L.M. v. Epstein, No. 9:09-cv-81092 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

UpdatedSeptember 10, 2026

ByEpsteinWiki

Case Snapshot

Field	Detail
Full caption	L.M. v. Jeffrey Epstein
Court	United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, West Palm Beach Division
Docket	9:09-cv-81092-KAM
Filed	July 24, 2009
District judge	Kenneth A. Marra, after transfer from Judge James I. Cohn
Plaintiff	L.M., a survivor who alleged that Epstein sexually exploited her from age 14 through age 17
Defendant	Jeffrey Epstein
Federal basis	Civil remedy under 18 U.S.C. § 2255
Complaint	234 pages and 156 separately pleaded § 2255 counts
Jury demand	Plaintiff
Trial	No trial occurred
Disposition	Settled and dismissed with prejudice on July 20, 2010
Public settlement amount	Not disclosed in the reviewed court filings
Parallel action	L.M. v. Jeffrey Epstein, No. 50-2008-CA-028051-XXXX-MB, Palm Beach County Circuit Court

Key Takeaways

L.M. alleged that Epstein first sexually exploited her in 2002, when she was 14 and attending middle school, and that the exploitation continued until approximately the end of October 2005.
The complaint alleged an average of four incidents per month. It converted that allegation into 156 separate counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, one count for each alleged incident from August 2002 through October 2005.
L.M. alleged that Epstein used money, employees, assistants, recruiters, gifts, manipulation, and her lack of adequate parental support to obtain access to her and to induce her to bring other girls to him.
L.M. filed motions asking to proceed under her initials and to place her true name in a sealed envelope. The reviewed docket continued to identify her as L.M.
Judge Kenneth A. Marra coordinated the case with other Epstein survivor actions for discovery and common procedural motions. The cases remained separate lawsuits.
Epstein moved to dismiss the complaint in June 2010 for alleged failure to complete service within the Rule 4(m) period. His motion also attacked the truth and purpose of the complaint. Those attacks were defense claims, not court findings.
The court never granted Epstein’s dismissal motion. The parties instead stipulated that the case be dismissed with prejudice and stated that the court should retain jurisdiction to enforce their settlement.
Judge Marra dismissed the case with prejudice, denied all pending motions as moot, and retained settlement enforcement jurisdiction. The public record reviewed here does not disclose the settlement amount or substantive terms.

Survivor Reading Note

This article discusses allegations of child sexual abuse, commercial sexual exploitation, coercion, recruitment, and trauma. It preserves the plaintiff’s initials and does not attempt to identify her. Details are included only when necessary to explain the claims, defenses, and procedural history.

The complaint and later defense motion sharply conflict. Allegations in the complaint are identified as L.M.’s allegations. Statements in Epstein’s motion are identified as defense assertions. The case ended through settlement, so neither account became a trial verdict.

Overview

L.M. filed this federal civil action against Jeffrey Epstein on July 24, 2009. The complaint alleged that Epstein began sexually exploiting her in Palm Beach in 2002, when she was 14, and continued doing so until approximately October 2005. It described her as a vulnerable child without adequate parental support and alleged that Epstein used his wealth, residence, staff, and payments to control and exploit her.

The complaint was unusual in size and structure. It ran 234 pages and pleaded 156 counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Each count corresponded to one alleged incident. The count headings began with August 2002 and ended with October 2005. Much of the count language repeated the same legal theory, claimed injuries, and request for relief.

L.M. was already pursuing a separate action against Epstein in Palm Beach County Circuit Court. The federal complaint stated that it sought civil remedies exclusively under § 2255. Epstein later relied on the parallel state action while arguing that the federal complaint had no legitimate purpose, but the court did not adopt that argument.

The federal action was transferred to Judge Kenneth A. Marra and coordinated with other survivor lawsuits for discovery and shared procedural motions. In June 2010, Epstein moved to dismiss for alleged failure to serve the complaint within the time then provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Before the court ruled on that motion, the parties settled. On July 20, 2010, they stipulated to dismissal with prejudice, and Judge Marra entered a final dismissal order.

Parties and Counsel

L.M. was a Palm Beach County resident who was 20 when she filed the federal action. Her complaint alleged abuse from age 14 through age 17. She sought to litigate under initials because the case concerned alleged sexual abuse while she was a minor and because public identification could intensify trauma and produce personal, professional, and economic harm.

Jeffrey Epstein was the sole defendant. L.M. sued him personally under the federal civil remedy provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2255.

Bradley J. Edwards represented L.M. The original filings identified his firm as Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler. By the time of dismissal, the filings reflected a different firm affiliation. The change matters because Epstein’s later motion attempted to connect the lawsuit to Scott Rothstein’s criminal fraud scheme. Nothing in the final order made a finding against L.M. or Edwards on that subject.

Epstein’s publicly listed counsel included Michael J. Pike and Robert D. Critton Jr. The docket also lists Jean-Luc Brunel as a material witness. Public copies and optical character recognition render Brunel’s name in more than one spelling.

Allegations in the Complaint

L.M. alleged that she was first brought to Epstein’s Palm Beach residence in 2002, when she was 14 and in middle school. She described herself at that time as vulnerable, economically deprived, and without adequate parental support.

According to the complaint, Epstein operated a system in which employees, assistants, and recruiters brought minor girls to his residence. L.M. alleged that staff members left her alone with Epstein and that he committed sexual acts, used money after the encounters, and used his resources and influence to normalize and continue the exploitation.

The complaint alleged that this conduct occurred repeatedly from approximately August 2002 through the end of October 2005. It alleged an average of four incidents per month. The pleading also accused Epstein of manipulating L.M. into bringing other minor girls to him in exchange for money. That allegation should be read in the context the complaint itself supplied: L.M. said Epstein began exerting influence over her when she was a middle school child.

L.M. alleged physical injury, pain, emotional distress, psychological trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, loss of dignity and privacy, medical and psychological expenses, diminished earning capacity, and loss of enjoyment of life. She alleged that some injuries were permanent.

These statements were allegations in a civil complaint. The case did not reach trial, and no jury returned findings about individual incidents.

The 156 Federal Counts

Each of the complaint’s 156 counts invoked 18 U.S.C. § 2255. That statute provides a civil remedy to a person injured as a minor by specified federal offenses. L.M. alleged predicate violations including provisions addressing coercion or enticement and travel or transportation connected to illicit sexual conduct.

The complaint’s organization was mathematical as well as legal. It alleged four incidents in each month from August 2002 through October 2005. Thirty-nine months multiplied by four produced 156 counts. Count 1 was labeled August 2002, Incident 1. Count 156 was labeled October 2005, Incident 4.

The individual counts generally repeated four elements:

incorporation of the complaint’s opening allegations;
an allegation that Epstein committed one or more federal offenses identified in § 2255;
a statement of injuries attributed to the alleged incident; and
a demand for compensatory damages, attorney fees, costs, other appropriate relief, and a jury trial.

The pleading’s length should not be mistaken for 156 separate judicial findings. The counts were L.M.’s method of pleading an alleged course of conduct as separate civil causes of action. The court did not adjudicate their truth, statutory sufficiency, limitations periods, or damages.

The Nonprosecution Agreement Theory

The complaint relied in part on language attributed to Epstein’s federal nonprosecution agreement. It quoted a provision stating that a person who was a minor victim of an offense enumerated in § 2255 would have the same right to proceed under § 2255 as if Epstein had been federally tried and convicted of an enumerated offense. L.M. alleged that she was covered by that provision.

The complaint also argued that Epstein’s Florida guilty pleas and federal agreement prevented him from denying the alleged acts and required him to admit civil liability. That was L.M.’s legal position. The court did not issue a ruling accepting it.

Epstein’s June 2010 motion disputed L.M.’s claimed connection to the nonprosecution agreement. He argued that she was not on the government list described in the complaint and that her parallel state action prevented her from receiving the asserted benefit. Those statements were Epstein’s litigation position. The court did not decide them because the case settled and the motion became moot.

The record therefore supports a narrow conclusion: the parties disputed whether and how the nonprosecution agreement affected L.M.’s federal claims, and no merits ruling resolved that dispute in this case.

Privacy Motions

L.M. filed two privacy motions with the complaint. One asked the clerk to keep an affidavit containing her true name in a sealed envelope. The other asked the court to allow her to proceed under the pseudonym L.M.

The pseudonym motion stated that L.M. was 20 and alleged that Epstein abused her between ages 14 and 17. It argued that public disclosure would expose highly sensitive and intimate information, intensify humiliation and trauma, and risk further injury. It also represented that Epstein already knew her identity and therefore would not be prejudiced by public use of initials.

The motion further stated that federal investigators and prosecutors had treated her identity as confidential. Epstein later disputed part of that account when he challenged whether she appeared on a particular government list. No court ruling in this docket resolved that factual disagreement.

The reviewed public docket continues to caption the plaintiff as L.M. No separate written order deciding the privacy motions was located in the reviewed EFTA set. Researchers should not use the absence of a located order as a reason to expose or speculate about the plaintiff’s identity.

Transfer and Coordinated Discovery

The action was initially assigned to Judge James I. Cohn with Magistrate Judge Barry S. Seltzer. On July 28, 2009, Judge Cohn transferred the case to Judge Kenneth A. Marra, who accepted it. Later filings use the suffix KAM.

On August 11, 2009, Judge Marra ordered the case consolidated with the related Epstein actions for discovery and for procedural motions affecting multiple cases. Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80119, served as the lead case for common discovery filings.

This was coordination, not a merger of the plaintiffs or their claims. L.M. retained her own docket, complaint, privacy interests, and disposition. A filing appearing under several captions may address only a shared discovery issue and should not automatically be treated as evidence about every survivor.

The coordinated record includes disputes involving document preservation, interrogatories, deposition limits, and third party witnesses. In December 2009, Magistrate Judge Linnea R. Johnson entered an omnibus order reminding the parties that shared discovery motions belonged in the lead docket. A motion for protective relief filed by third party Igor Zinoviev in L.M.’s case was denied as moot as part of that order.

Records associated with the coordinated litigation also address efforts to obtain testimony from Jean-Luc Brunel. His appearance in a witness filing is not a finding that he participated in any conduct alleged by L.M. It documents a discovery issue and must be described at that procedural level.

The Parallel Palm Beach County Case

The federal filings identify a parallel state action, L.M. v. Jeffrey Epstein, No. 50-2008-CA-028051-XXXX-MB, in Florida’s Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. That action predated the July 2009 federal complaint.

L.M.’s federal complaint said that she was exclusively seeking the federal civil remedy under § 2255 in this action. Epstein’s dismissal motion described the state case as seeking damages under other legal theories. He used the existence of both actions to argue that the federal case served no purpose and could not claim the benefit L.M. attributed to the nonprosecution agreement.

The existence of parallel proceedings did not itself establish duplication, fraud, or invalidity. Plaintiffs may pursue different claims arising from related events, subject to jurisdictional, claim preclusion, settlement, and procedural rules. The federal court did not issue a merits ruling holding that L.M.’s two actions were improper.

Researchers should keep the dockets separate. Documents from the state action, including deposition materials, may have been attached to filings in the federal coordinated cases, but that does not transform them into federal findings.

Epstein’s June 2010 Motion to Dismiss

On June 16, 2010, Epstein moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). At that time, Rule 4(m) generally required service within 120 days after filing. Epstein asserted that L.M. had never served the federal complaint within that period.

The motion did more than raise service. It argued that the federal complaint had no legitimate purpose because L.M. already had a state action. It also tied the original filing firm, Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, to Scott Rothstein’s Ponzi scheme and suggested that the complaint might have been used to attract investors through fabricated settlement opportunities.

Epstein further asserted that parts of the complaint were false. He cited deposition testimony that he claimed conflicted with allegations concerning particular sexual conduct and travel. He also challenged the complaint’s statement that L.M. had been identified in the manner described by the FBI and United States Attorney’s Office.

Those accusations were made by Epstein while seeking dismissal. They were not evidence findings, sanctions findings, or findings of fraud against L.M. The court did not hold an evidentiary hearing or issue an opinion accepting them.

The requested service remedy also matters. Rule 4(m) ordinarily contemplated dismissal without prejudice or an order setting a time for service, absent good cause or another basis for extension. Epstein asked the court to dismiss. The parties settled before the judge decided whether service was deficient or what remedy would follow.

Settlement and Dismissal

On July 20, 2010, L.M. and Epstein filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. The stipulation stated that each party would bear their own attorney fees and costs. It also expressly asked the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the parties’ settlement.

Judge Marra entered the final order the same day. The order:

dismissed the action with prejudice;
denied all pending motions as moot;
retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement; and
directed the clerk to close the case.

The order did not grant Epstein’s Rule 4(m) motion. Because all pending motions were denied as moot, the service question and Epstein’s other assertions remained undecided.

Dismissal with prejudice ended L.M.’s claims in this federal action and ordinarily prevents refiling of the same dismissed claims. It was not a trial verdict, a finding that the complaint was false, or an exoneration of Epstein. The settlement also was not a public admission of liability. The reviewed public filings do not disclose the payment amount, release language, confidentiality terms, evidence provisions, or any other substantive settlement term.

Procedural Timeline

Date	Event
2008	L.M. filed a separate action against Epstein in Palm Beach County Circuit Court, No. 50-2008-CA-028051-XXXX-MB.
July 24, 2009	L.M. filed the 234 page federal complaint, a jury demand, a motion to place her true name under seal, and a motion to proceed under initials.
July 27, 2009	The complaint and privacy motions were entered on the federal docket.
July 28 to 29, 2009	Judge James I. Cohn transferred the action to Judge Kenneth A. Marra, who accepted it.
July 30, 2009	Judge Marra entered an initial scheduling order requiring counsel to confer and file a joint report.
August 11, 2009	The court coordinated L.M.’s case with related Epstein actions for discovery and common procedural motions.
November 9, 2009	Third party Igor Zinoviev sought protective relief in the coordinated litigation.
December 16 to 17, 2009	Magistrate Judge Linnea R. Johnson entered an omnibus discovery order. Zinoviev’s motion was denied as moot, and the parties were reminded to file shared discovery motions in the lead case.
June 16, 2010	Epstein moved to dismiss the complaint for alleged failure to complete service under Rule 4(m).
July 20, 2010	The parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice and disclosed that they had settled. Judge Marra dismissed the case, denied pending motions as moot, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.

Evidence and Filing Index

Legal and Historical Significance

The case shows how a survivor attempted to use § 2255 after Epstein’s extraordinarily favorable federal nonprosecution arrangement. L.M. did not simply plead Florida tort claims in federal court. She framed every count as a federal statutory cause of action and argued that language in the agreement preserved or strengthened her right to proceed.

The complaint also illustrates the challenge of pleading repeated abuse when exact dates were not available. Rather than alleging one undifferentiated course of conduct, it assigned four counts to every month in the alleged period. That structure made the scale of the allegation visible, but it also produced a 234 page pleading whose repeated language became a target in Epstein’s later motion.

The litigation documents another limit of public case records. The docket proves that a settlement existed because the parties said so and the court retained enforcement jurisdiction. It does not reveal what the settlement required. Public readers can establish the procedural result but cannot responsibly infer the amount, admissions, releases, or confidentiality provisions.

Finally, the case demonstrates why defense motions must not be summarized as judicial conclusions. Epstein accused the complaint of falsehood and possible connection to a fraud scheme. The final order did not accept those accusations. It rendered the pending motion moot after the parties chose settlement and dismissal.

Fact Check

Checked September 10, 2026. The reviewed docket materials identify the case as L.M. v. Jeffrey Epstein, No. 9:09-cv-81092-KAM, filed July 24, 2009, and terminated July 20, 2010.

Is this a duplicate of L.M.’s Palm Beach County case?

No. The federal action was docket 9:09-cv-81092-KAM and pleaded § 2255 claims. The separate state action was docket 50-2008-CA-028051-XXXX-MB. They involved the same plaintiff and defendant but were distinct proceedings.

Why does the CourtListener address say “espstein”?

The public CourtListener slug contains that misspelling. The docket number, court, filing date, and party materials confirm that the defendant was Jeffrey Epstein. The misspelled URL should not be used to create a separate case entry.

Was L.M. “Jane Doe No. 101”?

Not in this docket. Paragraph 18 of the 234 page complaint contains one apparent carryover reference to “Jane Doe No. 101.” The caption, docket sheet, remaining complaint, motions, stipulation, and final order identify the plaintiff as L.M. The stray phrase should not be treated as an identity finding.

Did the court find that 156 incidents occurred?

No. The complaint pleaded 156 counts based on L.M.’s allegations. No trial or merits judgment determined the number of incidents.

Did the court find the complaint false or connected to Scott Rothstein’s scheme?

No. Epstein asserted those theories in his motion to dismiss. Judge Marra did not decide them.

Was Epstein’s service motion granted?

No. The final order denied all pending motions as moot after the parties settled and stipulated to dismissal.

Did L.M. lose on the merits?

No merits judgment was entered against her. The case ended by settlement and stipulated dismissal with prejudice.

Does dismissal with prejudice prove the allegations were false?

No. It prevents the dismissed claims from being litigated again in this action, but it is not a finding about the truth or falsity of the allegations.

Is the settlement amount public?

No amount was located in the reviewed public filings. The existence of a settlement is confirmed by the stipulation and final order.

Questions Still Unanswered

What amount, payment structure, and nonfinancial terms were included in the settlement?
Did the settlement contain confidentiality, nondisparagement, cooperation, evidence preservation, or document return provisions?
Did the settlement resolve or affect the parallel Palm Beach County action?
Did any agreement release people or entities other than Epstein?
What happened to the sealed true name affidavit requested at the start of the case?
Did the court ever enter a paperless or sealed order formally resolving the two privacy motions?
What evidence was produced through coordinated discovery but never filed publicly?
How would the court have resolved the disputed application of § 2255 and the nonprosecution agreement?
Would the court have extended the service deadline, ordered service, or dismissed without prejudice under Rule 4(m) if the parties had not settled?
What testimony or documents supported or contradicted the monthly incident structure used in the complaint?
Were discovery materials from the federal and state actions shared, and under what protective restrictions?

Limitations

This article relies principally on court filings preserved in the EFTA corpus and the public federal docket history. Some records contain redactions, scanning defects, incomplete optical character recognition, misspelled names, or documents copied across coordinated dockets.

The complaint states L.M.’s allegations. Epstein’s June 2010 motion states his defense positions. Neither is a trial verdict. Because the case settled, the court did not decide the truth of disputed allegations, the service issue, the statutory claims, damages, or the competing interpretations of the nonprosecution agreement.

The public record reviewed for this article confirms a settlement but does not include the substantive settlement agreement. No amount or confidential term should be inferred from the dismissal papers.

No article devoted specifically to docket 9:09-cv-81092 was located among the identified EpsteinWiki sleuth Substack sources during the source check. No unrelated Substack article has been added as filler.

Related EpsteinWiki Pages

Sources

PostedDecember 19, 2025