Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani (“HBJ”)

UpdatedSeptember 7, 2026

ByEpsteinWiki

Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani (“HBJ”)

Snapshot

Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, commonly known as HBJ, is a Qatari royal, former prime minister, former foreign minister, diplomat, and international investor.

HBJ served as Qatar’s foreign minister from 1992 until 2013 and as prime minister from April 2007 until June 2013. He also held senior responsibilities connected with the Qatar Investment Authority and helped direct Qatar’s rise as an influential diplomatic and investment power.

Released Jeffrey Epstein records document several points of contact involving HBJ after Epstein’s 2008 Florida conviction. The public material includes a proposed sale of Epstein’s Manhattan residence in 2012, an appointment in Doha that Epstein canceled in 2016, discussions during the 2017 blockade of Qatar, real estate communications, a reported meeting between Epstein and HBJ in 2018, and a completed meeting between HBJ and former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak that Epstein helped arrange.

Much of the communication passed through intermediaries, particularly Tom Barrack, Qatari businessman and royal family member Jabor Yousef Jassim Al Thani, former Kuwaiti minister Anas al Rasheed, Ehud Barak, and Steve Bannon.

The documents show that Epstein treated HBJ as an influential political and financial contact. They also show Epstein attempting to use access to HBJ in diplomacy, business, and elite networking.

The presently available evidence does not establish that HBJ participated in Epstein’s sexual abuse or trafficking operation. No survivor allegation, criminal charge, or judicial finding reviewed for this article identifies HBJ as a participant in Epstein’s sexual crimes.

Identity and Name Confusion

Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani was born in Doha in 1959 and belongs to Qatar’s ruling Al Thani family.

The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs biography identifies him as the fifth son of Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani. His paternal grandfather, Jaber bin Mohammed Al Thani, was a younger brother of Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani, a founder of modern Qatar.

HBJ should not be confused with Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the former emir of Qatar who ruled from 1995 until 2013. The two men governed together, but they were different people.

He should also not be confused with Qatar’s current prime minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, or with Jabor Yousef Jassim Al Thani, who appears repeatedly as an intermediary in Epstein’s correspondence.

Released documents use several spellings, including Hamad bin Jassim, Hamad bin Jassem, Sheikh Hamad, and HBJ. A document containing only the name “Hamad” requires contextual evidence before it can be attributed to HBJ.

Government Career

HBJ entered public service in the 1980s and became minister of municipal affairs and agriculture in 1989.

He was appointed foreign minister on September 1, 1992. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs records that he retained the position through several cabinet formations and became first deputy prime minister in 2003.

HBJ became prime minister on April 3, 2007, while continuing to serve as foreign minister. He left both offices during the 2013 transfer of power to Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

Reuters reporting on HBJ’s departure from government described him as one of the principal architects of Qatar’s emergence as a diplomatic, investment, and media power.

His work included mediation involving Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, the Palestinian territories, and other regional conflicts. Qatar simultaneously maintained relationships with the United States, Iran, Hamas, Israel, and other actors whose interests often conflicted.

This background helps explain why Epstein considered HBJ potentially valuable. HBJ combined diplomatic experience, access to sovereign investment networks, relationships across the Middle East, and substantial personal wealth.

Qatar Investment Authority and International Business

HBJ held senior positions connected with the Qatar Investment Authority and other state investment bodies.

The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists profile describes him as simultaneously serving as prime minister, foreign minister, and head of the Qatar Investment Authority during part of his government career.

Under Qatari leadership, the sovereign investment system acquired major international assets and interests, including Harrods, hotels, financial institutions, London property, and corporate holdings.

HBJ also developed substantial private business and real estate interests. Reuters reported that he possessed personal interests in Qatari companies and in Project Grande, a developer associated with London’s One Hyde Park.

The distinction between HBJ’s former government authority, sovereign investment responsibilities, and private investments is important. A document involving HBJ does not automatically establish that Qatar or the Qatar Investment Authority participated in the activity.

Why HBJ Mattered to Epstein

Epstein cultivated former heads of government, diplomats, investors, political advisers, and royal family members.

HBJ occupied several of those categories. He had served as a head of government, directed Qatari diplomacy for more than two decades, possessed extensive international investments, and retained influential relationships after leaving office.

The records suggest that Epstein viewed access to HBJ as useful in at least three areas:

International real estate
Middle Eastern diplomacy
Introductions involving political and security figures

The surviving correspondence does not establish that HBJ regarded Epstein as equally important. Much of the available evidence consists of Epstein describing HBJ to other people or attempting to arrange meetings through intermediaries.

The 2012 Manhattan Mansion Proposal

In January 2012, investor Tom Barrack approached Epstein about a possible sale of Epstein’s Manhattan residence to HBJ, who was then prime minister of Qatar.

The opening exchange appears in EFTA02037078. Barrack told Epstein that he had an idea and wanted to speak with him. Subsequent messages concerned bringing HBJ to inspect the property.

According to a CBS News investigation of Barrack’s Epstein correspondence, Epstein and Barrack arranged for HBJ and Barrack to visit the residence.

The proposed transaction was significant because Epstein’s East 71st Street property was one of Manhattan’s largest private residences. It was also closely associated with Epstein’s social and criminal history.

The documents establish that Epstein and Barrack considered HBJ a prospective buyer. They do not establish that HBJ knew how Epstein had used the property or understood its connection to Epstein’s abuse.

Epstein’s Instructions Before the Visit

Before the proposed viewing, Epstein directed his staff to alter the appearance of the residence.

In EFTA00529542, Epstein instructed staff to remove nude photographs from a wall before the visitors arrived.

A related message, EFTA01844096, contains Epstein’s instruction that a staff member wear heels. It also contains an obscure reference to Barrack and a person named Sarah.

These were Epstein’s instructions. The records do not show that HBJ requested the removal of the photographs, asked a staff member to dress in a particular manner, or knew that Epstein had issued the directions.

The distinction matters because the messages reveal Epstein managing the impression presented to a powerful visitor. They do not attribute Epstein’s conduct to the visitor.

Whether HBJ Viewed the Property

The original visit was delayed and reportedly canceled.

A later Barrack message preserved in EFTA00665866 told Epstein that HBJ had seen the house and liked it but considered it short of bedrooms.

Epstein responded that several rooms had been converted into a gym, office, and music space. Barrack said HBJ had promised to inspect the property again when his schedule allowed.

Barrack’s message supports the conclusion that HBJ viewed the residence at some point. It does not establish the exact circumstances of the viewing or prove that the proposed second inspection occurred.

No completed purchase by HBJ is documented in this exchange. CBS reported that HBJ later acquired another residence across the street.

The 2016 Doha Appointment

A November 2016 email chain documents an appointment that Jabor Y arranged for Epstein with a person identified as “Shk. Hamad.”

The complete chain appears in House Oversight document 031637.

Epstein told Jabor that he needed to cancel a planned Doha trip because of work surrounding the United States presidential election. Jabor replied that he had arranged an appointment for Epstein with Sheikh Hamad and would cancel and rearrange it.

Epstein apologized and predicted political turmoil regardless of who won the election.

Reason’s review of the correspondence identified the intended contact as HBJ. The context and Epstein’s later use of “HBJ” support that identification, but the underlying email itself says only “Shk. Hamad.”

The document proves that Jabor arranged an appointment and that Epstein canceled it. It does not prove that the meeting was rescheduled or that HBJ personally communicated with Epstein about it.

Jabor Yousef Jassim Al Thani

Jabor Yousef Jassim Al Thani appears repeatedly in the Qatar related records.

He is a Qatari businessman and member of the Al Thani family. In the correspondence, his name appears as Jabor Y, Jabor, and Jabor Al Thani.

Jabor arranged meetings, communicated with Epstein about Qatar, and later facilitated contact between HBJ and Ehud Barak.

A permit request preserved in EFTA00283067 concerns authorization for Epstein’s private aircraft to land in Qatar and identifies Jabor Yousef Jassim Al Thani.

That aircraft document establishes logistical assistance involving Epstein’s travel. It does not establish that HBJ requested the flight, travelled on the aircraft, or knew every purpose of Epstein’s visit.

Jabor and HBJ must not be merged into one identity. Jabor functioned as an intermediary in several exchanges involving HBJ, but he was a separate person.

The 2017 Blockade of Qatar

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt severed relations with Qatar in June 2017 and imposed restrictions on travel and trade.

The crisis divided close United States partners and created intense diplomatic pressure on Qatar. Although HBJ had left government four years earlier, Epstein treated him as a person who retained influence.

In a July 2017 exchange, Epstein told former Kuwaiti minister Anas al Rasheed that HBJ wanted a direct meeting with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The exchange is documented in EFTA01041447 and discussed in Reason’s investigation of Epstein’s Qatar diplomacy.

Epstein asked whether al Rasheed’s contact could organize the meeting. He later clarified that HBJ was not officially representing the Qatari government.

The records establish that Epstein represented HBJ as wanting the meeting. Without a direct message from HBJ or independent confirmation, they do not conclusively establish that HBJ personally authorized Epstein to make the request.

No public record reviewed for this article confirms that the proposed meeting with Mohammed bin Salman occurred.

Epstein’s Assessment of HBJ

In the same 2017 correspondence, Epstein described HBJ as the only experienced “adult” remaining within Qatar’s elite.

That was Epstein’s characterization. It was not an official assessment by the United States government, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or another institution.

Epstein contrasted HBJ with the officials then directing Qatari foreign policy. His language suggests that he regarded HBJ as an informal center of influence despite HBJ’s departure from government.

The correspondence does not establish how much influence HBJ actually exercised over the Qatari government in 2017.

Epstein’s Advice to Qatar

Epstein also communicated directly with Jabor during the blockade.

In EFTA01041105, Epstein advised that Qatar should stop arguing, allow tensions to cool, and consider steps involving Israel and the United States.

The document shows Epstein presenting himself as a political adviser. It does not show that Jabor or HBJ adopted his recommendations.

Epstein’s attempt to influence Qatar is distinct from evidence that Qatar authorized him to conduct diplomacy. The released material does not identify Epstein as an accredited representative of Qatar or HBJ.

Real Estate Discussions After HBJ Left Office

Real estate continued to appear in the relationship after the 2012 Manhattan house proposal.

EFTA02461875 contains correspondence concerning real estate discussions involving HBJ. The record has been cited as evidence that Epstein and HBJ’s network continued to discuss property years after HBJ left government.

A real estate discussion can involve investment, introductions, market information, or a proposed transaction. It does not prove that money changed hands or that a completed investment resulted.

The public evidence reviewed for this article does not establish that Epstein managed HBJ’s wealth or served as his formal financial adviser.

Epstein’s Reported 2018 Meeting With HBJ

In November 2018, Epstein wrote to Ehud Barak that he had “just left” HBJ and that HBJ wanted to meet Barak.

The message appears in EFTA01017030.

The statement supports the conclusion that Epstein had an in person encounter with HBJ shortly before sending the message. It also shows Epstein presenting himself as authorized to communicate HBJ’s interest in a Barak meeting.

The document does not reveal where Epstein and HBJ met, how long the encounter lasted, or everything they discussed.

Because the statement comes from Epstein, it remains possible that he exaggerated his access or role. The later scheduling and completed HBJ meeting with Barak nevertheless corroborate the central claim that contact was being arranged.

Epstein Introduces Ehud Barak and Jabor

After contacting Barak, Epstein introduced him to Jabor Al Thani by email.

Barak replied that he remembered his earlier meetings with HBJ and would be pleased to resume contact. His response appears in EFTA01015983.

This message is important because it establishes that Barak and HBJ had met before Epstein arranged their 2018 encounter.

It also limits Epstein’s role. Epstein did not introduce two people with no prior relationship. He helped reconnect former government leaders who already knew one another.

The December 2018 One Hyde Park Meeting

The correspondence eventually produced a meeting between HBJ and Barak in London.

The participants agreed that Barak would meet HBJ on December 20, 2018, at One Hyde Park. Epstein was not scheduled to attend.

Afterward, Jabor sent Barak a message thanking him for the meeting and copied Epstein. The message appears in EFTA02610104.

The thank you message converts the event from a proposed appointment into a documented completed meeting.

Epstein helped establish the contact and remained informed about the result, but the surviving record indicates that HBJ and Barak met without him.

The Security Company Discussion

Jabor’s message after the meeting asked Barak for more specific information about a security company they had discussed.

At the time, Barak and Epstein were involved with the emergency technology company Carbyne. That context makes Carbyne a possible subject of the conversation.

The released thank you message does not conclusively identify the security company as Carbyne. It would therefore be inaccurate to state as established fact that HBJ was offered an investment in Carbyne or agreed to support it.

The evidence establishes only that a security company was discussed and that Jabor requested additional details.

No completed HBJ investment in the company has been established by the records reviewed for this article.

Epstein’s Mossad Remark

Before the HBJ and Barak meeting, Epstein asked Barak to make clear to the Qatari side that Epstein did not work for Mossad.

Barak responded with a series of emojis in EFTA01013208.

The exchange documents Epstein raising the subject of Israeli intelligence. It does not establish that he worked for Mossad, that Barak believed he did, or that HBJ had accused him of doing so.

The message may have been a joke, an attempt to manage suspicions, or another example of Epstein cultivating mystery around his international relationships. The document alone cannot determine which interpretation is correct.

Steve Bannon Messages About HBJ

Epstein also invoked HBJ’s name in messages with former Trump adviser Steve Bannon.

In EFTA01615422, Epstein instructed Bannon to tell Jabor that Epstein considered him an Arab brother. He also asked Bannon to tell HBJ that Epstein regarded HBJ and Barak as standing above other regional figures.

Bannon answered that it was done.

The exchange establishes what Epstein asked Bannon to communicate. Bannon’s response does not independently prove that he delivered the complete message or that HBJ received it.

On December 11, 2018, Epstein told Bannon that Qatar was central to resolving the regional crisis and that lifting the blockade could help on several fronts. That conversation appears in EFTA01615501.

Bannon replied that Abu Dhabi and Mohammed bin Zayed were important to any workable agreement.

These messages show Epstein attempting to connect his Qatari relationships with Bannon’s political network. They do not establish that HBJ authorized Epstein to lobby Bannon.

The 2019 Bannon List

On June 30, 2019, Epstein sent himself a long collection of names under the subject “list for bannon steve.”

The list included “HBJ” among politicians, investors, scientists, academics, lawyers, business figures, and members of royalty.

The entry is preserved in the House Oversight email archive.

Its purpose is unclear. It may have been a list of possible interview subjects, contacts, introductions, or topics for Epstein’s work with Bannon.

A name appearing in the list does not prove a completed meeting with Bannon, participation in a project, or knowledge of why Epstein assembled the document.

Its value is limited but relevant. It demonstrates that Epstein continued to consider HBJ part of a network worth identifying shortly before Epstein’s July 2019 arrest.

Direct Contact and Intermediary Evidence

The HBJ record is more complicated than an archive containing a long series of direct emails between two identified personal accounts.

Many of the strongest records involve Epstein communicating with someone else about HBJ:

Tom Barrack regarding the Manhattan property
Jabor regarding meetings and Qatari policy
Anas al Rasheed regarding a proposed HBJ meeting with Mohammed bin Salman
Ehud Barak regarding the London meeting
Steve Bannon regarding messages about HBJ and Qatar

The phrase “just left HBJ” supports direct personal contact in 2018. The 2012 property viewing and 2016 appointment also demonstrate attempts to place Epstein and HBJ in the same physical or professional setting.

Even so, a claim made by Epstein about HBJ’s wishes should not automatically be treated as HBJ’s own statement. Epstein had a documented habit of emphasizing his access to important people.

Contact After Epstein’s Conviction

The documented HBJ related episodes occurred after Epstein’s 2008 conviction in Florida.

Epstein had pleaded guilty to offenses involving the procurement of a minor for prostitution and served a custodial sentence followed by release restrictions.

His criminal history was publicly reported before the 2012 property viewing, the planned 2016 Doha appointment, the 2017 diplomatic exchanges, and the 2018 meeting arrangements.

The records do not establish what HBJ personally knew about Epstein’s conviction at each point. They also do not establish what Epstein or the intermediaries told him.

The post conviction timing remains material because Epstein was attempting to rebuild or preserve elite relationships after becoming a registered sex offender.

No Public Sexual Misconduct Allegation Against HBJ

The reviewed evidence concerns property, diplomacy, political access, security business discussions, and elite introductions.

No released survivor statement reviewed for this article accuses HBJ of sexual abuse, trafficking, recruitment, or participation in Epstein’s massage operation.

No public criminal charge or civil judgment reviewed for this article finds HBJ responsible for an Epstein related sexual offense.

That conclusion may require revision if additional reliable evidence becomes public. It accurately describes the present evidentiary record and should accompany any discussion of HBJ’s appearance in Epstein materials.

A relationship with Epstein is relevant to understanding Epstein’s network. It is not, by itself, proof of participation in his crimes.

Responses and Public Comment

Reason reported that the Qatari embassy did not respond to requests for comment concerning the 2018 HBJ and Barak meeting.

The reviewed reporting does not contain a detailed public explanation from HBJ addressing his relationship with Epstein.

Absence of a public response does not establish wrongdoing. It means that several questions remain unanswered, including:

How HBJ first met Epstein
Whether the 2012 property proposal was their first contact
What they discussed during the 2018 encounter
Whether HBJ authorized Epstein’s 2017 representations
Which security company was discussed with Barak
What HBJ understood about Epstein’s criminal history

These are legitimate subjects for further documentary investigation.

What the Evidence Establishes

The available evidence establishes that:

HBJ served as Qatar’s foreign minister from 1992 until 2013.
He served as prime minister from 2007 until 2013.
He held senior responsibilities connected with Qatar’s sovereign investment system.
Tom Barrack proposed selling Epstein’s Manhattan residence to HBJ in 2012.
Epstein instructed staff to remove nude photographs before the proposed visit.
Epstein’s staff instructions were not shown to have been requested by HBJ.
Barrack later told Epstein that HBJ had viewed and liked the property but wanted more bedrooms.
Jabor arranged an appointment for Epstein with “Shk. Hamad” in Doha in 2016.
Epstein canceled the Doha trip before the appointment occurred.
Reporting identifies the intended person as HBJ, although the underlying email uses only “Shk. Hamad.”
Epstein represented in 2017 that HBJ wanted a direct meeting with Mohammed bin Salman.
Epstein said HBJ was not officially representing the Qatari government.
The reviewed documents do not confirm that the proposed HBJ and Mohammed bin Salman meeting occurred.
Epstein discussed real estate matters involving HBJ.
Epstein told Barak in November 2018 that he had just left HBJ.
Epstein conveyed that HBJ wanted to meet Barak.
Barak said he had met HBJ before and wanted to resume contact.
HBJ and Barak met at One Hyde Park on December 20, 2018.
A security company was discussed during that meeting.
The released follow up message does not conclusively identify the company.
Epstein asked Barak to deny that Epstein worked for Mossad.
The Mossad remark does not prove an intelligence relationship.
Epstein invoked HBJ in conversations with Steve Bannon.
HBJ appeared in Epstein’s June 2019 list associated with Bannon.
The strongest evidence concerns political, business, and real estate networking.

What the Evidence Does Not Establish

The available evidence does not establish that:

HBJ participated in Epstein’s sexual abuse.
HBJ recruited a woman or minor for Epstein.
HBJ travelled on Epstein’s aircraft.
HBJ visited Epstein’s island.
HBJ knew the full extent of Epstein’s crimes.
HBJ requested that Epstein remove nude photographs from his residence.
HBJ requested that an Epstein employee wear heels.
HBJ purchased Epstein’s Manhattan residence.
The proposed second property viewing occurred.
The canceled 2016 Doha appointment was rescheduled.
Every reference to “Hamad” in the Epstein files identifies HBJ.
HBJ authorized Epstein to represent Qatar.
HBJ personally asked Epstein to arrange a meeting with Mohammed bin Salman.
The proposed HBJ and Mohammed bin Salman meeting occurred.
HBJ adopted Epstein’s advice about the Qatar blockade.
The security company discussed with Barak was definitely Carbyne.
HBJ invested in Carbyne.
HBJ believed Epstein worked for Mossad.
Epstein worked for Mossad.
Bannon delivered every message Epstein asked him to convey.
HBJ participated in the project associated with Epstein’s Bannon list.
A meeting, email reference, or property discussion proves criminal participation.

Investigative Assessment

HBJ was not merely a name appearing incidentally in an address book.

The documentary record connects him with a proposed major property transaction, an arranged Doha appointment, Epstein’s Qatar diplomacy, a reported personal meeting, and the completed Barak meeting in London.

At the same time, the relationship should not be overstated. Much of the surviving evidence was written by Epstein or by intermediaries. The archive does not presently contain a comparable body of clearly authenticated direct correspondence from HBJ to Epstein.

The documents demonstrate Epstein’s method. He placed himself between powerful figures, carried messages, offered introductions, blended business with diplomacy, and presented private access as a source of influence.

HBJ’s value to that system was apparent. His experience connected Qatar’s royal family, sovereign investment apparatus, international property markets, and Middle Eastern diplomatic networks.

The most defensible description is that HBJ was a significant political and business contact within Epstein’s post conviction international network.

The available evidence warrants scrutiny of the relationship, especially the 2017 and 2018 diplomatic activity. It does not currently justify describing HBJ as a participant in Epstein’s trafficking organization or sexual crimes.

Key Takeaways

HBJ was one of Qatar’s most influential diplomats and investors.
Epstein related contact is documented from at least 2012 through 2019.
Tom Barrack attempted to connect HBJ with the possible purchase of Epstein’s Manhattan residence.
Epstein concealed nude photographs before the proposed property viewing.
Those preparations were Epstein’s actions, not documented requests from HBJ.
A planned 2016 Doha appointment was canceled by Epstein.
Epstein invoked HBJ during private diplomacy surrounding the Qatar blockade.
Epstein claimed that HBJ wanted to meet Mohammed bin Salman, but the surviving record does not independently confirm HBJ’s authorization.
Epstein reported meeting HBJ in November 2018.
Epstein helped reconnect HBJ with Ehud Barak.
The HBJ and Barak meeting occurred on December 20, 2018.
A security company was discussed, but the public evidence does not conclusively identify it as Carbyne.
Epstein raised a Mossad denial with Barak, but the exchange proves no intelligence affiliation.
Most HBJ related communications passed through intermediaries.
No reviewed survivor statement, criminal charge, or court judgment identifies HBJ as a participant in Epstein’s sexual crimes.

Primary Government and Institutional Sources

Primary Epstein Data Evidence

EFTA02037078 contains the opening January 2012 exchange between Tom Barrack and Epstein concerning the property idea.
EFTA00529542 contains Epstein’s instruction to remove nude photographs before the proposed visit.
EFTA01844096 contains Epstein’s additional staff instructions before the viewing.
EFTA00665866 contains Barrack’s report that HBJ had seen the property and considered it short of bedrooms.
EFTA00283067 contains a permit request associated with Jabor Yousef Jassim Al Thani and Epstein’s aircraft.
EFTA01041447 contains correspondence about a possible HBJ meeting with Mohammed bin Salman and Epstein’s statement that HBJ was not speaking officially for Qatar.
EFTA01041105 contains Epstein’s Qatar blockade advice to Jabor.
EFTA02461875 contains real estate correspondence involving HBJ.
EFTA01017030 contains Epstein’s statement that he had just left HBJ and that HBJ wanted to meet Barak.
EFTA01015983 contains Barak’s statement that he remembered previous meetings with HBJ and wanted to resume contact.
EFTA02610104 contains the follow up correspondence after the December 2018 HBJ and Barak meeting.
EFTA01013208 contains Barak’s response to Epstein’s request concerning Mossad.
EFTA01615422 contains Epstein’s requested HBJ and Jabor messages to Steve Bannon.
EFTA01615501 contains Epstein and Bannon’s December 2018 discussion of Qatar and the blockade.

Investigative Reporting Sources

These reports provide context and document identification. Conclusions should be checked against the linked primary records.

PostedDecember 27, 2025