William D. Langford Jr.

PostedSeptember 17, 2026

UpdatedSeptember 17, 2026

ByEpsteinWiki

William D. Langford Jr. was a senior JPMorgan Chase compliance and anti money laundering executive who pressed the bank to end Jeffrey Epstein’s client relationship in 2010 and 2011. Internal emails, meeting records, sworn testimony, and later congressional analysis show that Langford treated Epstein as a serious reputational and human trafficking risk, sought renewed approval if the bank wanted to retain him, and continued urging an exit after Jes Staley defended Epstein.

Snapshot

Field	Detail
Full name	William D. Langford Jr.
Epstein connection	Senior JPMorgan Chase compliance executive involved in reviews of whether the bank should retain or terminate Epstein
JPMorgan roles	Senior Vice President and Director of Global Anti Money Laundering, 2006 to 2010; Global Head of Compliance in 2011; later Head of Enterprise Financial Crimes Compliance and General Counsel for Global Compliance and Regulatory Management
Central documented action	Asked the Private Bank to reevaluate its sponsorship of Epstein and obtain renewed approval from General Counsel Stephen Cutler if it wanted to retain him
Core concern	Reputational risk, the possibility of a continuing federal human trafficking investigation, and conflict with JPMorgan’s own human trafficking initiative
Key meeting	January 14, 2011 meeting with Jes Staley and Catherine Keating concerning Epstein
Sworn testimony	Deposed on May 3, 2023 in the United States Virgin Islands litigation against JPMorgan
Present role	Deputy Chief Compliance Officer of MUFG Bank, Global Head of Financial Crimes Compliance, and Head of Regulatory Operations and Affairs
Criminal or civil status	No public evidence located that Langford was charged, sued individually, found liable, or sanctioned over Epstein
Evidence character	Internal JPMorgan emails and meeting records, deposition excerpts, litigation filings, bank admissions, and a 2026 Senate Finance Committee staff report

Key Takeaways

Langford was not Epstein’s banker, lawyer, or social associate. His documented connection arose through his senior compliance responsibilities at JPMorgan.
The available record shows that Langford wanted Epstein removed. In December 2010 he wrote that he had no patience for wavering on Epstein. In January 2011 he required renewed review and pressed the Private Bank to justify retaining the relationship.
JPMorgan’s Anti Money Laundering Operations team sought an exit after new reporting revived allegations that Epstein was involved in trafficking young girls. Private Bank participants said nobody in a January 2011 review favored keeping Epstein and attributed his retention to Jes Staley’s personal relationship with him.
At a January 14, 2011 meeting, Staley told Langford and Catherine Keating that Epstein had not done what his conviction suggested and that lawyers were trying to overturn the plea. Langford then participated in an unusual call with Epstein lawyer Ken Starr, but testified that Starr did not change his view that the bank should exit Epstein.
Langford distinguished reputational danger from evidence of ongoing criminal use of JPMorgan accounts. He testified that the transaction review did not, on its face, establish that Epstein was operating a trafficking ring through the bank and that the activity did not match the trafficking typologies then used by the bank.
Those two positions are not contradictory. A bank can decide that a client presents unacceptable risk even when its investigators have not established that specific transactions constitute a crime.
Langford’s evidence is important because it shows a control function seeking an exit and a senior business executive resisting it. It also exposes a governance gap: compliance pressure did not immediately determine the outcome.

Overview

William D. Langford Jr. entered JPMorgan in 2006 to lead global anti money laundering work after serving in senior policy and enforcement roles at the United States Treasury Department and its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. His Epstein related role became visible in late 2010, when members of JPMorgan’s Anti Money Laundering Operations group revisited the bank’s continuing relationship with Epstein.

Epstein had pleaded guilty in Florida in 2008 to solicitation of prostitution and procurement of a minor for prostitution. JPMorgan nevertheless retained him. By January 2011, internal records said the bank held roughly $212 million for him. Members of the Private Bank and compliance organization discussed press reports about possible human trafficking, cash activity, Epstein’s connection to a modeling agency, and the reputational contradiction between retaining him and promoting the bank’s human trafficking initiative.

The documentary record places Langford on the side seeking renewed scrutiny and an exit. It does not show that he could terminate Epstein unilaterally. Meeting records and testimony instead indicate that client retention involved the Private Bank, Jes Staley, and General Counsel Stephen Cutler. Jamie Dimon later testified that the general counsel was the ultimate decision maker for such a question. Epstein remained at JPMorgan until 2013.

Langford left JPMorgan at the end of 2012. He was deposed in 2023, after survivors and the United States Virgin Islands sued the bank. His testimony supplies important distinctions between suspicion, reputational risk, transaction monitoring, suspicious activity reporting, and proof that an account was being used for trafficking.

Identity, Education, and Career

Langford graduated summa cum laude from Hastings College with an undergraduate degree in mathematics and with high honors from the University of Texas School of Law. Before joining JPMorgan, he held several federal financial crime policy roles. His official biography states that he served as Senior Counsel for Financial Crimes in the Treasury Department and as Senior Advisor to the Treasury General Counsel, with work focused on anti terrorism and anti money laundering provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.

At the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, known as FinCEN, Langford served as Associate Director for the Regulatory Policy and Programs Division. FinCEN stated that he oversaw its Bank Secrecy Act regulatory, compliance, and enforcement functions. A March 22, 2006 FinCEN release announced that he would leave at the end of April to become Director of Global Anti Money Laundering and a Senior Vice President at JPMorgan Chase.

JPMorgan discovery materials identify this sequence of roles:

Period	Role
2006 to 2010	Senior Vice President and Director of Global Anti Money Laundering
January 2011 to September 2011	Global Head of Compliance
Beginning October 2011	Head of Enterprise Financial Crimes Compliance
October 2012 to December 2012	General Counsel for Global Compliance and Regulatory Management

The discovery email that lists these roles contains an apparent date error for the end of the Enterprise Financial Crimes Compliance position. It states September 2011 even though the role is said to begin in October 2011 and the next listed role begins in October 2012. The sequence strongly suggests September 2012, but the original error should not be silently corrected as an established fact.

After JPMorgan, Langford became Global Head of Compliance Architecture and Strategy at Citigroup. He joined GE Capital in 2015 as Chief Compliance Officer and joined MUFG in 2017 as Chief Compliance Officer for the Americas. MUFG currently identifies him as Deputy Chief Compliance Officer of MUFG Bank, Global Head of Financial Crimes Compliance, and Head of Regulatory Operations and Affairs.

How Langford Entered the Epstein Review

The available public record does not identify Langford as part of JPMorgan’s earlier decisions to retain Epstein in 2006 or 2008. His documented direct involvement appears in the renewed review that began in December 2010.

On December 22, 2010, Phillip DeLuca told Langford that the issue would be raised with the Rapid Response team after the new year and that Kevin McCleerey agreed the customer should go. The next morning, DeLuca discussed the reputational conflict between Epstein and JPMorgan’s human trafficking work. Langford replied that McCleerey should not waver and wrote, “No patience for this.” The short exchange is direct evidence of Langford’s disposition before the January meetings.

An internal January 2011 message said JPMorgan’s Anti Money Laundering Compliance Director had asked the Private Bank to reevaluate its sponsorship of Epstein and seek renewed approval from Cutler if it wanted to retain him. Other internal records identify that director as Langford.

The January 7, 2011 Rapid Response Review

JPMorgan held a Rapid Response meeting on January 7, 2011 after new adverse media connected Epstein to possible human trafficking. Maryanne Ryan’s internal summary described several issues:

Epstein was alleged to be involved in trafficking young girls, and law enforcement was reportedly examining the matter.
His accounts generated recurring cash alerts.
Bear Stearns had reportedly received a subpoena before JPMorgan acquired it, while JPMorgan apparently had not.
Epstein had a financial connection to a modeling agency and had sponsored accounts for women.
The bank’s relationship with him risked undermining its public human trafficking initiative.
Private Bank participants did not favor retaining him, but Ryan wrote that retention appeared to be due to Jes Staley’s personal relationship with Epstein.

The Anti Money Laundering Operations group asked the Private Bank to exit the relationship. The review did not produce an immediate exit. Instead, the outcome was a meeting in which Langford and Private Bank leadership would explain the human trafficking concern and reputational risk to Staley.

The Rapid Response material also recorded that Langford had expressed concern that Epstein might be under investigation for human trafficking. This was a concern about reported allegations and risk, not a finding that a current federal investigation actually existed.

The January 14 Meeting With Jes Staley

Calendar evidence confirms that Langford, Catherine Keating, and Jes Staley were scheduled to discuss Epstein on January 14, 2011. Langford later testified that Staley defended Epstein during the meeting. According to Langford, Staley said Epstein had not done what the conviction implied, should not have pleaded guilty, was not responsible, and had lawyers working to have the plea thrown out.

Langford testified that the practical takeaway was that JPMorgan representatives would speak with Epstein’s lawyer. This changed the review from an internal risk decision into a process that gave Epstein’s defense team an opportunity to argue his case to senior compliance and legal officials.

Langford did not describe the meeting as changing his own conclusion. In his deposition he said that he continued to press for an exit and that no exit occurred.

The Ken Starr Call

On February 17, 2011, Langford and an investment bank lawyer spoke with Kenneth Starr, who was representing Epstein. Starr immediately reported the call to Epstein and wrote that he had argued there were no crimes, only inappropriate conduct. He also told Epstein that the call had gone well.

Langford’s sworn account was less favorable to Epstein. He testified that he was willing to accommodate Staley’s request but did not expect Starr to change his mind. He recalled Starr saying that the defense was working to have Epstein’s plea agreement thrown out. Langford characterized the presentation as what he expected from Epstein’s lawyer and said it did not alter his view that JPMorgan should terminate the relationship.

Langford also testified that this was the first and probably the only time he had spoken with a criminal defense lawyer in connection with a bank client relationship. The call did not address Epstein’s cash withdrawals, transfers to women in Eastern Europe, or other account activity raised in the later litigation.

Continued Pressure to Exit

Langford testified that after speaking with the lawyers he continued pressing for an exit, but the bank did not terminate Epstein at that time. He said he had no additional direct conversations with Staley about the issue and did not know whether anyone tried to bypass Staley.

The wider record shows further review after Langford’s January intervention. Cutler recommended exiting Epstein in March or April 2011. JPMorgan held another Rapid Response meeting on August 4. That meeting called for Private Bank head John Duffy to advise Staley that the bank should exit while conditions were relatively settled. Duffy testified that Staley still wanted Epstein retained and that the relationship persisted because of Staley.

In January 2013, after Staley announced his departure from JPMorgan, DeLuca asked Ryan whether the bank should now remove Epstein. Ryan replied that at Langford’s going away event, Langford had told her Staley was on his way out and had mentioned the Epstein matter to another colleague. This message links Langford’s departure with the continuing unresolved concern. JPMorgan later terminated Epstein in 2013.

Transaction Review and Human Trafficking Typologies

Langford’s opposition to retaining Epstein rested on reputational risk and unresolved concerns, not on a conclusion that reviewed transactions proved current trafficking through JPMorgan.

In January 2011, Langford asked what evidence connected JPMorgan accounts to bad activity. Ryan investigated cash alerts, accounts sponsored for women, old spending records, and the modeling agency connection. She reported that she found no decisive transaction evidence. Langford later testified that the modeling agency connection alone revealed little and that a bank had limited ability to determine what occurred inside such a business.

On the night before the Staley meeting, Ryan sent Langford the results of several days of account research. She identified a JPMorgan letter of credit connected to MC2 Models Management, accounts Epstein had sponsored for two young adult women, payments to models and educational programs, at least $12 million wired to a Palm Beach bank account, and other unresolved issues. Ryan described the findings as interesting but not decisive. Langford answered, “Lots of smoke. Lots of questions.” He noted that only fifteen minutes had been scheduled with Staley and said he planned to join Keating in person to help the discussion. This exchange captures both the seriousness of his concern and the evidentiary uncertainty immediately before the January 14 meeting.

Langford explained that JPMorgan’s human trafficking initiative was focused on the business side of trafficking: organizations that captured, controlled, moved, and sold the services of victims and generated criminal proceeds. He testified that the account activity presented to him did not match that typology. In his view, some transactions involving adult women who had their own accounts, documented expenses, and access to funds looked different from the coercive patterns the initiative was designed to detect.

He further testified that Ryan’s findings did not, on their face, establish a link between JPMorgan accounts and Epstein’s operation of a trafficking ring. He said he did not then believe Epstein was continuing illegal activity after his 2008 plea. He recommended exit because of reputational risk, not because he had concluded that current account activity was criminal.

This testimony describes Langford’s contemporaneous assessment. It does not establish that Epstein had stopped abusing or trafficking victims. Later evidence and survivor accounts documented continued abuse after 2008. The point is narrower: the evidence shown to Langford and the detection models used by the bank did not lead him to identify the reviewed account behavior as the operation of a trafficking enterprise.

Suspicious Activity Reporting and Escalation

The 2023 litigation tested whether business interests interfered with the bank’s regulatory reporting. Langford testified that nobody in JPMorgan’s business lines tried to dissuade him from filing a suspicious activity report, commonly called a SAR, and that he was unaware of anyone trying to dissuade a colleague from doing so.

He also distinguished currency transaction reports from SARs. Currency transaction reports record qualifying cash activity without necessarily signaling suspicion. SARs communicate suspicion and may supply investigative context. Langford said that ordinary large cash withdrawals by wealthy clients were not by themselves the focus of JPMorgan’s trafficking typology.

Langford testified that if he had believed a client was engaged in ongoing legal violations and colleagues refused to support an exit, he would have escalated the disagreement to JPMorgan’s board. Because he viewed the Epstein question as reputational rather than proof of ongoing crime through the accounts, the public record does not show that he made such a board escalation.

Evidence and Accountability Chart

Issue	What the record shows	Evidence strength	Limit
Desire to remove Epstein	Langford wrote that he had no patience for wavering, requested renewed review, and testified that he continued pressing for exit	Strong, based on direct email and sworn testimony	Does not show that he possessed unilateral termination authority
Human trafficking concern	Internal reviews identified allegations involving young girls and a possible investigation, with Langford named as the concerned AML director	Strong, based on contemporaneous records	Concern is not proof that Langford verified an active investigation
Staley’s intervention	Langford testified that Staley denied the substance of Epstein’s conviction and directed bank officials toward Epstein’s lawyers	Strong, based on testimony and meeting records	Staley’s statements were advocacy, not an adjudication
Starr call	Starr’s email and Langford’s deposition independently confirm the call	Strong	Accounts differ in tone about how persuasive it was
Transaction assessment	Langford said reviewed activity did not establish trafficking through the bank and did not match the typology then in use	Strong as evidence of his assessment	Does not establish that trafficking or abuse had ceased
Continued retention	Epstein remained at JPMorgan until 2013 despite compliance pressure	Undisputed institutional outcome	The public record does not assign the entire decision to one person
Individual wrongdoing by Langford	No charge, judgment, sanction, or survivor allegation against him was located	Strong as a statement about the located public record	Absence of a located action is not proof that every nonpublic record has been reviewed

Chronology

Date	Event
March 22, 2006	FinCEN announces that Langford will leave the agency and join JPMorgan as Director of Global Anti Money Laundering and Senior Vice President
2006 to 2010	Langford leads JPMorgan’s global anti money laundering function
December 22, 2010	DeLuca tells Langford that the Epstein issue will go to Rapid Response and that McCleerey agrees the client should go
December 23, 2010	Langford says he has no patience for wavering on Epstein
January 4, 2011	Internal message says Langford required the Private Bank to reevaluate its sponsorship of Epstein and seek renewed Cutler approval if it wished to retain him
January 7, 2011	Rapid Response participants review trafficking allegations, cash alerts, the modeling agency connection, and the conflict with JPMorgan’s human trafficking initiative
January 10, 2011	Langford asks his team to assemble prior emails, relevant reporting, and evidence linking the accounts to bad activity before meeting Staley
January 14, 2011	Langford and Keating meet Staley. Staley defends Epstein and directs them toward Epstein’s lawyers
January 27, 2011	Proposed due diligence update says the coverage team, Keating, and Langford agreed to enhanced monitoring after Staley relayed Epstein’s denial
February 17, 2011	Langford and an investment bank lawyer speak with Ken Starr. Starr argues that Epstein’s conduct was inappropriate but not criminal
March or April 2011	Cutler recommends exit, according to later testimony and filings
August 4, 2011	A fourth Rapid Response meeting again produces a recommendation to tell Staley that the bank should exit Epstein
August 19, 2011	Duffy recommends exit to Staley, but Staley continues to favor retention
End of 2012	Langford leaves JPMorgan
2013	JPMorgan terminates its relationship with Epstein after Staley’s departure
May 3, 2023	Langford gives a videotaped deposition in the United States Virgin Islands case against JPMorgan
2023	JPMorgan settles survivor claims for $290 million and the United States Virgin Islands action for $75 million without admitting liability
August 4, 2026	Senate Finance Committee staff report says Langford tried for years to remove Epstein and was overruled by senior leadership

Litigation Record

Langford’s testimony was taken in Government of the United States Virgin Islands v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. on May 3, 2023. Excerpts were filed in that case and in related litigation brought by a survivor proceeding as Jane Doe. He appeared as a fact witness and former JPMorgan executive, not as an individual defendant.

The litigation produced competing narratives. The United States Virgin Islands cited internal warnings and compliance concerns as evidence that JPMorgan knew or recklessly disregarded the risk that Epstein was trafficking women and girls. JPMorgan cited testimony from Langford and others to argue that employees investigated the account activity, did not identify it as ongoing trafficking through the bank, and sought termination because of reputational risk.

Both sides used Langford’s evidence. His emails helped show that serious warnings reached senior levels. His testimony about transaction typologies and lack of identified current criminal activity supported JPMorgan’s defense. A careful account must therefore distinguish the underlying document from each litigant’s argument about what it proves.

JPMorgan resolved the survivor class action for $290 million and the United States Virgin Islands case for $75 million in 2023. The settlements did not adjudicate Langford’s conduct and did not impose individual liability on him.

Senate Finance Committee Findings

An August 4, 2026 report issued by investigative staff for Senator Ron Wyden, then the Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Committee, concluded that Langford tried for years to terminate Epstein over human trafficking concerns but was overruled by senior JPMorgan leadership, including Cutler. The report cited internal emails, deposition testimony, and litigation exhibits.

The report treated Langford as a compliance executive who sought removal, not as one of the individual bankers it recommended for federal investigation. Its list of JPMorgan personnel recommended for scrutiny named several other executives and bankers but did not name Langford.

The report is an official congressional staff product and an important synthesis of evidence. It is not a judicial finding and should not be treated as one. Its conclusions should be read alongside the cited primary emails, meeting records, testimony, and the parties’ litigation filings.

Direct EFTA Appearance Index

The EFTA corpus includes primary records and many duplicate or overlapping court filings. The index below separates the most probative direct records from filings that quote, attach, index, or summarize them.

Record group	EFTA documents	Relevance
December 2010 exit discussion	EFTA02811327, EFTA02811333	McCleerey agrees Epstein should go; Langford says he has no patience for wavering
January 2011 review emails	EFTA02807983, EFTA02808679, EFTA02810271, EFTA02811068, EFTA02811341, EFTA02812998, EFTA02813004, EFTA02813111	AML exit request, collection of records, transaction review, trafficking concerns, and Staley relationship
Reapproval request	EFTA02813044, EFTA02817841	Records that Langford requested reevaluation and renewed Cutler approval
January 14 meeting	EFTA02813048, EFTA02817912	Calendar evidence for the Langford, Keating, and Staley meeting
Post meeting monitoring decision	EFTA02813284, EFTA02818098	Records the decision to monitor and document Staley’s discussion with Epstein
Lawyer contacts	EFTA01798012, EFTA02814549, EFTA02817930, EFTA02813280	Ken Starr call, Cutler contact, and later effort to identify current Epstein counsel
Langford deposition excerpts	EFTA02808584, EFTA02811360, EFTA02813050, EFTA02814551, EFTA02817442	May 3, 2023 testimony and filing declarations identifying excerpts
JPMorgan admissions	EFTA02810547	Bank admission that Langford knew in 2011 and 2012 of Epstein’s guilty plea involving a person under eighteen
Role and discovery records	EFTA02806283, EFTA02808682, EFTA02816521	Employment roles, designated custodians, and deposition index
Rapid Response testimony	EFTA02810594, EFTA02811365	Testimony identifying Langford and the human trafficking initiative participants
Private Bank and AML fact statements	EFTA02807933, EFTA02809392, EFTA02809437, EFTA02810334, EFTA02811951, EFTA02812502, EFTA02814735, EFTA02815448, EFTA02815793, EFTA02815839, EFTA02815995, EFTA02817624	Competing statements of fact and briefs discussing concern, meeting history, transaction interpretation, SAR independence, and exit rationale
Repeated exhibit declarations	EFTA02812041, EFTA02813116, EFTA02813352, EFTA02813817, EFTA02814385	Filing records that list or authenticate Langford testimony and exhibits
January 13 account findings	EFTA02818049	Ryan’s account research and Langford’s assessment that it presented extensive smoke and unanswered questions

Search results can change as OCR and corpus indexing improve. The direct records above should be preferred over a party’s characterization when the two can be compared.

What the Evidence Establishes

The public record establishes that Langford was a senior compliance decision participant, knew by 2011 about Epstein’s guilty plea, considered the relationship a major reputational and human trafficking concern, and pressed for renewed scrutiny and termination. It also establishes that Staley defended Epstein, that the bank heard from Epstein’s lawyer, and that Langford said the defense presentation did not change his view.

The record further establishes that Langford did not interpret the reviewed account activity as proof of ongoing trafficking through JPMorgan. He separated an unacceptable client risk from a conclusion that specific transactions demonstrated continuing crime.

What the Evidence Does Not Establish

The located record does not establish that Langford had a personal relationship with Epstein, provided him banking services, profited from his accounts, visited his properties, or participated in his abuse or trafficking.

It does not establish that Langford had sole power to terminate Epstein. It also does not show that Langford personally suppressed a SAR, blocked an investigation, or overruled an exit recommendation.

His statement that he did not identify ongoing illegal activity should not be expanded into a finding that no such activity existed. It reports his assessment of the information and detection models available to him at the time.

Legal and Regulatory Status

No public criminal charge, civil judgment, survivor allegation, professional discipline, or regulatory sanction against Langford concerning Epstein was located in the sources reviewed for this article. He was a deponent and fact witness in the 2023 JPMorgan litigation, not an individually named defendant.

The 2026 Senate Finance Committee staff report did not include Langford in its list of individual JPMorgan bankers recommended for investigation. Instead, it described him as a compliance executive whose removal efforts were overruled.

Why Langford Matters

Langford’s record is important because it documents institutional resistance from inside the control function. The Epstein relationship did not survive merely because compliance personnel lacked concern. At least by late 2010 and early 2011, senior compliance employees understood the reputational contradiction, raised the possible trafficking issue, asked for an exit, and sought renewed approval from the highest legal level.

His experience also shows the limits of transaction typologies. A model designed to identify organized trafficking businesses may miss abuse financed through ordinary looking withdrawals, payments, sponsored accounts, and wealth management services. The gap between known allegations and transaction based proof became a reason the bank characterized the issue as reputational rather than legal.

Finally, the record illustrates how a powerful sponsor can shape escalation. Instead of an immediate termination after the January 2011 warning, the process included a meeting with Staley, a call to Epstein’s defense lawyer, enhanced monitoring, and further review. Epstein remained a client for roughly two more years.

Open Questions

Who had final operational authority to terminate Epstein at each stage from December 2010 through 2013?
What precise recommendations did Langford send to Cutler, the Private Bank, and other members of senior management outside the emails now public?
Were all versions of the Rapid Response memoranda and supporting transaction analyses preserved and produced?
Why did the January 2011 process give Epstein’s criminal defense counsel a direct audience with bank officials but apparently did not include interviews with survivors or women receiving Epstein related transfers?
What thresholds or typologies would have connected Epstein’s cash use and payments to exploitation, and were those systems revised after the case?
Did Langford ask for any SAR specific review relating to Epstein, and if so, what was the outcome?
Was a formal board escalation considered even if Langford viewed the concern as reputational rather than proof of current illegality?
What did Langford communicate at his 2012 departure about Epstein, Staley’s expected exit, and the unresolved client relationship?
Which portions of Langford’s full deposition remain sealed or unavailable, and would they materially change the public account?

Jeffrey Epstein; JPMorgan Chase; Jes Staley; Stephen Cutler; Catherine Keating; Maryanne Ryan; Phillip DeLuca; Kevin McCleerey; John Duffy; Mary Erdoes; Paul Morris; Kenneth Starr; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; United States Virgin Islands v. JPMorgan Chase Bank; JPMorgan Rapid Response Team; JPMorgan Human Trafficking Initiative.

Sources

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