condition before breakfast.
Other staff movements during the night
The OIG’s reconstruction identifies a supervisory visit to the SHU common area around 4 a.m. It also describes a brief visit by an officer from the adjacent 10 South Unit around 5:30 a.m., when Thomas relieved that officer.
Those movements did not amount to the required observations of Epstein’s tier. The distinction between entering the common area and checking individual cells is essential to reading the video timeline.
Describing the night as one in which nobody entered any part of the SHU is too broad. The investigative finding concerned the absence of required checks and the lack of observed entry to Epstein’s tier during the relevant interval.
The discovery during breakfast delivery
The OIG’s account of the discovery places the start of breakfast delivery around 6:30 a.m. Noel opened the tier entrance. Thomas approached Epstein’s cell with food.
Thomas said he knocked, called for Epstein to come to the door and received no response. He then unlocked the cell and entered. He described finding Epstein suspended from the upper bunk by material around his neck.
His detailed interview records that he separated the material from its attachment, lowered Epstein to the floor and started chest compressions. He called for assistance, while Noel activated the body alarm.
The contemporaneous operations lieutenant memorandum, on page 4 of the referral package, records arriving to find Thomas performing CPR. Other responding staff then took over.
What Thomas’s medical response establishes
Thomas’s account of resuscitation states that he did not first check for a pulse and did not administer rescue breaths. He began chest compressions because Epstein was unresponsive and he did not believe he was breathing.
He said he could not determine whether Epstein was already dead when he entered. Medical personnel later used an automated external defibrillator and continued the emergency response.
Thomas’s description of Epstein’s appearance was an observation by a prison employee. It was not a medical finding about the time of death. It should not be used to establish that Epstein was alive, recently dead or dead for a particular number of hours.
The OIG found the employees’ reactions to the discovery consistent with their not knowing of harm to Epstein before Thomas entered the cell. That is an investigative assessment of the response, rather than a clinical opinion by Thomas.
Statements made immediately afterward
The August 10 lieutenant memorandum attributes admissions about missed checks to both employees. It records Thomas acknowledging that they had failed to perform rounds and taking responsibility.
The indictment later included the same general account. Thomas’s lawyer also relied on his immediate acknowledgment when seeking a deferred prosecution agreement.
Thomas’s 2021 interview shows that he did not recall all of the words attributed to him during the emergency. His later formal admission nevertheless established that he accepted responsibility for knowingly false records.
Statements about having failed to perform rounds should be read in that context. They are not admissions that he murdered Epstein.
Video evidence and its limits
The final OIG report describes a recording system failure beginning on July 29. Staff discovered the problem on August 8, but it was not repaired before Epstein’s death. Cameras could still transmit live images even when their feeds were not being recorded.
The surviving SHU common area footage showed portions of the access routes to the tiers. It did not show Epstein’s cell door or the interior of his cell.
The OIG reported no observed approach to Epstein’s tier from the common area between approximately 10:40 p.m. and 6:30 a.m. It also considered inmate interviews, locked access points and the response to the discovery.
The recording failures substantially limited the available evidence. They do not establish that Thomas disabled cameras, deleted footage or arranged the malfunction. The reviewed primary records do not support attributing those acts to him.
The internal affairs referral
The BOP administrative package contains a referral describing the August 10 incident and an August 12 transmission to the OIG. Its matter number is OIA 2019 05324.
The package lists inattention to duty, failure to follow policy and endangering an inmate’s safety. The last description appears with the administrative subcategory code 062A.
That administrative label is not a separate criminal homicide charge. The package classifies the matter as administrative and records allegations at the opening of the investigation.
Fields showing no arrest or conviction at that stage do not describe the eventual case outcome. The federal indictment came months later, and the dismissal came more than two years later.
The November 2019 indictment
The Justice Department’s November 19 announcement states that Thomas and Noel surrendered that morning. The case was assigned to Judge Analisa Torres in the Southern District of New York.
Thomas faced one conspiracy count under 18 U.S.C. section 371 and three false record counts under section 1001. Each count carried a statutory maximum of five years. A statutory maximum is not an actual sentence.
The charged conspiracy concerned false records and interference with the MCC’s lawful functions. It was not a charge of conspiring to kill Epstein.
The indictment itself was an accusation. No trial tested every allegation or produced a verdict. The later agreement provides the separate basis for reporting Thomas’s admitted falsification as established conduct.
The defense account and request for leniency
A letter from Thomas’s lawyer, Montell Figgins, sought deferred prosecution and described heavy overtime, financial pressure, military service and the personal consequences of the prosecution.
The lawyer argued that Thomas had worked excessive shifts without adequate rest, and that MCC’s staffing culture encouraged such work.
Sources
- Archive citation EFTA00009786
- Archive citation EFTA00113577
- Archive citation EFTA00009747
- Archive citation EFTA00173658
- Archive citation EFTA00048963
- Archive citation EFTA00039025
- House Oversight: Tova Noel interview transcript
- DOJ Office of the Inspector General: report 23-085
- U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY: November 19, 2019 charging announcement
- Archive citation EFTA00032687