Michael Horowitz
Snapshot
| Field | Documented information |
|---|---|
| Public identity | Michael E. Horowitz, attorney and federal inspector general |
| Epstein related office | Inspector General of the United States Department of Justice during the investigation of federal custody failures |
| DOJ tenure | Began April 16, 2012; served until his move to the Federal Reserve Board and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in June 2025 |
| Current office | Inspector General for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, effective June 30, 2025 |
| Principal Epstein report | DOJ OIG Report 23-085, released June 27, 2023 |
| Investigative scope | Bureau of Prisons personnel’s custody, care and supervision of Epstein at MCC New York from July 6 through August 10, 2019 |
| Central findings | Serious staff misconduct, failures of supervision, inaccurate records, inadequate inmate safeguards and defective camera recording systems |
| Finding about the death | The OIG found no evidence contradicting the FBI’s determination that Epstein’s death was not the result of a criminal act |
| Separate review | The Office of Professional Responsibility reviewed the handling of the earlier federal prosecution and nonprosecution agreement |
| Reform status | Six recommendations remained listed as open on the OIG report page when checked October 7, 2026 |
| Last checked | October 7, 2026 |
Michael Horowitz’s office released the principal federal custody investigation into Jeffrey Epstein on June 27, 2023. The report documented serious failures at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York and called for changes extending across the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Horowitz was the senior oversight official who publicly presented those findings. The interviews, forensic work and detailed conclusions were the work of the Office of the Inspector General, or OIG, rather than a personal eyewitness account by its director.
Horowitz’s own public statement connected the prison’s failures to two consequences: a person in federal custody had not been safeguarded, and Epstein’s victims lost the opportunity to have the pending prosecution against him proceed to a criminal judgment. His role belongs in the history of government accountability for the case. The records discussed here identify an investigator and oversight official, not an associate in Epstein’s social or financial network.
Important Points
- Horowitz was DOJ Inspector General during the 2019 investigation and the 2023 report. He moved to a different inspector general office in June 2025.
- The OIG reviewed prison personnel and custody practices. The FBI investigated the circumstances of the death, and the New York City medical examiner made the medical determination.
- The OIG found serious misconduct and documented falsification of prison records. Its conclusion about the absence of evidence of a criminal act causing death did not erase those findings.
- The 2020 review of the earlier federal nonprosecution agreement was issued by the Office of Professional Responsibility, or OPR. It was a different investigation by a different office.
- In October 2021, Horowitz told the Senate that DOJ leadership had denied his office permission to investigate the nonprosecution agreement. This statement is part of his own public testimony.
- The report recommended eight institutional changes and consideration of discipline or other administrative action. Prosecutors and prison administrators retained their respective decision making responsibilities.
- The OIG’s status label “Resolved” did not mean a recommendation had been closed. Several remained on its open recommendations list in October 2026.
Professional Background and Exact Tenure
His official biography records a career spanning federal prosecution, private practice and oversight. He served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1991 to 1999, including leadership of its Public Corruption Unit, then worked in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division from 1999 to 2002. From 2002 to 2012 he was a partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. He also served on the United States Sentencing Commission. He holds degrees from Brandeis University and Harvard Law School.
The inspectors general council’s announcement identifies April 16, 2012 as his swearing in date at DOJ. His later service included chairing the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency from 2015 to 2020 and the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee from April 2020 until February 2026. The latter committee remained a separate responsibility from the Epstein investigation.
The Federal Reserve OIG’s current biography states that his appointment as inspector general for the Federal Reserve Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau took effect June 30, 2025. As of October 7, 2026, that is the office the official biography identifies. His June 2023 statements therefore require their historical DOJ title; later DOJ actions should not automatically be attributed to him.
The Different Institutions and Their Responsibilities
The report’s introductory explanation describes a joint OIG and FBI investigation with distinct responsibilities. Understanding those boundaries prevents a custody review from being mistaken for a new prosecution of Epstein’s entire network or a review of every decision made since the original Palm Beach investigation.
| Institution or official | Relevant responsibility | Limit of the role |
|---|---|---|
| Horowitz and DOJ OIG | Investigating misconduct and institutional failures involving BOP personnel; issuing findings and recommendations | Oversight did not make Horowitz the warden, the medical examiner or the prosecutor deciding charges |
| Federal Bureau of Investigation | Investigating the circumstances and cause of Epstein’s death, alongside work with OIG | The FBI’s conclusion about the death was distinct from OIG findings about staff conduct |
| New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner | Autopsy and medical determination of cause and manner of death | The medical determination was not made personally by Horowitz |
| Southern District of New York prosecutors | Charging decisions and the criminal case against staff accused of falsifying records | The OIG’s findings did not themselves constitute a conviction or a prosecutorial decision |
| Bureau of Prisons leadership | Custody operations, staff supervision, discipline and implementation of institutional reforms | Agreement with an OIG recommendation did not by itself establish that the reform had been implemented |
| Office of Professional Responsibility | Review of professional conduct by the federal prosecutors who handled the earlier Epstein investigation | Its November 2020 report was not the June 2023 custody report |
Horowitz’s testimony on inspector general independence also identifies an important structural limit. The OIG was a statutorily independent oversight office within the Justice Department. That description did not mean it possessed unlimited jurisdiction over every DOJ decision, could independently prosecute crimes, or could compel every outside witness to provide testimony.
Why the Earlier Plea Agreement Went to OPR
An August 29, 2019 congressional letter urged Attorney General William Barr to permit a broader OIG investigation covering the officials who approved, reviewed and defended Epstein’s nonprosecution agreement. The letter, copied to Horowitz, recounted his January 29 response that his office lacked jurisdiction over that professional conduct inquiry. It is direct evidence of the lawmakers’ request and their account of his response; it should not be presented as the original January letter.
Horowitz addressed the jurisdiction issue himself in October 2021. In written Senate testimony supporting expanded OIG authority, he said DOJ regulations permitted the office to request permission from the Deputy Attorney General to investigate professional misconduct by department lawyers. He said every such request had been denied, including the request to investigate the circumstances in which Epstein received his nonprosecution agreement from the Southern District of Florida. That is a direct statement by Horowitz about the limits placed on his office, rather than a motive inferred from a later press account.
The Justice Department’s November 12, 2020 announcement identifies OPR as the office that examined the resolution of the 2006 to 2008 federal investigation and prosecutors’ treatment of victims. OPR did not find professional misconduct under its disciplinary framework. It nevertheless found poor judgment by Alexander Acosta in resolving the investigation through the agreement and in failing to ensure that victims would be notified of the state plea hearing. It also found that victims had not received the forthright and sensitive treatment the department expected.
The separate OPR executive summary concerns prosecutorial decisions, while Horowitz’s 2023 OIG report concerns custody at MCC New York. Neither report should be used as a substitute for the other. The record also does not support describing Horowitz’s jurisdictional position as a personal endorsement of the agreement or as proof that he arranged its terms.
The Opening of the Custody Investigation
The OIG report dates the inquiry’s beginning to notification from BOP that Epstein had been found dead at MCC New York on August 10, 2019. The report’s substantive custody period began with Epstein’s arrival after his July 6 arrest and ended with his death. It examined decisions during that detention, including supervision requirements, staff communications, housing, records and surveillance.
An email from Horowitz to Geoffrey Berman provides a small but direct trace of his personal involvement on August 10. Sent at 23:38:10 UTC, its subject asks, “You free for a call on Epstein matter?” The released page contains the header and no message body. It establishes that he requested a call; it does not establish that Berman answered or what either official said.
A separate FBI email chain forwarded an account of a call from Horowitz that evening. The account described the existence of prison round logs and the opening of a false statement investigation to be worked by OIG and FBI agents. This was an early investigative account, not a final finding. The chain independently documents discussion of a call, but it does not establish that it was the call requested in the separate Berman email.
The two records show why precise attribution matters. One is Horowitz’s outgoing message. The other is a report by someone else of what he said, circulated within the FBI. Neither should be expanded into an undocumented transcript or a claim that he personally performed every investigative step.
What the OIG Examined and How It Reached Its Findings
The methodology section says the OIG interviewed 54 witnesses, several more than once, and also participated in interviews of 15 inmates. The witnesses included correctional staff, facility leaders, medical staff, employees responsible for the camera system, other BOP personnel and contractors, and a relative of Epstein. Three of the interviewed inmates had cells opposite Epstein’s and a direct line of sight to his cell door. Those categories should not be collapsed into a claim that Horowitz personally interviewed all of them.
The documentary record comprised more than 127,000 documents, as well as video and photographs. Investigators examined staff rosters, duty logs, count slips, round sheets, inmate transfer and housing records, medical and psychological records, visitor and telephone records, staff communications, camera service records, policies and financial records. They also conducted forensic analysis of SHU computers and BOP cellular telephones, reviewed FBI investigative records and interviewed the medical examiner who performed the autopsy.
The report’s standard for misconduct findings was a preponderance of the evidence unless otherwise noted. That administrative standard differs from the proof required for a criminal conviction. The report weighed conflicting accounts against records and other witnesses and sometimes rejected an employee’s explanation. Those determinations are OIG findings under the stated standard, not verdicts returned by a criminal jury.
The methodology also records limits. One of Epstein’s attorneys declined an interview, citing attorney client privilege and litigation involving the estate. The report did not have complete recorded surveillance of the relevant housing area. The existence of these limits is part of the investigation’s published record and must remain visible when its conclusions are summarized.
The Accountability Findings
The conclusions identified failures across several layers of custody management. They extended beyond the two employees stationed in the SHU during the final overnight shift. The OIG examined the obligations of officers, lieutenants, the captain, the warden and those responsible for technical systems. It linked individual lapses to recurring institutional weaknesses.
| Area | OIG finding | Accountability issue |
|---|---|---|
| Cellmate assignment | Staff did not implement the Psychology Department’s requirement that Epstein have an appropriate cellmate after his cellmate was transferred | Communication, supervisory follow through and contingency planning failed |
| Rounds and inmate counts | Required counts and rounds were omitted, while records falsely indicated that they had occurred | The documentation created an inaccurate appearance of supervision |
| Cell searches and safety | The OIG found deficient search practices and excessive linens in the cell | Routine safeguards were not reliably implemented or documented |
| Telephone access | A supervisor permitted an unrecorded and unmonitored call contrary to policy | Established controls were bypassed within the facility |
| Camera recording | A recording system failure left investigators with limited footage; the malfunction was discovered before the death but not repaired in time | Technical maintenance and regular functionality checks were inadequate |
| Supervision and candor | The OIG identified job performance failures by supervisors and lack of candor by several interviewees | Accountability extended to management and the truthfulness of explanations supplied to investigators |
The supervisory findings distinguish failure to transmit information from failure to act on information already available. Some supervisors had received notice of the cellmate’s transfer but did not ensure a replacement was assigned. The OIG found that supervisors could not satisfy their responsibilities simply by waiting for a subordinate to alert them. It also criticized the absence of a contingency plan for identifying an appropriate replacement.
The discussion of camera systems places MCC New York within a longer record of OIG warnings. The report described inadequacies documented since at least 2013 and a 2016 recommendation addressing camera upgrades. In its account, later upgrades had addressed some deficiencies without resolving all of them. The significance for oversight is the persistence of known risks, rather than an inference that every equipment failure was deliberate.
The staffing analysis likewise connected overtime and personnel shortages with operational risks. It described how staff temporarily assigned to help upgrade cameras could instead be used to cover custody posts. This analysis supported reform beyond the conduct of a single officer, while leaving intact the findings that employees had failed to carry out existing duties.
What the Investigation Said About the Death
The executive summary states the OIG’s conclusion carefully: investigators found no evidence contradicting the FBI’s determination that there was no criminality in how Epstein died. The New York City medical examiner determined suicide. The OIG nevertheless found significant misconduct by prison staff and conditions that left Epstein without required safeguards. These findings can coexist because they address different questions.
The surveillance chapter explains the evidence gap. Cameras continued to provide live feeds, but the recording system failed for many cameras. Available footage showed part of the common area and access routes, not Epstein’s cell door itself. Investigators evaluated that limited footage alongside witnesses, records and the physical security arrangements. The report does not present a recording of events inside the cell.
The detailed death investigation and the autopsy records guide address the medical and chronological questions at greater length. For Horowitz’s role, the key distinction is that he announced an investigative conclusion while also identifying extensive failures requiring accountability. The conclusion was not a blanket finding that all prison operations were proper.
Horowitz’s Own Public Explanation
The June 2023 video transcript is the clearest source for words issued in Horowitz’s own voice. He described staffing, camera systems, care of people at risk of suicide and disregard of BOP policies as recurring operational problems. He summarized the cellmate, monitoring and search failures, while keeping the OIG’s administrative findings separate from the FBI’s conclusion about the death.
His statement emphasized the harm to victims. He said the failures had deprived Epstein’s victims of the opportunity to seek justice through the criminal process. In context, this concerns the pending prosecution of Epstein. It should not be read to mean that every other criminal case or every civil avenue concerning his conduct ended with his death.
The accompanying press release names Horowitz as the official announcing the report, but its detailed findings are attributed to the OIG. The report itself is an institutional investigation issued by the office’s Investigations Division. Neither the public statement nor the announcement establishes that Horowitz personally observed MCC conditions in July or August 2019.
Disputed Assessments and the Bureau’s Response
A retired warden’s response to the draft report was addressed to Horowitz and states that the author reviewed the draft on April 5, 2023. The author disputed the criticism that no backup cellmate had been selected, arguing that the changing inmate population, security threats and shortage of suitable candidates left no appropriate backup. The released copy redacts the author’s name, which is not reconstructed here. The memorandum establishes an objection submitted during the review process; it does not by itself establish that the objection was accepted.
The final report retained the poor judgment finding concerning the absence of a backup cellmate assignment. A footnote records the warden’s response that there had been no suitable backup candidates. Presenting both the objection and the final conclusion gives readers the relevant disagreement without converting the warden’s explanation into an OIG finding or omitting it altogether.
BOP Director Colette Peters’s June 22, 2023 response agreed with all eight recommendations. She characterized the misconduct as involving a small proportion of the workforce and emphasized ongoing efforts to improve accountability. On staffing, BOP agreed to continue its work but argued that the failures identified in this case reflected employees not adhering to their duties rather than a staffing shortage. That qualification is important: agreement on a recommended reform did not mean BOP adopted every aspect of the OIG’s causal analysis.
The OIG’s analysis of that response required additional action and documentation before closing recommendations. For the second recommendation, it expressly found BOP’s response not fully responsive: a process for choosing a cellmate did not answer the separate need to ensure that a required cellmate remained continuously assigned. The exchange shows how oversight continued after a general statement of agreement.
Criminal Prosecution and Administrative Fault
The criminal case chronology in the report records the November 19, 2019 indictment of Tova Noel and Michael Thomas for conspiracy and falsification of records. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York later entered deferred prosecution agreements with them on May 25, 2021. The agreements included admissions that they had falsely certified counts and rounds and required cooperation, community service and other conditions.
The same chronology records the disposition: on December 13, 2021, the court dismissed the pending charges after prosecutors determined that the defendants had fulfilled the agreements. The outcome was not a trial conviction, and the indictment should not be presented as proof of guilt by itself. At the same time, the admissions described in the agreements and the OIG’s administrative findings should not be erased by calling the dismissal a finding that all their conduct was proper.
The OIG also reported that prosecutors declined other cases involving employees it found had created false documentation. The report recommended that BOP review the described conduct and performance and decide whether discipline or other administrative action was appropriate. This separated the OIG’s investigative findings, prosecutors’ charging discretion, the court’s disposition and the agency’s employment decisions. The report did not confer all four functions on Horowitz.
Eight Recommendations and the Difference Between Agreement and Completion
The report’s recommendations addressed safeguards capable of applying beyond MCC New York. They concerned continuity of care after suicide watch, reliable observation, management supervision and the basic staffing and technology needed to keep a facility functioning.
| Recommendation | Requested institutional change |
|---|---|
| 1 | Establish a process for assigning a cellmate after suicide watch or psychological observation, with criteria for appropriate exceptions |
| 2 | Ensure continuity of a required cellmate assignment, including contingency planning for a replacement |
| 3 | Review approval and documentation of legal or social visits during suicide watch or psychological observation |
| 4 | Improve methods for accounting for inmates’ whereabouts and wellbeing |
| 5 | Clarify what a lieutenant must do when conducting a supervisory round |
| 6 | Continue developing and implementing plans to address staffing shortages |
| 7 | Evaluate and improve cell search procedures |
| 8 | Require recording capacity and regular functionality checks for institutional security camera systems |
Appendix B initially marked the recommendations “Resolved” while setting out what BOP still needed to provide or implement before the OIG would consider closing them. In that context, the status reflected a path toward corrective action, not a certification that the problem had already been fixed. The OIG requested an update within 90 days of the report’s issuance.
The official report page checked October 7, 2026 still displayed recommendations 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 under its open recommendations heading, with each labeled “Resolved.” These concern cellmate assignment and continuity, inmate accountability, supervisory rounds, staffing and camera systems. The page did not list recommendations 3 and 7 in that open section. Its display does not supply the full underlying closure documentation or an implementation history for those two recommendations.
The continuing open entries show that the report’s publication and BOP’s initial agreement did not complete the oversight process. Because Horowitz left DOJ in June 2025, the October 2026 display is a status of the office’s recommendations, not proof of actions personally taken or omitted by him after that departure.
Later Testimony and the Wider Prison Oversight Record
Horowitz’s February 28, 2024 Senate testimony returned to Epstein’s custody failures in a broader examination of deaths in federal prisons. He summarized the unfulfilled cellmate directive, missed rounds and counts, inadequate cell searches, supervision and camera problems. He presented these findings alongside other investigations and inspections to explain why risks could not be understood solely through one notorious case.
His account of a separate deaths in custody review covered 344 deaths in the categories of suicide, homicide, accident and unknown factors during fiscal years 2014 through 2021. It described recurring problems with housing decisions, staff communication, required rounds, emergency response and the documentation needed to learn from deaths. That review had its own scope and recommendations. Its inclusion in his testimony showed that the institutional issues raised by the Epstein report remained part of his public oversight agenda.
The distinction matters when assessing effectiveness. Issuing a critical report and urging reform are documented oversight actions. Whether recommended changes were implemented, whether they worked and what disciplinary measures followed require their own evidence. A report’s existence alone cannot answer those later accountability questions.
Verified Evidence Appearances
| Record | What the source establishes | Important limit |
|---|---|---|
| EFTA00088582 | August 10, 2019 email from Horowitz to Geoffrey Berman requesting a call on the Epstein matter | Header only; no call transcript or reply appears on the released page |
| EFTA00165281 | FBI circulation of an account of a call from Horowitz and early discussion of a false statement investigation | A relayed investigative account, not words directly recorded from Horowitz or a final finding |
| EFTA00175131 | August 29, 2019 congressional request for a broader OIG investigation, copied to Horowitz | The lawmakers describe his January response; their letter is not the original response |
| EFTA00035913 | Retired warden’s memorandum to Horowitz disputing a draft cellmate finding after an April 5, 2023 review | A subject’s rebuttal; the author’s redacted identity is not inferred |
| EFTA02847760 | June 27, 2023 OIG press release announcing the report through Horowitz | Institutional summary; the complete report supplies methodology, details and qualifications |
| EFTA02847763 | June 2023 transcript of Horowitz’s public video explanation | His public presentation of the office’s work, not testimony that he personally witnessed the custody events |
These identifiers locate specific documents, not allegations of participation in Epstein’s crimes. A record containing the surname Horowitz also requires identification: Adam Horowitz, who represented survivors, is a different lawyer. Neither a surname match nor a name on an oversight document establishes a social relationship with Epstein.
Key Takeaways
- Horowitz’s documented role was leadership of an oversight office that investigated BOP custody failures and publicly pressed for institutional reform.
- His own 2021 testimony explains that the office sought permission to investigate the earlier nonprosecution agreement and was denied that authority. The later OPR and OIG reports must be kept distinct.
- The 2023 report documented extensive misconduct while finding no evidence contradicting the FBI’s conclusion about the death. Those are separate findings with different subjects.
- The report used interviews, a large documentary record and forensic work, while disclosing incomplete surveillance and limits on witness cooperation.
- The warden’s rebuttal, BOP’s qualified response and the OIG’s conditions for closing recommendations belong in the accountability record alongside the headline findings.
- Criminal charges, deferred prosecution agreements, dismissal, administrative findings and potential discipline are different outcomes. Horowitz did not personally exercise every authority involved.
- The open recommendation entries in October 2026 demonstrate an unfinished public follow through record, while his current professional role is at the Federal Reserve Board and CFPB.
Related EpsteinWiki Reading
- Federal Bureau of Prisons, for the agency’s custody responsibilities and institutional history.
- Death of Jeffrey Epstein, for the broader investigation and competing claims about the death.
- Jeffrey Epstein Death Timeline 2019, for the detailed sequence of custody events.
- Jeffrey Epstein Autopsy and Associated Records, for the medical examiner material.
- DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility Executive Summary, for the separate review of prosecutors’ decisions.
- Alexander Acosta, for the federal agreement and the decisions preceding Epstein’s 2008 state plea.
- Tova Noel, for the correctional employee’s own place in the custody and records investigation.
Sources
- Federal Reserve Board and CFPB OIG official biography of Michael E. Horowitz. Current office, appointment date and career history; checked October 7, 2026.
- Council announcement of Horowitz’s election as chair. Official account of his April 16, 2012 DOJ swearing in.
- Horowitz’s October 21, 2021 Senate testimony on inspector general independence. Printed pages 1 through 4 explain professional misconduct jurisdiction, denial of the Epstein agreement request and testimonial subpoena limits.
- DOJ OPR executive summary of the Epstein prosecution review, November 2020. Distinct scope, professional conduct framework and findings.
- DOJ statement announcing the OPR findings, November 12, 2020.
- DOJ OIG investigation and review of Epstein’s custody at MCC New York, Report 23-085, June 2023. Printed pages 1 through 7 cover scope and methodology; pages 94 through 114 contain conclusions and recommendations; pages 115 through 121 contain BOP’s response and the OIG’s analysis.
- DOJ OIG release announcing the custody report, June 27, 2023.
- Transcript of Horowitz’s public video statement, June 2023. Also released as EFTA02847763.
- Horowitz’s February 28, 2024 Senate Judiciary Committee testimony. Discussion of the Epstein report and a separate evaluation of deaths in BOP custody.
- OIG report page and open recommendation entries. Current display checked October 7, 2026.
- EFTA00088582. Horowitz’s August 10, 2019 call request to Berman.
- EFTA00165281. FBI email chain carrying an early account of a call from Horowitz.
- EFTA00175131. Congressional letter of August 29, 2019; the substantive letter begins on PDF page 2.
- EFTA00035913. Retired warden’s response to the draft report, referring to an April 5, 2023 review.
- EFTA02847760. Released copy of the June 27, 2023 OIG press announcement.