Sleuth Report: Soror FV Examines the Bank Assurances Behind Epstein’s Palace Bid

Snapshot

Key takeaways

• A March 2019 chain records Kahn saying that Haze accounts had been closed and that the banker could make a funds statement for an earlier date, not the current date.
• On April 9, LGT asked Deutsche Bank for more than the material supplied: the account holder’s name, confirmation of at least €30 million freely available, and a specified means of transmission or a signed reference.
• On April 18, Oldfield confirmed that the letter had not been sent signed and offered to resend it. The reviewed chain does not establish that a signed replacement was subsequently delivered or accepted.
• These are documentary limits on particular assurances. They do not establish Epstein’s total wealth, a finding of money laundering, or a completed palace purchase.

What Soror FV added

Soror FV’s October 20 report, “What Her Side Could Not Produce,” examines the buyer-side paperwork behind the proposed acquisition. Her October 21 follow-up, “When Mr Kiss Dies, Mrs Kiss Will Become Realistic,” follows the subsequent negotiations and the banks’ correspondence. This review focuses on their bank-assurance strand, rather than repeating the full palace history.

The distinction is useful: a proposed buyer’s offer, an accountant’s assurance, a bank’s letter, and the receiving bank’s acceptance are different records. The three email chains below show why one should not stand in for another.

March 20: the requested assurance and its date

EFTA01035307, page 1 preserves a March 20, 2019 exchange between Epstein and Richard Kahn about obtaining a statement from Deutsche Bank. In the quoted chain, Epstein sought confirmation that the owners of Haze Trust had more than 30 million available. That sentence does not specify a currency.

Kahn said that the Haze accounts had been closed and suggested that the banker might confirm what was held at an earlier date. He referred to approximately “18mm remaining” across accounts or entities abbreviated sfl and stc. The email does not expressly state a currency for that figure. It is not a complete balance sheet, a bank statement, or an inventory of Epstein’s assets elsewhere.

The same record contains Kahn’s report that Stewart could make the statement as of early February, but not the current date. Epstein’s top message then asks for an assurance that the owner could pay €25 million. The chain shows pressure to obtain a useful bank assurance and a stated date limitation. It does not independently establish the exact balance on every relevant date or prove that the requested wording was supplied.

April 9: LGT asked for additional information

EFTA01353362, page 1 contains an April 9 email from LGT’s Mile Lukic to Deutsche Bank’s Stewart Oldfield, above Oldfield’s April 8 transmission of an attachment named Haze 190408.pdf. Lukic said the material was not what the client expected or what LGT needed for its due diligence.

He requested a SWIFT message with the letter’s content, the account holder’s name, and confirmation of at least €30 million freely available. Alternatively, he asked for a signed bank reference containing that information, initially copied by email and then mailed. LGT’s compliance department would contact Deutsche Bank to verify a mailed reference.

This is direct evidence of what LGT requested in this transaction. It is not a general statement of what every bank or every jurisdiction’s law required. The attachment’s contents are not reproduced in this single-page record, so this review does not infer everything the initial letter did or did not certify.

April 18: the signature question was still being pursued

In EFTA01421009, page 2, Bates EFTA01421010, Kahn asked whether the letter had been sent to Mile signed, and requested a signed resend if not. Oldfield replied, “It wasn’t. But happy to resend.” He also asked whether that would satisfy the request.

On page 1 of the same record, Kahn said that appeared to be the latest request and asked whether the letter could be sent by FedEx if he supplied an address. Oldfield agreed. The chain documents the question, answer and proposed next step. It does not contain proof of dispatch, a signed replacement, delivery confirmation or LGT’s final acceptance.

Absence of those items from this reviewed chain is not proof that none exists anywhere in the released files or the banks’ records. The defensible statement is narrower: acceptance and completion are not established by the documents checked here.

The response obtained by the original reporter

In her October 21 report, Soror FV attributes an October 16 response to LGT spokesperson Franziska Raff. As reported there, LGT said it had requested additional due-diligence information, did not regard the supplied material as sufficient, and had found no evidence that the discussed transaction was completed. This is a response obtained by Soror FV, not independently obtained correspondence reviewed by EpsteinWiki. Her report also records Shuliak declining comment through counsel and no response from several other approached parties at publication.

What this review does not establish

• Kahn’s statement about closed Haze accounts is not proof that the trust had no assets or banking arrangements anywhere.
• The abbreviated remaining-balance figure is not a verified assessment of Epstein’s total liquidity. The currency should not be silently supplied.
• A deficient or unfinished bank-assurance exchange does not, by itself, establish money laundering, fraud, a legal violation or a participant’s criminal intent.
• The reviewed records do not resolve the trust’s complete ownership history or reconstruct redacted identities.
• No signed replacement or final bank acceptance was identified in these three records. An exhaustive search of all correspondence would be a different, larger task.

Questions and further digging

Does this show that Epstein could not afford the palace? No. It shows a problem with a particular requested assurance, not a complete assessment of his finances.

Did LGT accept the April 8 material? Its April 9 email says the material was insufficient for the requested due diligence and asks for additional information.

What would close the documentary gap? The actual April 8 attachment, any signed replacement, transmission and receipt records, and a final bank decision would allow a firmer account of what was supplied and accepted.

Does this replace the palace article? No. The Bin Ennakhil purchase-attempts article covers the broader chronology, proposals and later payment attempts. This report isolates the bank-assurance evidence surfaced in Soror FV’s newer reporting.

Conclusion

Soror FV’s two reports identify a useful documentary gap between making an offer and satisfying the seller’s bank. The checked records support specific statements about an earlier-date assurance, LGT’s additional requests, and an unsigned letter. They do not justify treating a proposed transaction as completed or a compliance concern as a proven crime.

Sources

1. Soror FV, “What Her Side Could Not Produce,” October 20, 2026.
2. Soror FV, “When Mr Kiss Dies, Mrs Kiss Will Become Realistic,” October 21, 2026. Includes the reporter’s account of responses.
3. EFTA01035307: March 20, 2019 bank-assurance exchange, page 1.
4. EFTA01353362: April 9 LGT request, with the April 8 forwarding email, page 1.
5. EFTA01421009: April 18 signature and delivery discussion, pages 1–2, Bates EFTA01421009–10.
6. EpsteinWiki, Bin Ennakhil Palace: Jeffrey Epstein’s Repeated Purchase Attempts. Related coverage, not a substitute for the primary records above.

Primary links point to public PDF copies of the DOJ release preserved by Roll Call. Relevant page images were inspected. Private contact information, account identifiers and redacted identities are not reproduced.