Cherie Quigley’s FBI Interview: Epstein, Deutsche Bank and 102 Deferred Reviews
Snapshot
- Primary evidence: EFTA00128968, a five page FBI interview report.
- Interview date: October 10, 2019.
- Location: Middletown, New Jersey.
- Report drafted: October 16, 2019.
- Date of entry: October 22, 2019.
- Interviewing agents: Carmen Anthony Cacioppo and Steven G. Wintonick.
- Witness: Cherie Quigley, a former Deutsche Bank transaction monitoring manager working at DWS when interviewed.
- Document format: FD 302, an FBI summary of an interview.
- Page identifiers: EFTA00128968 through EFTA00128972.
- Main subjects: Epstein’s payments to women, Darren Indyke’s cash withdrawals, internal reporting procedures, 102 deferred politically exposed client reviews, Jared Kushner related transactions and Donald Trump’s restricted profile access.
- Evidence status: The report records Quigley’s account. It expressly states that it contains neither FBI recommendations nor conclusions.
Overview
EFTA00128968 documents an FBI interview with a banking compliance manager whose team included Tammy Hill McFadden.
Quigley described how Deutsche Bank monitored transactions and escalated potentially suspicious activity. She also responded to several concerns that Hill McFadden had previously raised.
The interview is particularly important because Quigley acknowledged the existence of 102 deferred reviews involving politically exposed persons. However, she offered an administrative explanation that differed sharply from Hill McFadden’s account.
Quigley also recalled Epstein’s lawyer Darren Indyke withdrawing $7,500 in cash each week. She said an internal suspicious activity information form was filed on him.
Regarding Epstein himself, Quigley initially said she had not seen activity warranting a filing. Later in the interview, she acknowledged that a filing perhaps should have been made.
These statements document what Quigley told investigators. They do not establish that the FBI accepted her explanations or resolved the disagreements between the witnesses.
Key Takeaways
- Quigley confirmed that 102 politically exposed client reviews had been placed in deferred status by Ying Wang.
- She said the reviews had been performed but were waiting for bank statements to be attached.
- She acknowledged that Wang was overwhelmed and that she perhaps should have required faster completion.
- Quigley said only five or six suspicious activity information forms were submitted annually through her department’s escalation mailbox.
- She said neither she nor her team could access that mailbox.
- She recalled an internal filing concerning Darren Indyke’s recurring $7,500 cash withdrawals.
- She saw Epstein accounts paying women who appeared to her to be models of legal age.
- She distinguished transaction concerns from reputational concerns and said ending the Epstein relationship was not her decision.
- She acknowledged, in hindsight, that an internal filing perhaps should have been made on Epstein.
- She said Trump became a covered client whose profile required special access.
- Her account disputes important parts of Hill McFadden’s description of workplace treatment and compliance practices.
Quigley’s Professional Background
Page 1 states that Quigley worked in DWS’s anti financial crime unit when interviewed.
She said she had worked directly for Deutsche Bank from 2014 until her transition to DWS. Her responsibilities involved transaction management within the asset and wealth management business.
Before Deutsche Bank, she performed similar work at Bank of New York Mellon.
The report records the following management relationships:
- Quigley initially reported to Wayne Salit.
- She subsequently reported to Maura Liconte.
- Liconte reported to Tim McNeil.
- Salit reported to Keith Falconer in Germany.
- Salit was also working at DWS by the interview date.
The report does not provide the precise date of Quigley’s move to DWS.
A factual correction is necessary: The interview summary places DWS’s IPO in 2017. DWS’s official IPO record identifies its successful Frankfurt listing as March 23, 2018. DWS Group
The Compliance Team
Page 1 describes Quigley managing seven employees across New York and Jacksonville.
The New York team consisted of:
- Ying Wang.
- Kripa Aryal.
- Robert Wang.
The Jacksonville team consisted of:
- Michelle Gabriel.
- Tammy McFadden.
- Danya Friedman.
- Kevin Wilson.
Quigley said Horace Swafford and Patricia Melo were subsequently added.
She described the New York and Florida teams as working together. She believed her department had appropriate resources to perform its work.
That assessment differs from Hill McFadden’s description of extremely heavy workloads.
The report’s spelling of some employee names also differs from the Hill McFadden interview. Those differences should remain visible when comparing the records.
Monitoring Systems and Risk Parameters
Pages 1 and 2 identify two principal monitoring systems:
- PRIME: Used by wealth management for transaction monitoring.
- ACTIMIZE: Used by the broker dealer department.
Quigley said the monitoring parameters were already established when she joined Deutsche Bank.
She suggested that her predecessor, Clarissa Delafuente, might have set them. This was a possibility she raised, rather than a confirmed explanation.
According to Quigley:
- Deutsche Bank’s global organization previously determined parameters and risk levels.
- Risk and parameters underwent annual review.
- An analytics team later took responsibility for setting parameters.
- That transition produced numerous changes.
Quigley recalled conducting one annual review and sending her findings to Salit. She said that review did not result in parameter changes.
She also recalled uncertainty about transactions involving Bitcoin and marijuana. She said she raised those concerns with Salit.
The interview does not attach her review, the parameter settings or the correspondence.
How Alerts Were Reviewed
Page 2 describes alerts generated at different intervals, including daily, weekly and monthly.
Quigley assigned alerts to team members.
A review involved:
- Examining the customer’s account.
- Reviewing know your client documentation.
- Searching for negative news.
- Documenting the review in PRIME.
If the reviewer concluded that an alert did not present an issue, the explanation was recorded and the alert was cleared.
If the review identified potentially suspicious activity, it was escalated through a suspicious activity information form, known as a SAIF.
The SAIF went to a designated mailbox.
Quigley said the original alert was then closed in PRIME with a notation explaining that it had been escalated.
Closing an alert in PRIME did not necessarily mean dismissing the concern. Under her description, closure could accompany escalation into a separate reporting process.
The SAIF Mailbox and Limited Visibility
Page 2 contains a significant description of the department’s reporting boundaries.
Quigley said she was active in PRIME and knew about all alerts escalated to the SAIF mailbox.
However, she said nobody in her department could access that mailbox, including her.
She described SAIF submissions as unusual. Approximately five or six were filed annually, usually concerning cash activity.
That figure refers to submissions through the process she described. It should not be treated as the total number of SARs filed by Deutsche Bank across all departments.
The interview does not identify:
- Who controlled the mailbox.
- Who assessed the submitted forms.
- Which forms resulted in filings with FinCEN.
- How the submitting team learned the outcome.
- Whether the reported annual volume was checked against bank records.
A SAIF submitted inside the bank is not, by itself, proof that a corresponding SAR reached federal authorities.
Monthly Cases and Politically Exposed Clients
Pages 2 and 3 describe customer account profiles and risk ratings.
Quigley said PRIME generated a case when activity exceeded the relevant average or threshold. Higher risk customers had lower thresholds.
Politically exposed persons, known as PEPs, required an additional manual process.
According to Quigley:
- PRIME did not automatically generate PEP cases.
- She downloaded PEP account activity each month.
- Domestic and international thresholds applied.
- She created approximately 30 or 40 PEP cases monthly when thresholds were exceeded.
- Initially, all PEP cases went to Ying Wang.
- As work increased, other team members also received PEP cases.
Review work was documented in PRIME. Emails were used during the process and attached to case summaries.
Quigley said she could comment in PRIME but could not edit the material.
She also said she did not review case analysis before it entered PRIME, although she answered questions during the process.
Sampling and Quality Review
Page 3 records Quigley’s description of monthly sampling.
She said she reviewed:
- 50 percent of PEP cases.
- 10 percent of alerts.
- 20 percent of high risk country transactions.
If sampling identified an issue, she investigated it.
The interview does not attach sampling reports or show how cases were selected.
These percentages describe Quigley’s account of her review practice. They do not independently establish that every required review occurred.
Her Account of Compliance Culture
Page 3 records Quigley denying that she experienced a culture of suppressing concerns.
She said:
- Nobody instructed her not to report an issue.
- Nobody told her not to file a SAIF.
- She felt no pressure to avoid filings.
- She was free to perform her work.
- When uncertain, she generally took a conservative approach and filed a SAIF.
Quigley also characterized wealth management clients generally as presenting lower risk, which she offered as an explanation for the small number of forms.
Elsewhere, the same report identifies PEPs as an example of high risk wealth management clients.
Her general description therefore should not be read as establishing that every wealth management customer was low risk.
Quigley’s Criticism of Hill McFadden
Pages 3 and 4 contain strong criticism of Hill McFadden’s performance and working style.
Quigley said the two did not get along.
She described Hill McFadden as difficult to manage, resistant to criticism and less capable than other members of the team.
She alleged that Hill McFadden delayed submissions until deadlines to avoid additional assignments and relied heavily on internet findings.
Quigley also recalled an unspecified case in which Hill McFadden concluded that no structuring occurred, while Quigley believed it had.
The report provides no transaction details or case identifier for that example.
Quigley used a psychological label when criticizing Hill McFadden. That wording is a workplace opinion recorded in an interview, not a clinical diagnosis.
She said Hill McFadden’s performance reviews remained steady, but she would not promote her.
The interview does not attach those reviews or independently resolve the employment dispute.
The $4,000 Kushner Related Transaction
Page 4 describes Quigley’s recollection of a PEP review involving Jared Kushner.
She said the transaction involved $4,000 sent to Russia from a Kushner corporate account.
According to Quigley:
- Hill McFadden examined a GoDaddy website.
- Her research located someone in New Hampshire and part of a Kushner business name.
- The information went to the relationship manager.
- The recipient was identified as a software developer.
- Quigley discussed the matter with Salit.
Quigley said this was the only Kushner concern Hill McFadden raised with her.
She nevertheless said Hill McFadden acted appropriately by raising it.
Quigley described being surprised by Hill McFadden’s allegations when a New York Times article appeared.
The interview does not provide the recipient’s name, corporate account identifier, transfer date or supporting documentation.
It also does not identify the relationship manager.
Comparing the Kushner Accounts
Hill McFadden’s interview, EFTA00128987, describes a company printed as “REAL CONTRAD, LLC,” cryptocurrency activity, difficulty validating recipients and concerns about a Russian individual’s apparent employment.
Quigley’s interview instead describes a $4,000 payment to Russia and an explanation that the recipient was a software developer.
The two accounts share several features:
- A Kushner related corporate account.
- A concern raised by Hill McFadden.
- A Russian connection.
- Internet research about the recipient.
- Involvement of a relationship manager.
- Discussion involving Salit.
However, the reports do not attach enough transaction information to prove that every detail concerns the same payment or review.
Quigley’s explanation should not replace Hill McFadden’s account. Hill McFadden’s concerns likewise do not establish that Quigley’s explanation was false.
The underlying bank records are necessary to resolve the differences.
Quigley’s Explanation for the 102 Deferred Reviews
Page 4 confirms that Hill McFadden raised concerns about 102 PEP reviews placed in deferred status by Wang.
Quigley said PRIME required a bank statement to be attached before the review could be completed.
Her explanation was that Wang:
- Performed the review.
- Documented the work.
- Waited to attach the statement.
- Used deferred status during that interval.
She said Wang was overwhelmed with work.
Quigley acknowledged giving him leeway and said she perhaps should have required him to finish the reviews more quickly.
She also said the requirement to attach statements was eventually removed.
Importantly, Quigley suggested examining PRIME timestamps to corroborate her explanation.
The existence of the deferred reviews is supported by both witnesses’ accounts. Their meaning remains disputed.
The interview does not attach the timestamps, statements, case histories or list of clients.
Comparing Quigley and Hill McFadden
The two FBI reports describe substantially different interpretations of the same workplace and review process.
| Issue | Hill McFadden’s account | Quigley’s account |
|---|---|---|
| Department resources | Workload was extremely large and reviews could be delayed | Resources were appropriate, although Wang became overwhelmed |
| The 102 deferred reviews | High risk client reviews remained deferred and required attention | Reviews were performed but awaited attached statements |
| Management response | Work rejection began shortly after she questioned the deferrals | Hill McFadden exaggerated an administrative issue |
| Performance reviews | Reviews became unusually negative and contributed to alleged retaliation | Reviews remained steady, but promotion was not warranted |
| Escalation culture | Internal reports could face pushback or fail to progress | She felt free to escalate and received no instructions to suppress forms |
| Kushner review | Unresolved recipient and cryptocurrency concerns | A $4,000 payment was explained as compensation to a software developer |
| Epstein payments | Payments to young women prompted concern and a request for reassignment | Women appeared to be models of legal age |
| Epstein reporting | Described an internal report on a lawyer under an unresolved name | Identified Darren Indyke and recalled a SAIF concerning his cash withdrawals |
Neither interview supplies the underlying records needed to settle every disagreement.
Epstein’s Payments to Women
Page 4 states that Quigley saw Epstein accounts paying women.
She said the women appeared to be models of legal age.
The interview provides no names, ages, transaction amounts or evidence explaining how she reached that assessment.
Her description therefore does not establish that every recipient was an adult or that every payment had a legitimate purpose.
Quigley also said she strongly disliked Epstein and recalled asking Salit why Deutsche Bank was doing business with him.
She said Salit agreed with her concern.
However, Quigley described the issue as reputational and said the decision to retain or terminate the relationship was not theirs to make.
Darren Indyke’s $7,500 Cash Withdrawals
Pages 4 and 5 contain Quigley’s recollection of Darren Indyke withdrawing $7,500 in cash each week.
She identified Indyke as Epstein’s attorney.
She said a SAIF was filed on him.
The interview does not supply:
- The withdrawal dates.
- The relevant account numbers.
- The total amount withdrawn.
- The SAIF itself.
- A corresponding FinCEN filing.
- The outcome of the internal escalation.
The recurring amount is important evidence about the activity Quigley remembered. This interview alone does not establish the purpose of each withdrawal or a criminal finding concerning it.
It also provides a clearly printed lawyer’s name for comparison with the unresolved “DARIN MCINKE” wording in Hill McFadden’s separate report.
Her Hindsight About Reporting Epstein
Pages 4 and 5 record a notable change in emphasis.
Quigley initially said that she would have filed on Epstein if she had seen something warranting it, but that she had not.
Later, the report states:
“Looking back, maybe a SAIF should have been filed on EPSTEIN.”
Quigley again emphasized that her work focused on transaction activity rather than reputational risk.
She could not recall the types of accounts Epstein held.
She also said Deutsche Bank had recently tried to terminate the relationship before details appeared in the press.
The report gives no precise date for that attempt or identifies which press coverage she meant.
Her hindsight statement acknowledges a possible missed escalation. It does not establish why no form was filed on Epstein or who bore responsibility.
Trump’s Covered Client Status
Page 5 states that Trump became a “covered client.”
Quigley explained that special access was required to view his profile.
She also said she had to review all relationships to Trump.
The report does not define the bank’s covered client policy or establish:
- When the designation began.
- Who approved it.
- Which employees retained access.
- Whether the designation changed transaction monitoring.
- What the relationship reviews found.
Restricted profile access does not, by itself, prove that transactions were concealed from compliance staff or that unlawful activity occurred.
The designation remains important because it identifies a specific access control that can be compared with bank policies and system records.
Instructions About Speaking to the Press
Page 5 records Quigley saying Deutsche Bank advised all employees not to speak with the press.
The interview does not attach that instruction or give its date.
It does not establish whether it was a general media policy or a direction issued in response to particular allegations.
Independent Investigations and Related Evidence
Donny Evans’s February 2026 investigation connects Quigley’s interview with separate bank communications concerning Indyke’s cash activity and internal escalation. Its linked records provide leads for examining what followed the SAIF submission. Its conclusions about criminal accountability should remain distinguishable from the interview itself. iamdonnyevans.substack.com
Document Zero’s March 2026 research highlights Quigley’s statement about Trump’s covered client status. That passage is directly supported by page 5 of the attached report. rhowardstone.substack.com
EpsteinWiki’s Deutsche Bank article provides broader institutional context.
EpsteinWiki’s Amanda Kirby article provides another banking witness comparison.
What This Interview Establishes
EFTA00128968 establishes that the FBI interviewed Quigley about Deutsche Bank’s compliance practices and Epstein related activity.
It records her acknowledgment of:
- The 102 deferred PEP reviews.
- Wang’s workload difficulties.
- An internal reporting process outside PRIME.
- Her department’s inability to access the escalation mailbox.
- Epstein payments to women.
- Indyke’s recurring cash withdrawals.
- A SAIF concerning Indyke.
- A possible missed SAIF concerning Epstein.
- Trump’s special profile access requirement.
The document does not establish that the FBI verified each statement, accepted her explanation of the deferred reviews or resolved Hill McFadden’s retaliation allegations.
The most valuable next evidence would be the original case histories, timestamps, internal forms, correspondence and filing outcomes.
Evidence Appearances
- EFTA00128968, page 1: Interview details, employment history, reporting relationships, team membership and resource assessment.
- EFTA00128969, page 2: Monitoring systems, parameter reviews, alert procedures, SAIF escalation, mailbox access and Bitcoin related uncertainty.
- EFTA00128970, page 3: Manual PEP reviews, sampling percentages, compliance culture and criticism of Hill McFadden.
- EFTA00128971, page 4: Kushner related payment, explanation of 102 deferred reviews, Epstein payments to women and Indyke cash withdrawals.
- EFTA00128972, page 5: Indyke’s SAIF, hindsight about reporting Epstein, attempted relationship termination, Trump’s covered client status and press instructions.
- EFTA00128987: Hill McFadden’s separate July 12, 2019 interview, providing the principal comparison.
Questions for Further Investigation
- Do PRIME timestamps support Quigley’s account that substantive reviews preceded the deferred status?
- How long did each of the 102 cases remain deferred?
- Were statements the only outstanding requirement?
- Who controlled the SAIF mailbox, and what happened to each submission?
- Did the Indyke SAIF result in a SAR filed with FinCEN?
- What records document the recurring $7,500 withdrawals?
- How did staff verify the ages and occupations of women receiving Epstein payments?
- Did Quigley and Hill McFadden describe the same Kushner transaction?
- What do the original performance reviews show?
- How did covered client status affect access and review responsibilities?
- Who authorized the attempted termination of Epstein’s relationship?
- Did investigators obtain the records Quigley suggested checking?