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Doe No. 103 v. Epstein, No. 9:10-cv-80309 (S.D. Fla. 2010)

Doe No. 103 v. Epstein, No. 9:10-cv-80309, was a federal civil action brought by a pseudonymous survivor against Jeffrey Epstein in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The complaint alleged that Epstein recruited, groomed, sexually abused, and sexually exploited the plaintiff beginning in January 2004, when she was a 17 year old high school student, and continuing through approximately May 2005.

The plaintiff invoked 18 U.S.C. section 2255, a federal civil remedy for people injured by specified federal crimes involving the sexual exploitation of minors. Her six counts alleged different predicate violations, including coercion and enticement, interstate travel for illicit sexual conduct, production and transportation of sexual images of a minor, and participation in a child exploitation enterprise.

The lawsuit did not reach a trial or a ruling on the truth of every allegation. The parties settled shortly after filing. A released settlement agreement states that Epstein paid $400,000, exclusive of attorney fees and costs. On May 19, 2010, Judge Kenneth A. Marra dismissed the action with prejudice, denied pending motions as moot, retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, and closed the case.

This article preserves the distinction between the plaintiff’s allegations, Epstein’s litigation positions, the terms of the settlement, and the court’s limited procedural orders. It also preserves the survivor’s court ordered anonymity.

Snapshot

FieldDetail
Full captionJane Doe No. 103 v. Jeffrey Epstein
CourtUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
DivisionWest Palm Beach Division
Docket number9:10-cv-80309
Initial case suffixWJZ, for Judge William J. Zloch
Final case suffixKAM, for Judge Kenneth A. Marra
Complaint filedFebruary 23, 2010
Complaint entered on public docketMarch 9, 2010
PlaintiffJane Doe No. 103, proceeding under a permanently protected pseudonym
DefendantJeffrey Epstein
Legal basis18 U.S.C. section 2255
CountsSix federal civil claims based on alleged predicate offenses
Jury demandYes
Settlement$400,000, exclusive of attorney fees and costs
Final dispositionDismissed with prejudice on May 19, 2010
Merits trialNone
Merits judgmentNone
AppealNone identified
Last fact checkSeptember 9, 2026

Key Takeaways

  • Jane Doe No. 103 alleged that Epstein began abusing her when she was 17 and that the conduct continued for approximately 17 months.
  • She alleged that another minor recruited her from their workplace for a paid massage at Epstein’s Palm Beach residence.
  • The complaint asserted six claims under 18 U.S.C. section 2255, each tied to a different alleged federal predicate offense.
  • The complaint relied heavily on paragraph 8 of Epstein’s 2007 federal non-prosecution agreement, which addressed civil claims by identified victims proceeding under section 2255.
  • Epstein moved to dismiss Count Six, sought a more definite statement of the plaintiff’s age, and sought to strike allegations about his wider recruitment system.
  • The court never decided that motion. Settlement made the pending issues moot.
  • A released agreement records a $400,000 payment, while also stating that settlement was not an admission of liability or a violation of a predicate statute.
  • The action was dismissed with prejudice. That prevents the same claim from being refiled, but it is not a judicial finding that every allegation was proved or disproved.
  • The court permanently sealed the plaintiff’s identity. Her pseudonym should be preserved across indexes, exhibits, and related articles.

Case Overview

The complaint was filed on February 23, 2010. Because it was initially submitted with material concerning the plaintiff’s identity, it did not appear on the public docket until the court ruled on her anonymity request. On March 9, Judge William J. Zloch granted the unopposed motion to proceed anonymously, permanently sealed the filing that identified her, and directed the clerk to unseal the complaint, anonymity motion, and summons.

The action was one of a group of civil cases brought against Epstein in the Southern District of Florida after his 2008 Florida guilty pleas and the disclosure of his federal non-prosecution agreement. The complaint’s civil cover sheet identified 11 related pending cases. Doe No. 103 later asked that her action be transferred to Judge Kenneth A. Marra, who was coordinating discovery and procedural motions common to multiple Epstein survivor cases.

Judge Zloch entered a transfer order on April 27, 2010. Judge Marra accepted the transfer, and later filings used the suffix KAM or MARRA. This explains why surviving copies of the same docket show both 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ and 9:10-cv-80309-KAM. They refer to the same action, not two different lawsuits.

The case moved quickly. Epstein filed a dismissal motion in early April, amended it on April 12, and the parties reported in May that they were resolving the matter. They stipulated to dismissal with prejudice on May 18. Judge Marra entered the final dismissal order on May 19.


The Plaintiff and Her Anonymity

The plaintiff sued as Jane Doe No. 103. Her number was a litigation pseudonym used to distinguish her action from other anonymous survivor cases. It is not an invitation to match her with names in police files, contact books, school records, deposition exhibits, or other Doe lawsuits.

In her motion to seal and proceed anonymously, Doe explained that the complaint contained sensitive allegations of sexual assault and abuse while she was a minor. Epstein did not oppose the request. Judge Zloch’s March 9 order directed that her identifying filing remain permanently sealed and permitted her to proceed as Jane Doe No. 103.

The later settlement agreement separately required Epstein and his side not to release the plaintiff’s identity, name, or physical depiction absent an express written waiver, subject to limited litigation and claim related exceptions. The agreement also continued a no contact obligation tied to an earlier order in the coordinated litigation.

EpsteinWiki should follow the court’s privacy determination. The relevant public facts are the allegations, legal claims, evidence record, procedural history, and disposition. The plaintiff’s real name is not necessary to understand any of those matters.


Background to the Lawsuit

The complaint placed the plaintiff’s experience within the recruitment system investigated by the Palm Beach Police Department, the FBI, the Palm Beach County State Attorney’s Office, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.

In June 2008, Epstein pleaded guilty in Florida state court to solicitation of prostitution and procuring a person under 18 for prostitution. The civil complaint also relied on the federal non-prosecution agreement, its addendum, and its affirmation. Those documents had been executed in 2007 before Epstein entered the state pleas.

Paragraph 8 of the non-prosecution agreement provided special civil terms for identified victims who elected to sue exclusively under 18 U.S.C. section 2255. As quoted in Doe No. 103’s complaint, Epstein agreed not to contest federal jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or liability, and not to contest damages up to an amount agreed with the identified individual, if that individual proceeded exclusively under section 2255 and waived other claims.

The complaint alleged that Doe No. 103 was one of the victims identified by federal prosecutors. It therefore argued that Epstein was bound by paragraph 8. Epstein’s dismissal papers did not concede every allegation or every asserted predicate violation. They did, however, state that he would honor his obligations under paragraph 8 and would not contest the allegation that he committed at least one predicate offense alleged by Doe No. 103.

That litigation statement is important, but it must be described accurately. It was a position taken in a defense filing because of the non-prosecution agreement. It was not a jury verdict, a criminal conviction on the federal predicates, or a judicial finding that every count was established.


Factual Allegations

The 19 page complaint alleged that Epstein operated a systematic recruitment and abuse scheme involving minor girls, paid appointments, referrals, household staff, drivers, assistants, telephones, residences, and interstate travel. It alleged that girls were brought to his Palm Beach residence for massages and that he progressively crossed boundaries and committed sexual acts.

The plaintiff alleged that she was a 17 year old high school student when a coworker recruited her in or around January 2004. The coworker was also described as a minor whom Epstein paid to recruit other underage girls. According to the complaint, the coworker accompanied Doe to Epstein’s residence, where an assistant led her to a room containing a massage table.

Doe alleged that Epstein instructed her to massage him and remove clothing. She said she refused, that he continued to press physical boundaries, and that he touched her despite her objections. The complaint alleged that he paid her $200 after the first encounter.

The pleading alleged that contact continued for approximately 17 months. Doe claimed that Epstein and his agents telephoned to arrange appointments, sometimes twice in a day, and that the alleged sexual conduct escalated. She alleged at least 100 incidents between approximately January 2004 and May 2005.

The complaint also alleged a grooming pattern involving money, gifts, promised modeling opportunities, offers involving college admission and tuition, and travel related inducements. It alleged that Epstein knew her age and urged her to become legally emancipated so that she could travel with him.

One allegation had a documentary dimension. Doe claimed that Epstein took sexual images of her while she was a minor, transported at least one image through interstate or foreign commerce, and kept records of encounters. She further alleged that Palm Beach police recovered one or more images and her high school transcript during the October 20, 2005 search of Epstein’s residence.

These are allegations from a civil complaint. The dismissal following settlement meant that no trial tested each allegation and no merits opinion decided whether every factual claim was true.


Alleged Recruitment and Grooming Structure

Paragraphs 10 through 16 of the complaint described conduct extending beyond Doe’s individual encounters. The plaintiff alleged that Epstein and at least three assistants arranged appointments, obtained personal information, transported girls, delivered payments, and helped maintain a recurring supply of minor girls.

The complaint described a referral system in which a person who brought another girl could receive money. It alleged that Epstein and his staff selected economically vulnerable teenagers whom they believed would be less likely to report him or be believed. The alleged use of household staff, vehicles, telephones, cash, and controlled residential space was presented as infrastructure, not incidental background.

Epstein specifically asked the court to strike these wider system allegations as immaterial to Doe’s individual section 2255 claim. His motion argued that the relevant pleading should focus on conduct involving Doe herself. The court did not decide that request before settlement.

The unresolved motion matters when assessing the record. The broader system allegations remained allegations. They were neither stricken nor adopted as findings in this case. At the same time, their inclusion shows that Doe’s theory was not limited to isolated personal misconduct. She alleged that her experience was made possible by an organized recruitment and scheduling system.


The Six Federal Claims

All six counts sought a civil remedy under 18 U.S.C. section 2255. Section 2255 does not itself create the underlying criminal offense. It allows an injured person to sue when the injury results from one of the federal offenses listed in the statute. The complaint used six alleged predicate violations:

CountAlleged predicateCore allegation
One18 U.S.C. section 2422(b)Use of interstate or foreign commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prostitution or unlawful sexual activity
Two18 U.S.C. section 2423(b)Interstate or foreign travel with the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct
Three18 U.S.C. section 2251Persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct to produce a visual depiction
Four18 U.S.C. section 2252(a)(1)Mailing, transporting, shipping, or sending a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct through interstate or foreign commerce
Five18 U.S.C. section 2252A(a)(1)Transportation of child sexual abuse material through interstate or foreign commerce
Six18 U.S.C. section 2252A(g)(1)Engaging in a child exploitation enterprise

The complaint used the statutory phrase “child pornography” in Count Five. This article uses “child sexual abuse material” outside the formal claim title because it more accurately describes images that record abuse. The terminology change does not alter the statute the plaintiff cited.

For each count, Doe sought actual and compensatory damages available under section 2255, attorney fees, costs, other appropriate relief, and a jury trial. She alleged lasting physical, psychological, educational, economic, privacy, dignity, and quality of life harms.

The six counts were never decided on the merits. Their presence in a complaint proves that the claims were made, not that each predicate was judicially established.


Epstein’s Motion to Dismiss and Strike

On April 5, 2010, Epstein filed a motion to dismiss Count Six, for a more definite statement, and to strike. The title and opening paragraph of the filed motion are important because some duplicate OCR records incorrectly summarize it as an attack on all six counts. The operative request targeted Count Six, together with pleading details and portions of the factual narrative.

Epstein argued that the child exploitation enterprise provision in 18 U.S.C. section 2252A(g) did not take effect until July 27, 2006. Because Doe alleged conduct from 2004 through May 2005, he argued that the later provision could not serve as a predicate for Count Six without an impermissible retroactive application.

He also asked the court to require Doe to state her date of birth more precisely. His theory was that section 2255 protected a person injured while a minor, while some alleged conduct extended across the period when Doe turned 18. He asked to strike allegations concerning conduct after her eighteenth birthday.

Finally, Epstein asked to strike paragraphs 10 through 16, which described his alleged wider recruitment and abuse operation. He argued that those paragraphs concerned other girls and were immaterial to Doe’s individual claim.

On April 12, Epstein filed a motion for permission to amend and attached an amended dismissal motion. The amendment clarified the retroactivity argument. Doe did not oppose the amendment itself.

The motion was never adjudicated. Doe obtained extensions to respond, and on May 13 she told the court that the parties were in the process of resolving the matter and expected the briefing to become moot. The final dismissal order denied all pending motions as moot.


Procedural History

DateEventRecord
February 23, 2010Doe filed the complaint and jury demand under seal with an anonymity requestComplaint
March 9, 2010Judge Zloch granted anonymous filing, permanently sealed Doe’s identity, and unsealed the complaint and related public papersAnonymity order
March 25, 2010Epstein requested and received additional time to respondExtension motion
April 1, 2010Doe moved to transfer the case to Judge Marra for coordination with related Epstein survivor actionsTransfer motion
April 2, 2010Epstein filed a notice agreeing to transferNotice of agreement
April 5, 2010Epstein moved to dismiss Count Six, require more precise pleading, and strike specified allegationsDismissal motion
April 12, 2010Epstein sought leave to amend and attached his clarified motionMotion to amend
April 22, 2010Doe requested an agreed extension to respondFirst response extension
April 27, 2010Judge Zloch transferred the case and Judge Marra accepted itTransfer order
April 29, 2010Judge Marra entered a scheduling and discovery orderScheduling order
May 13, 2010Doe reported that the parties were resolving the matter and sought another agreed extensionSettlement related extension
May 18, 2010The parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice and asked the court to retain enforcement jurisdictionDismissal stipulation
May 19, 2010Judge Marra dismissed the case with prejudice, denied pending motions as moot, retained jurisdiction, and closed the caseFinal order

The short timeline explains why the docket contains no answer, merits discovery ruling, summary judgment decision, trial, or appeal.


Transfer and Coordination With Related Cases

Doe asked that the case be transferred because Judge Marra was already handling common discovery and procedural matters in a group of Epstein civil cases. Her transfer motion cited Jane Doe No. 2 v. Jeffrey Epstein, No. 08-80119, as the lead matter for coordinated issues.

The complaint’s civil cover attachment listed these related case numbers:

  • 08-80119
  • 08-80232
  • 08-80380
  • 08-80381
  • 08-80811
  • 08-80893
  • 08-80993
  • 08-80994
  • 09-80469
  • 09-80802
  • 09-81092

Transfer did not merge Doe No. 103’s identity, claims, or settlement with those of another plaintiff. It routed common matters to a judge already familiar with the related litigation. Researchers should not assume that a filing in one numbered action automatically proves a fact in every coordinated case.


Settlement Agreement

The released Settlement Agreement and General Release identifies the pending action as Jane Doe No. 103 v. Jeffrey Epstein, No. 10-80309-CIV-Marra, and provides for dismissal with prejudice after payment cleared.

The agreement records consideration of $400,000 plus other valuable consideration. It states that the amount did not include attorney fees or costs. It also states that payment had been placed in the plaintiff’s attorneys’ trust account but could not be released until the agreement was executed and the case dismissed.

The release was broad. It covered claims against Epstein and other persons or entities who could have been included as potential defendants. The agreement said it fulfilled Epstein’s obligations to Doe under the 2007 non-prosecution agreement, exclusive of attorney fees and costs.

The agreement also contained confidentiality, anonymity, no contact, enforcement, medical lien, and cooperation provisions. Although the settlement amount later appeared in a government production and is now publicly readable, the agreement itself required the parties to keep the amount confidential except in specified circumstances.

Most importantly for legal accuracy, the agreement characterized the matter as a disputed claim resolved to avoid litigation. It said settlement was not an admission of liability or fault and was not an admission that Epstein violated a federal predicate for section 2255 or any other federal or state statute.

That clause does not erase the complaint or Epstein’s separate commitments under the non-prosecution agreement. It does mean that the settlement amount cannot accurately be described as a damages verdict or a judicial finding of liability.


Final Dismissal and What It Means

The parties filed a Rule 41 stipulation on May 18, 2010. Judge Marra’s May 19 final order of dismissal did four things:

  • Dismissed the action with prejudice.
  • Denied all pending motions as moot.
  • Retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.
  • Closed the case.

“With prejudice” means the plaintiff could not simply bring the same settled action again. It gives the dismissal finality. It does not mean that the judge conducted a trial and found the allegations true, nor does it mean that the judge rejected them.

The motion to dismiss became moot because the case ended by agreement. Accordingly, there is no ruling on Epstein’s retroactivity argument, his request for a more definite statement, or his request to strike the wider scheme allegations.

No appeal is identified in the released docket materials. The settlement and dismissal concluded the litigation less than three months after the complaint was filed.


Important Evidence Files

The following records are the most useful primary materials for this case:

Evidence fileWhat it establishesLimits
EFTA02739126Complete complaint, six counts, jury demand, civil cover sheet, and related case listContains allegations, not merits findings
EFTA02739145Plaintiff’s request to proceed anonymouslyDoes not disclose the protected identity
EFTA02739154Court order permanently sealing the plaintiff’s identityProcedural privacy ruling only
EFTA02739166Plaintiff’s request to transfer for coordinationDescribes related litigation but does not consolidate all facts or claims
EFTA02739173Epstein’s original motion attacking Count Six and specified allegationsDefense argument, not a ruling
EFTA02739188Amended motion with clarified retroactivity theoryDefense argument, not a ruling
EFTA02739214Transfer from Judge Zloch to Judge MarraAdministrative and procedural order
EFTA02739218Notice that the parties were resolving the matterDoes not state the settlement amount
EFTA02739224Signed stipulation to dismiss with prejudiceDoes not decide liability
EFTA02739226Final dismissal and closure orderNot a merits judgment
EFTA00727289Ten page settlement agreement, $400,000 amount, release, confidentiality, anonymity, and no admission termsPrivate agreement, not adjudicated factual findings
EFTA00298293Deposition excerpts discussing Palm Beach police evidence associated with Doe No. 103Testimony and exhibit questioning must be assessed in context
EFTA02824152Federal non-prosecution agreement invoked by the complaint and settlementAgreement terms do not independently prove each alleged predicate offense

The corpus contains duplicates of several filings. Duplicate production numbers should not be counted as separate motions, complaints, or judicial decisions.


Evidence Beyond the Pleadings

The complaint alleged that law enforcement had records connecting Doe to the investigation, including scheduling information, images, and her high school transcript. Later released deposition excerpts from Palm Beach detective Joseph Recarey contain questioning about evidence associated with Jane Doe No. 103, including a high school transcript reportedly found in Epstein’s master bedroom and Recarey’s interview of her.

Those excerpts provide potential corroborative context for limited points, especially that police identified and interviewed Doe and discussed a document associated with her. They should not be stretched beyond what the testimony supports. A witness’s answer in a deposition is evidence, not automatically a judicial finding.

The article intentionally does not reproduce unnecessary intimate testimony from those excerpts. The public interest is served by documenting the alleged recruitment pattern, the existence of the investigation, the civil claims, and the case outcome without republishing graphic details or creating a path to identify the survivor.


Legal Significance

This case is significant for four reasons.

First, it shows how the 2007 non-prosecution agreement influenced later civil litigation. The plaintiff framed paragraph 8 as a contractual path to liability and damages under section 2255. Epstein’s defense briefing acknowledged an obligation not to contest at least one alleged predicate offense while preserving disputes about Count Six, statutory versions, age, pleading scope, and damages structure.

Second, the case illustrates the importance of statutory timing. Count Six relied on a child exploitation enterprise provision enacted after the alleged conduct. Epstein raised retroactivity as a basis for dismissal. Settlement prevented a ruling, so this docket supplies an argument but no precedent resolving it.

Third, the action documents the difference between individual abuse allegations and evidence of a wider system. Doe pleaded both. Epstein sought to narrow the case to conduct involving her. Because the court did not rule, later researchers must not describe either side’s pleading position as the court’s conclusion.

Fourth, the case demonstrates how settlement can produce compensation and finality without public factfinding. Doe obtained a substantial payment and enforceable privacy protections. The public lost the opportunity for a full trial record, findings on all six predicates, and a reasoned decision on the dismissal motion.


Relationship to Other Epstein Proceedings

The action followed Epstein’s 2008 Florida convictions and depended on the non-prosecution agreement executed by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida. It was part of the wave of civil litigation that exposed how the federal agreement operated for identified victims.

It also overlapped factually with the Palm Beach police investigation. Allegations concerning recruitment through massages, referral payments, telephone scheduling, staff involvement, and records at the El Brillo Way residence resemble patterns described in police interviews and other survivor suits. Similarity is useful context, but it does not establish that different pseudonyms refer to the same person.

The case predates United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490 in the Southern District of New York, by nine years. The 2019 indictment concerned a separate federal prosecution, a different jurisdiction, and a later charging decision. Nothing in the 2010 settlement should be treated as a verdict in the 2019 criminal case.

The plaintiff also resolved her case while Epstein was alive. It is therefore distinct from survivor actions filed against the Estate of Jeffrey Epstein after his death in 2019 and from claims submitted through the later Epstein Victims’ Compensation Program.


Fact Check

ClaimAssessmentBasis
Doe No. 103 was 17 when the alleged conduct began.Supported as a pleaded allegationComplaint paragraph 17
The alleged conduct continued for approximately 17 months.Supported as a pleaded allegationComplaint paragraph 18
Epstein admitted every allegation in the complaint.FalseHis filings preserved multiple disputes, and the settlement contained a no admission clause
Epstein agreed not to contest at least one predicate offense alleged by Doe.Supported as a defense litigation statementFootnote in his dismissal motion discussing paragraph 8 of the non-prosecution agreement
The court ruled that Count Six was legally invalid.FalseThe motion was denied as moot after settlement
The court ruled that Doe’s wider scheme allegations were immaterial.FalseThe request to strike was never decided
Doe received $400,000.Supported by a released settlement agreementEFTA00727289 states the settlement amount
Attorney fees and costs were included in the $400,000.FalseThe agreement expressly excluded them
A jury awarded $400,000.FalseThe payment resulted from a private settlement
The case was dismissed without prejudice.FalseIt was dismissed with prejudice
The dismissal proved that the allegations were false.FalseSettlement ended the case without a merits determination
The case was initially before Judge Zloch and later transferred to Judge Marra.SupportedTransfer order and docket captions
The plaintiff’s identity is public because the settlement was released.FalseThe identifying docket filing remains permanently sealed, and the released agreement redacts her name

Questions Still Unanswered

  • What complete body of police and federal evidence specifically corroborated Doe No. 103’s allegations?
  • Which appointment, telephone, payment, travel, or household records referred to her?
  • What was the complete chain of custody for the high school transcript discussed in later testimony?
  • What images, if any, were authenticated as depicting this plaintiff, and what happened to them after seizure?
  • How would the court have resolved the retroactivity challenge to Count Six?
  • How would the court have treated alleged conduct occurring after the plaintiff turned 18?
  • Would the court have permitted the wider recruitment system allegations to remain in the pleading?
  • What attorney fees and costs were paid in addition to the $400,000 settlement amount?
  • Which potential defendants were covered by the broad release?
  • What evidence and negotiations produced the final settlement amount?
  • Which related cases involved materially similar section 2255 arguments, and how were those issues resolved?

Any further investigation should use authenticated records, avoid conflating Doe numbers, and preserve the plaintiff’s anonymity.


Related EpsteinWiki Pages


Source List

No case specific article from the established EpsteinWiki sleuth Substack list was located during the September 9, 2026 source check. This absence does not establish that no relevant independent analysis exists.

Previous Doe No. 102 v. Epstein, No. 9:09-cv-80656 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
Next Doe No. 3 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80232 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
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