EFTA01681865: Deutsche Bank’s Presentation on Jeffrey Epstein’s Financial Network
Overview
EFTA01681865 is Deutsche Bank’s September 12, 2019 presentation to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. Its 19 exhibits reconstruct Epstein-related accounts and payments from bank records, customer information, trust documents and internal research. It is a bank analysis, not a criminal judgment.
Exhibit A counts 76 relationship accounts: 71 classified as intentional, 42 as capitalized, 56 as Epstein-controlled, and 36 as both controlled and capitalized. These categories overlap; they are not separate totals. The relationship extended beyond Epstein’s personal accounts to companies, trusts, charities, property entities, employees and affiliated organizations. Certain administrative accounts were excluded.
Checking, money-market, brokerage-advisory, custody and interest-bearing transaction accounts appear in the relationship. The presentation’s scope therefore includes both ordinary operating expenses and substantial investments, rather than only transfers to individuals.
The exhibits cover investments, cash withdrawals, legal and settlement expenses, education, travel and other payments. Structures such as Southern Financial, Southern Trust Company and the Butterfly Trust appear alongside personal accounts. Account ownership, signing authority and receiving a payment are different relationships; none alone establishes who authorized a particular transaction or knew its full purpose.
The bank distinguishes recorded transfers from suspected purposes and tentative identities. Terms such as “potential,” “alleged” and “ostensible” are analytical qualifications, not uniform legal designations. A name in a payment reference may differ from the account holder receiving the money. Selected tables also overlap or apply thresholds, so their amounts cannot simply be combined into a criminal-proceeds total.
Later evidence has different legal significance: a December 2019 prosecutorial memorandum recorded a qualified preliminary assessment; a 2020 regulatory consent order found monitoring failures; and a 2023 civil settlement resolved claims without an admission of liability. None makes every entry in the presentation a proven criminal transaction.
The embedded copy contains 52 PDF pages. Printed numbering jumps from 29 to 31 and ends at 53; the reason is unknown. Page links below use PDF positions, not printed numbers. The Rule 6(e) confidentiality marking does not establish how prosecutors used the document. The following evidence groups distinguish the bank’s transaction data, historical customer descriptions and interpretations.
Jump to: Accounts · Payments · Legal expenses · Recipients · Other banks · Legal context · 2026 developments · Sources · PDF
Evidence and page guide
| Exhibits | Subject | PDF pages |
|---|---|---|
| A–D | Accounts and roles | 2–13 |
| E–I | Trust and beneficiary payments | 14–22 |
| J–N | Cash, investments and legal payments | 23–32 |
| O–R | Affiliates, recipients and education | 33–49 |
| S | Other financial institutions | 50–52 |
Account roles and offboarding
Exhibit C, pages 7–8 uses onboarding to include signatories, beneficial owners, legal representatives and authorized users. Its affiliated-payment column does not establish personal receipt. Exhibit D, pages 9–13 separates those roles from beneficiaries and limited powers of attorney, while warning that not every change is reflected. Stated customer-review purposes are not proof of actual use.
The NYDFS consent order dates opening to August 19, 2013 and termination notice to December 21, 2018—not closure of every account. Exhibit E, page 14 dates the Butterfly Trust’s settlement to December 27, 2006 and its Deutsche accounts to January 24, 2014. Its money-market account closed July 8, 2019, with an apparent transfer to Fidelity. Separate attorney-proffer notes discuss risk reviews and closures; they are an attorney account, not another transaction ledger.
Beneficiary payments and selected transactions
Beneficiary profiles reflect pre-offboarding information, not present-day status; some information is missing or inconsistent. They combine customer records, trust documents and internet research, not independent findings about beneficiaries’ activities. Exhibit G, pages 17–18 aggregates payments from multiple affiliated accounts, not solely the Butterfly Trust. Exhibit H, pages 19–20 selects direct payments of at least $10,000. G’s indirect-payment references overlap M, N and R: matching underlying entries is necessary before adding totals. Recorded purposes include tuition, loans, rent and travel; some are unexplained.
Exhibit I, pages 21–22 separately records direct-payment sums and indirect-payment flags. Its “ostensible foreign models” label does not verify anyone’s profession or role. Exhibit J, pages 23–24 selects combined dollar totals above $10,000; smaller components, multiple accounts and euros can contribute. It is not a total of all cash withdrawals, and large withdrawals are not automatically illegal.
Exhibit K, page 25 draws investment wires from Southern Financial, Southern Trust Company and the 2017 Caterpillar Trust. It records five Boothbay Absolute Strategies Fund transactions totaling $28.25 million and one $10 million Boothbay Multi Strategy Fund transaction, without establishing fund misconduct. Exhibit L, page 26 records a January 4, 2019 $7 million transfer to Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart PA, classified as a potential settlement payment. Wire instructions do not disclose every settlement term or ultimate beneficiary.
Legal expenses and classification limits
Exhibit M, pages 27–28 explicitly says some firms represented both Epstein and others, and some payments may have benefited Epstein alone. Timing and shared counsel do not establish whose defense each dollar funded. Exhibit N, pages 29–32 includes two $1,500 entries despite its $10,000 heading. A footnote says a redacted individual had not been publicly identified as a co-conspirator. The bank’s grouping does not establish that every listed person was accused, charged or guilty; entries include loans and third-party expenses.
Tentative identities and actual recipients
Exhibit O, pages 33–36 contains provisional employment, control and identity assessments, sometimes based on recurring payments or public profiles. Failure to find repayment in reviewed records does not prove none occurred. Exhibit P’s biographies are historical. On page 38, the May 1, 2019 $53,750 payment referencing Kathy Ruemmler went to JetSuite Air, not directly to Ruemmler. The April 13, 2015 $1 million wire went to Neoteny 3 LP, associated with Joichi Ito, for a subscription and capital call—not directly to Ito.
Exhibit Q, pages 40–44 groups potentially notable payments, including ordinary services and purchases. Identities sometimes remain unconfirmed; alternative matches or contrary facts undermine suggested connections. These are not reliable identifications of everyone mentioned. Exhibit R covers schools, camps, tutoring, language instruction and childcare. Some beneficiaries are unknown or tentative; institutional payments do not establish a student’s relationship to Epstein.
Other banks and date fields
Exhibit S, pages 50–52 mixes controlled entities, affiliates, employees and beneficiaries. Its dates are last-known-wire dates, not account openings or closures. A footnote suggests TD Bank accounts grouped under HBRK Associates might instead belong to Epstein or controlled entities and may have moved in May 2019. This qualified inference is not a confirmed ownership register. Inclusion does not show every institution managed Epstein’s wealth or knew a transfer’s context.
Prosecutorial, regulatory and civil context
A December 19, 2019 SDNY memorandum, page 67 reported no immediate indication of financial criminal misconduct at that stage and no identified signs of client-money trading in Deutsche accounts. The bank’s internal investigation continued. This was a qualified assessment, not final exoneration or a ruling on later findings.
The July 2020 NYDFS action imposed a $150 million penalty covering Epstein and two unrelated correspondent relationships. Its consent order found deficient monitoring while stating that Currency Transaction Reports were filed appropriately. It left ultimate criminal use to criminal authorities and credited cooperation and remediation. These were administrative findings, not a criminal judgment.
The May 2023 opinion allowed four civil claims to proceed at the pleading stage, not after a liability trial. The October 20, 2023 judgment approved a $75 million settlement, dismissed released claims with prejudice and expressly disclaimed any admission or evidence of liability or wrongdoing. See the litigation index for separate proceedings.
In a statement updated in 2026, Deutsche Bank called onboarding Epstein an error, expressed regret, and described cooperation and stronger controls. These are the bank’s claims, not independent verification of their effectiveness.
2026 developments
August 4: Senator Ron Wyden’s Finance Committee staff report said Deutsche retrospectively flagged more than $250 million in suspicious wires after the 2019 arrest. One cited suspicious activity report covered 1,140 transfers totaling $147 million—an example, not an additional sum. The staff analysis drew on in-camera Treasury review and public records, without a transaction-level reconciliation establishing a unique total. Suspicious activity is not proof every transfer was criminal. The committee’s announcement remains available; its linked report PDF, pages 44–45 was unavailable on October 29, 2026.
September 30: Wyden requested FBI banker interview reports, including Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America records. His letter described an unreleased interview concerning an unnamed banker but did not identify that banker’s employer. The request does not revise the presentation or establish its classifications as criminal findings.
October 15: The introduced Epstein Wall Street Records Act, H.R. 10820 proposes regulatory-record disclosure and investigations, with protections for victims’ identifying information. The introduced text is a proposal, not operative law or a finding of wrongdoing by covered institutions.
Related records
Separate FBI interviews cover Amanda Kirby’s wire-handling account and Cherie Quigley’s deferred-review account. They are witness accounts, not automatic corroboration of each bank classification. The financial transaction evidence index connects records and entity research.
Sources and document copies
The PDF is the presentation source; archive references are separate. General Justice Department publication notices do not establish whether or why this document was removed or replaced.
- 52-page presentation · EFTA01681865 archive record
- 609827 beneficiary table · 609833 archive reference
- 609850 archive reference · NYDFS announcement
- DOJ Epstein Library · DOJ publication announcement
- Network mapping guide · Epstein Search Hub