Amanda Kirby’s FBI Interview: Epstein’s Deutsche Bank Accounts, Wire Transfers and Compliance Alerts
Snapshot
- Primary evidence: EFTA00128765, a 15 page FBI interview report.
- Interview date: August 10, 2021.
- Interview method: Webex conference.
- Location recorded: New York City.
- Report drafted: August 12, 2021.
- Date of entry: August 23, 2021.
- Witness: Amanda Kirby, a former relationship coordinator in Deutsche Bank’s Private Wealth Management division.
- Other participants: FBI agents, representatives of the United States Attorney’s Office, and attorneys Barry Pollack and Carolyn Forstein of Robbins Russell.
- Page identifiers: EFTA00128765 through EFTA00128779.
- Main subjects: Epstein’s onboarding, Paul Morris’s banking team, criminal history research, corporate accounts, the Butterfly Trust, payments to women, wire verification and client pressure.
- Evidence status: An FBI summary of Kirby’s statements, including her responses to documents shown during the interview. The report expressly contains neither FBI recommendations nor conclusions.
Overview
EFTA00128765 provides a detailed account of the operational work behind Jeffrey Epstein’s Deutsche Bank relationship.
Kirby described compiling background research, collecting account opening documents, responding to compliance inquiries and entering wire transfers.
She said she knew about Epstein’s criminal history before the bank accepted him. She also said she felt uncomfortable working with him from the beginning.
However, Kirby did not recall flagging Epstein’s wires as suspicious. She described relying on further review by more senior personnel and other bank teams.
The interview also records her belief that some payments might concern Epstein’s past misconduct rather than ongoing activity.
That belief was her interpretation. The report does not establish the actual purpose of those payments.
EpsteinWiki’s Amanda Kirby profile provides broader background. This article focuses on the interview itself.
Key Takeaways
- Kirby prepared a research memorandum covering Epstein’s criminal history before his onboarding.
- She said Paul Morris knew about Epstein’s background.
- The memorandum went to senior personnel identified as Chip Packard and Patrick Harris.
- Kirby believed emphasizing corporate accounts rather than personal accounts may have helped senior staff become comfortable with the relationship.
- She worked on KYC documentation and entered wires, but said she did not approve the wires herself.
- Richard Kahn generally submitted wire requests or was copied on them.
- Kirby said payments to women were consistent with Epstein’s account activity.
- She did not recall whether particular payments to women raised concerns or whether she flagged Epstein wires as suspicious.
- She described pressure for quick responses while denying that certain emails sought to bypass procedures.
- She requested a transfer from Morris’s team because of their working relationship and her discomfort with Epstein.
- She said she did not observe violations of bank policy. That statement does not independently establish that the bank complied with its obligations.
- Repeated failures of recollection limit what the interview can establish about individual transactions and decisions.
Kirby’s Background and Banking Role
Pages 1 and 2 describe Kirby’s background before Deutsche Bank.
She worked at Universal Music Group as an assistant to the chief financial officer of corporate finance. She had not previously worked at a bank.
At Deutsche Bank, her official title was relationship coordinator. She described herself as a junior employee within a private banking team.
Her responsibilities included:
- Gathering original signed account opening documents.
- Requesting KYC documentation from clients.
- Assisting with due diligence.
- Communicating with clients by telephone.
- Entering wire transfers.
- Conducting research when due diligence questions arose.
- Occasionally attending client meetings.
She did not maintain her own book of clients.
Kirby remembered onboarding training and annual online KYC training. She could not recall all the details and thought some training might have occurred every six months.
She understood KYC to require information about identity, sources of wealth and other client characteristics.
Her Work With Paul Morris
Pages 2 through 4 describe Kirby initially working with Patricia Janco and Becky Crivan.
She believed she spent approximately three or four years on their team.
When Morris joined Deutsche Bank, Kirby began assisting him while still working with Janco and Crivan.
Kirby later estimated that she worked on Morris’s team from approximately 2013 through 2015.
She said Epstein was Morris’s only client during the period she worked under him. Elsewhere, she discussed preparations involving Leon Black and references to additional clients or prospects.
Those statements should be read together. The report does not provide a complete client roster or establish the status of every prospective relationship.
Paul Morris is the principal banker discussed in Kirby’s account.
Her Transfer Request and HR Complaint
Pages 3 and 14 describe Kirby’s dissatisfaction with Morris.
She said their personalities did not fit and that she felt excluded from meetings and undervalued.
She recalled an incident in which she notified Morris that she would be late. His initial response appeared accepting, but she was later called into a managing director’s office about tardiness.
Kirby contacted HR because she disliked working with Morris and felt uncomfortable handling his only client.
The report identifies the HR employee with a phonetic spelling of Michelle Kirschenbaum.
Kirby recalled the employee questioning whether she was uncomfortable doing the job she had been hired to perform.
Around 2015, Kirby moved to Heather Kirby’s team.
Despite her criticism of Morris, Amanda Kirby said she did not believe she had seen him do anything illegal or improper concerning Epstein.
Her dislike of Morris was a workplace assessment, not an allegation that she witnessed a specific crime.
Direct Contact With Epstein
Page 3 states that Kirby never met Epstein in person.
She spoke with him by telephone when account procedures required confirmation from the account holder.
Those calls concerned wire transfers and other regulatory matters.
Kirby distinguished direct telephone contact from information she learned through background research.
Her knowledge of Epstein’s criminal history and allegations largely came from media accounts and due diligence work. The interview does not describe her witnessing sexual abuse.
The Criminal History Research Memorandum
Pages 3 through 5 describe Kirby researching Epstein before he became a client.
She compiled internet findings and information about criminal charges into a memorandum.
Kirby said she wanted to include relevant information rather than leave it out. She may also have linked internet findings to legal documents, although she did not clearly remember.
Investigators showed her documents identified as Bates 103224 and 103225.
She identified:
- Chip Packard: A senior private banking employee to whom Morris reported.
- Patrick Harris: A senior employee whom she thought might have headed risk.
Kirby said Morris wanted to present Epstein’s background before onboarding raised the same issues through KYC.
She said Morris knew about Epstein’s history.
The memorandum was shared with Packard and Harris. Kirby did not recall attending meetings where it was discussed.
The report does not establish what each recipient decided solely from Kirby’s recollection.
Corporate Accounts and Reputational Risk
Pages 5 and 7 explain wording that Epstein would not receive personal accounts.
Kirby said the proposed accounts belonged to two companies he owned.
She understood that business account onboarding still required KYC on the owners.
By the interview date, Kirby believed the distinction between corporate and personal accounts might have been intended to make senior employees more comfortable with the relationship.
She also believed Morris wanted that distinction included in the memorandum.
When discussing another document, Kirby described an attachment from Packard as indicating that the two company accounts did not pose reputational risk despite Epstein’s ownership.
These statements concern the documents shown and her interpretation of them.
The important distinction: Opening an account under a company name does not remove the owner from the account’s due diligence requirements.
EpsteinWiki’s Chip Packard profile provides related institutional background.
KYC Approvals and High Risk Classification
Pages 5 and 6 describe multiple KYC checkpoints.
Kirby identified Armen Brash as a senior KYC employee involved in fact checking and approvals. She could not recall his precise title.
She said the KYC team conducted its own assessment and that her private banking team could not simply sway its decisions.
Kirby acknowledged that Epstein and his accounts were high risk.
She said that classification resulted in:
- Greater scrutiny during account opening.
- Additional approvals.
- More due diligence.
- The application of Epstein’s risk rating to other accounts in the relationship.
She also said KYC became stricter during her employment and eventually required annual updates.
Kirby explained an email about being out of practice as relating to organizational changes, layoffs and a period when she had not completed a KYC.
She said she had forgotten some required items.
Different Accounts for Different Purposes
Page 6 records Kirby reviewing an apparent list of Epstein accounts.
She said new accounts required another KYC process.
Epstein wanted separate company accounts for different purposes. Kirby could not recall the precise purpose of each entity.
She thought some accounts related to properties, household upkeep and wages.
Kirby said understanding an account’s purpose mattered to her work. However, she also said comparing outgoing wires with the overall nature of an account was not part of her daily job description.
Later in the interview, she described checking whether a stated wire purpose fit the client’s business.
Those statements show uncertainty about the boundaries of her role. They do not establish how consistently transaction purposes were assessed.
Requests to Change Risk Ratings
Pages 6 and 7 discuss an email to Melisa Venegas.
Kirby did not remember Venegas but thought the document indicated a KYC role.
The email concerned two women whom Kirby said were married to one another.
She explained that her request was to reduce the women’s risk ratings, rather than downgrade Epstein’s accounts.
Kirby said she had not understood that their connection to the Epstein relationship automatically produced a high risk classification.
She denied that her phrase “please work your magic” requested an override.
She also described stress caused by the Epstein team’s expectations that work should be completed immediately.
The report does not establish the women’s identities, whether the ratings changed or whether the request was justified.
Confidentiality and Avoiding Epstein’s Name
Pages 7 and 8 discuss a communication with Vahe Stepanian.
Kirby identified Stepanian as a junior employee on the brokerage side who worked with Epstein related accounts but did not report to Morris.
She understood that client confidentiality required care in referring to accounts.
She also acknowledged possible sensitivity surrounding Epstein’s criminal past.
Kirby could not recall why she reminded Stepanian not to mention Epstein’s connection to the accounts.
She offered possible explanations, but none was established as the actual reason.
The interview therefore documents the communication and her uncertain explanation. It does not independently prove concealment or an innocent confidentiality purpose.
The Butterfly Trust and an Alleged Co Conspirator
Pages 8 and 9 state that the Butterfly Trust formed part of the relationship managed by Kirby’s team.
Kirby initially could not recall its purpose. A document partly refreshed her memory.
She said researching beneficiaries was standard practice for trust accounts.
Investigators also asked about an alert concerning a redacted beneficiary identified as an alleged co conspirator.
Kirby thought the alert related to that allegation, but described this as her best guess.
She said she would have stated a conviction if there had been one.
Kirby did not recall being concerned at the time about an alleged co conspirator being a trust beneficiary.
She explained that she regularly ended responses with a request to clear the alert. In her account, she supplied information and other employees made the decision.
She could not recall whether any alert remained uncleared during her time at the bank.
The report does not establish the beneficiary’s identity or the final approval reasoning.
New Allegations and Updated Reviews
Page 9 discusses an article referring to alleged misconduct involving girls as young as 12.
Kirby said she was disgusted by the article.
She could not recall:
- Whether she discussed it with colleagues.
- Whether she raised it with Morris.
- Whether she performed an updated KYC.
- Whether the bank changed its approach to Epstein.
She identified Troy D. Williams as part of risk management.
By the interview date, Kirby said she was surprised that Epstein related concerns had not been escalated further.
That was a retrospective assessment. It does not establish which escalation steps occurred when the article appeared.
How Kirby Processed Wires
Pages 10 and 11 describe Kirby receiving signed wire request forms containing account and beneficiary information.
Her work included:
- Comparing the request signature with the authorized signature.
- Calling the authorized signer when the amount exceeded a threshold.
- Recording that confirmation.
- Entering the wire.
- Responding to further questions from the wire team.
Kirby said she entered wires but did not approve them.
The wire team performed additional review after entry.
When more information was required, Kirby contacted the client or Morris.
She said clients generally stated the purpose on the request form. However, when discussing a specific request, she could not remember whether entering the purpose was always required.
She also could not recall how many Epstein wires she handled each week.
Callback Verification Was Not a Complete Purpose Check
Page 12 describes a “High Risk Media Callback Verification” stamp.
Kirby said it required a callback to an approved signer through an approved telephone number.
She thought it applied to wires of approximately $50,000 or more, but could not recall the exact threshold.
Two employees had to confirm the details recorded in the stamp.
A box concerning consistency with expected activity relied on their knowledge of the account.
Callback verification checked authorization. It did not independently establish that the payment’s purpose was lawful or that the recipient’s explanation was accurate.
Kirby could not recall whether Butterfly Trust transactions generated AML alerts.
She also said large wires did not require Morris’s review under the procedures she remembered, although she would make him aware of them.
That is her account of the requirements, rather than an independently verified statement of banking law.
The People Submitting and Explaining Requests
Pages 6, 11 and 13 identify several people involved in obtaining documents or handling requests.
- Richard Kahn: Identified by Kirby as Epstein’s accountant. Wire requests generally came from him, or he was copied.
- Harry Beller: Identified as another accountant.
- Bella Klein: Identified as Kahn’s assistant.
- Jeanne Brennan: Identified as an Epstein team assistant who helped gather information.
- Darren Indyke: Identified as holding power of attorney.
- Daphne Cales: Kirby believed she worked with the branch in Deutsche Bank’s Park Avenue office.
Kirby said direct confirmation from Epstein was relatively uncommon.
When she needed more information, she contacted people such as Kahn, Klein or Beller.
She did not recall several other names shown to her, including a person printed as Susan M. Hanblin.
The report’s name spellings should not be silently corrected or used to identify redacted recipients.
Payments to Women and Modeling Related Questions
Pages 11 through 13 record questions about payments to women, overseas recipients and other entities.
Kirby did not remember MC2 Model Management.
She also did not recall whether seeing payments to women or overseas women raised a concern.
The report prints a name as “KARYNA SHULLAK.” Kirby remembered the name in connection with Epstein but could not recall who the person was.
When discussing another transaction, the report states:
“Transactions to women were consistent with the activity of the EPSTEIN account.”
That statement describes an established transaction pattern from Kirby’s perspective. It does not establish that those transactions were legitimate.
Kirby also could not recall whether references to several female recipients raised concerns given her knowledge of Epstein’s history.
She did not remember whether supporting documents, such as invoices, were required.
What She Said About Suspicious Wires
Pages 10 through 13 describe training about unusual transactions, countries on sanctions lists and certain keywords.
Kirby said a new recipient or unusual amount could cause her to seek confirmation that the client had authorized the request.
However, she did not recall flagging any Epstein wire as suspicious.
She also did not recall Cherie Quigley’s name or the PRIME monitoring system.
When asked about a compliance inquiry, she described gathering information for Morris to answer. She would generally seek information from the client rather than conduct internet research for that purpose.
The distinction matters: confirming that a customer requested a payment is different from independently assessing whether the payment facilitates unlawful activity.
The Important Client Email and $250,000 Wire
Pages 13 and 14 discuss a document identified as Bates 0131011.
Kirby explained an email describing Epstein as a very important client.
She said she wanted to learn what was needed to allow a wire to proceed. She denied trying to avoid procedures.
Kirby acknowledged pressure to obtain an answer and said she understood how the email appeared to an outside reader.
She said nothing about the $250,000 amount raised her suspicions.
She also said the email referred to four additional clients, including Leon Black. She could not remember the other three and said she would not have mentioned them without instruction.
The interview does not identify the wire recipient in this passage or independently establish the status of those additional relationships.
Kirby said the email was not motivated by her own compensation. She remembered that banking team bonuses were based on revenue but could not recall the detailed bonus structure.
Leon Black’s Prospective Relationship
Pages 3 and 13 record Kirby remembering research and account opening preparations involving Leon Black.
She thought Morris wanted an introduction to him.
However, she could not clearly remember whether Black became a client, whether she worked on his account or whether discussions concerned background research.
She did not believe Black’s relationship was managed under the Epstein umbrella.
The report therefore supports Kirby’s recollection of preparations and discussions. It does not independently establish the complete account structure or Epstein’s authority over any Black account.
EpsteinWiki’s Leon Black profile provides a separate account of his documented Epstein connections.
Her Belief About Payments Concerning Past Misconduct
Pages 14 and 15 contain one of the interview’s most significant passages.
Kirby said she thought she was paying people off in connection with inappropriate relationships Epstein had in the past.
She associated some payments with misconduct from 2007 or 2008.
She believed more senior employees would review the wires. She did not think the payments concerned activity occurring during her time on the team.
The report does not establish:
- Which payments she meant.
- Who received them.
- Whether they were settlements or another type of payment.
- Whether senior employees actually reviewed each one.
- Whether her interpretation was correct.
This passage records her understanding of the payments. It should not be converted into a confirmed finding that particular wires were settlement payments or payments for ongoing abuse.
Statements About What She Did Not Observe
Page 14 records Kirby saying she did not observe anyone violating bank policy concerning Epstein.
She did not believe Morris met Epstein frequently or received Epstein funded trips.
She also said she did not know Trump was a Deutsche Bank client.
These statements describe the limits of her knowledge.
They do not establish that no violations occurred, that no trips existed or that other employees lacked information she did not possess.
Kirby said she was not working when interviewed in August 2021.
Related Banking Interviews and Independent Research
Hill McFadden’s interview, EFTA00128987, describes transaction monitoring concerns, internal reporting and alleged retaliation.
Quigley’s interview, EFTA00128968, describes monitoring procedures, an internal report concerning Indyke and hindsight about whether Epstein should have been reported.
Kirby’s interview concerns a different operational position: the employee collecting documents, entering wires and answering inquiries.
Together, the reports help distinguish:
- Relationship management.
- Transaction entry and authorization checks.
- Monitoring and investigation.
- Internal escalation.
- Decisions about external reporting.
Donny Evans’s Deutsche Bank investigation examines separate communications concerning Indyke and internal escalation. iamdonnyevans.substack.com Its linked records provide related research leads, while Kirby’s statements remain a separate evidentiary account.
Documents Discussed During the Interview
The interview report identifies documents shown to Kirby through Bates numbers. These are not interchangeable with EFTA identifiers.
| Identifier recorded | Subject discussed | Interview pages |
|---|---|---|
| 103224 | Packard and Harris’s roles | 4 |
| 103225 | Criminal history memorandum and corporate accounts | 4 and 5 |
| 43810 | KYC approvals, Brash and missing information | 5 and 6 |
| 105591 | Brennan and Kahn | 6 |
| 105592 | Account list and entity due diligence | 6 |
| 50182 | Risk ratings and request involving two women | 6 and 7 |
| 50206 | Alerts and reputational risk | 7 |
| 000000028 | Stepanian and references to Epstein’s name | 7 and 8 |
| 105470 | Butterfly Trust KYC update | 8 |
| 39435 | Alert involving a redacted trust beneficiary | 8 and 9 |
| 000000038 | Article mentioning allegations involving 12 year olds | 9 |
| 70625 | Negative media and possible KYC update | 9 |
| 51034 | Client identification and expected alert clearance | 9 and 10 |
| 45599 | Kahn and Beller; later questions about MC2 and recipients | 11 and 12 |
| 45600 | Name printed as Susan M. Hanblin | 11 |
| 45602 | International wire and requests for more information | 11 |
| 45604 | Redacted recipient Kirby did not identify | 11 |
| 44380 | Wire authorization and callback verification | 12 |
| 44383 | Butterfly Trust alerts | 12 |
| 50560 | Payments to women | 12 |
| 57814 | Review requirements for a large wire | 12 and 13 |
| 61576 | Compliance questions, Quigley and PRIME | 13 |
| 31709 | Cales and Indyke’s power of attorney | 13 |
| 0131011 | Important client email and $250,000 transaction | 13 and 14 |
The report repeats identifier 45599. That repetition should remain visible rather than be silently corrected.
Evidence Appearances by Page
- EFTA00128765, page 1: Interview details, prior employment, training and relationship coordinator role.
- EFTA00128766, page 2: Team structure, KYC duties, wire entry and Morris’s client relationship.
- EFTA00128767, page 3: Morris, HR concerns, telephone contact with Epstein and background knowledge.
- EFTA00128768, page 4: Criminal history research and memorandum recipients.
- EFTA00128769, page 5: Corporate accounts, reputational risk and KYC approvals.
- EFTA00128770, page 6: Account list, entity purposes, high risk classification and Epstein staff.
- EFTA00128771, page 7: Risk rating requests, alerts and confidentiality.
- EFTA00128772, page 8: Stepanian, the Butterfly Trust and beneficiary research.
- EFTA00128773, page 9: Alleged co conspirator alert, new media allegations and possible KYC updates.
- EFTA00128774, page 10: Alert responses and wire processing procedures.
- EFTA00128775, page 11: Suspicious transaction training, accountants and international wires.
- EFTA00128776, page 12: MC2, recipient questions, callback verification and payments to women.
- EFTA00128777, page 13: Compliance inquiries, Indyke, Black and the important client email.
- EFTA00128778, page 14: The $250,000 payment, compensation, limits of Kirby’s observations and her understanding of past misconduct payments.
- EFTA00128779, page 15: Continuation of that understanding and employment status at interview.
Questions for Further Investigation
- What did senior employees record when reviewing Kirby’s onboarding memorandum?
- Which original documents correspond to the interview’s Bates identifiers?
- How were corporate account reputational risks assessed despite Epstein’s ownership?
- Were the requested risk rating changes approved?
- What happened after alerts involving trust beneficiaries were cleared?
- Which payments did Kirby associate with misconduct from 2007 or 2008?
- What documents established the purposes of payments to women?
- What review occurred beyond signature and callback verification?
- Which wires generated internal investigations or external SAR filings?
- What did senior reviewers know that Kirby did not?
- How did the bank respond to new allegations after onboarding?
- What records resolve the status of Black and the other referenced clients or prospects?
Sources
- FBI interview of Amanda Kirby, EFTA00128765. August 10, 2021. Primary source for this article.
- FBI interview of Tammy Hill McFadden, EFTA00128987. July 12, 2019. Related transaction monitoring account.
- FBI interview of Cherie Quigley, EFTA00128968. October 10, 2019. Related compliance management account.
- Donny Evans’s Deutsche Bank investigation. February 15, 2026. Related research concerning Indyke and internal reporting.
- EpsteinWiki: Amanda Kirby. Internal profile.
- EpsteinWiki: Paul Morris. Internal banker profile.
- EpsteinWiki: Chip Packard. Internal executive profile.
- EpsteinWiki: Leon Black. Internal related profile.
- EpsteinWiki: Deutsche Bank. Internal institutional background.