EFTA00128987: Tammy Hill McFadden’s FBI Interview: Deutsche Bank, Epstein Payments and Compliance Warnings
Snapshot
- Primary evidence: EFTA00128987, a seven page FBI interview report.
- Interview date: July 12, 2019.
- Location: FBI field office in Jacksonville, Florida.
- Report drafted: July 24, 2019.
- Date of entry: August 21, 2019.
- Witness: Tammy Hill McFadden, a former Deutsche Bank compliance officer.
- Legal representatives present: Kristen Doolittle and Brian McCafferty.
- Document format: FD 302, an FBI summary of an interview.
- Page identifiers: EFTA00128987 through EFTA00128993.
- Main subjects: Epstein related wire transfers, internal suspicious activity reporting, 102 deferred reviews involving politically exposed clients, alleged workplace retaliation, Kushner related account activity and Trump’s old post office portfolio.
- Evidence status: The report records Hill McFadden’s account. It expressly states that it contains neither FBI recommendations nor conclusions.
Overview
EFTA00128987 records a detailed account from a former compliance officer who reviewed private banking activity at Deutsche Bank.
Hill McFadden told investigators that she raised concerns about Jeffrey Epstein’s payments to young women. She also described discovering 102 politically exposed clients whose reviews were pending in deferred status.
According to her account, management rejected her work, reduced her recorded productivity and blocked efforts to transfer departments. She believed this treatment was retaliation. Deutsche Bank terminated her employment in 2018.
The interview also covers transactions involving an entity the report calls “REAL CONTRAD, LLC,” which Hill McFadden identified as owned by Jared Kushner. It separately describes difficulties tracing funds in Trump’s old post office portfolio.
These subjects appear in the same interview. Their inclusion does not establish that the transactions were connected to one another or to Epstein’s crimes.
Key Takeaways
- Hill McFadden said she raised concerns about Epstein’s wire transfers in 2015 and asked to stop reviewing his accounts.
- She recalled her supervisor responding that Epstein had served his time. The accounts remained open at that point.
- She described 102 existing politically exposed clients whose reviews were in deferred status. The report does not identify those clients.
- She alleged that retaliation began shortly after she questioned the deferred reviews and continued until her dismissal.
- She distinguished an internal suspicious activity report from a report submitted to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, known as FinCEN.
- She said compliance officers did not know whether their internal reports ultimately reached FinCEN.
- The interview contains unresolved names and spellings. “ROSE,” “DARIN MCINKE” and “REAL CONTRAD” should remain distinguishable from independently verified identities.
- The document establishes that the FBI interviewed a banking compliance employee about Epstein. It does not identify the banker whose unreleased interview Senator Ron Wyden described in September 2026.
Hill McFadden’s Banking Experience
Pages 1 and 2 of the interview describe more than 18 years of experience in anti money laundering work and know your client compliance.
Hill McFadden said she began her banking career at Bank of America in Jacksonville. During approximately seven years there, her roles included:
- Loan officer.
- Assistant branch manager.
- Operations manager.
- KYC compliance officer.
She subsequently worked in contract positions for Chase and Fidelity.
In 2008, she joined Deutsche Bank as a senior operations specialist. Her work included tax, audit and loan operations.
Around 2010, she became a KYC manager. She supervised approximately eight to ten employees who reviewed documentation for new trading and equity accounts.
Their work included examining financial statements and articles of incorporation. The team assessed whether the documentation supported opening an account and informed the onboarding team of its decision.
Hill McFadden also described holding professional certifications. The interview mentions AML and University of Cambridge certifications without providing their precise titles.
Pressure to Open Accounts
Page 2 records Hill McFadden’s description of pressure from relationship managers and colleagues in New York to open accounts quickly.
She gave an example of a relationship manager demanding that an account be opened by a particular afternoon deadline.
Hill McFadden said she generally responded by email. She explained the outstanding issues and why resolving them protected both the bank and its employees.
She recalled that colleagues sometimes escalated requests above her. However, she did not know how often those efforts succeeded.
The report identifies a New York KYC contact only as “ZANAIB,” a senior vice president. It does not provide enough information to establish that person’s full identity.
Her KYC reporting chain included Elenita Escobar, Steve Hellinger and Paul Kavanaugh. The interview states that the work was outsourced to India in 2014.
Her Move Into Private Banking Compliance
Page 2 states that Hill McFadden became an AML compliance officer in 2014. She was no longer a manager and worked with private bank clients.
She initially reported to Clarrisa Delafuente, described as a vice president of transaction monitoring in New York.
Hill McFadden and Almarie Worlds worked in Jacksonville. The report separately names Ying Wang and Yang Wong as employees based in New York.
She described the workload as extremely large. Additional Jacksonville employees included Michelle Gabriel, Kevin Wilson, Danya Friedman and Cripa Apal.
The report names her subsequent supervisor as “SHERI QUIGLEY,” who took over in 2015 and reported to director Wayne Salit.
These names and spellings reflect the interview report. The document does not attach an organizational chart or personnel records confirming every spelling and reporting relationship.
How Transaction Monitoring Worked
Pages 2 and 3 describe several systems used to monitor account activity:
- MELAVANTE, also called PRIME, for compliance monitoring.
- ACTIMIZE for trading activity.
- Other systems, including NORCOM.
According to Hill McFadden, senior management set alert parameters, including transaction amounts and countries. She could see some parameters, but not all of them.
She described the review process as follows:
- PRIME generated alerts every two weeks and cases monthly.
- Quigley distributed the work to the team.
- Compliance officers reviewed accounts and transactions.
- They also conducted internet searches and assessed whether activity appeared consistent with the available information.
- Officers submitted recommendations for approval.
- Quigley decided whether to open a case.
Hill McFadden said alerts were supposed to receive immediate attention. Workload pressures meant that this did not always happen.
Crucially, she said an alert did not stop transactions from continuing.
The usual deadline for completing review work was 30 days.
Internal Reports and FinCEN Filings Were Different
Page 3 makes an important distinction between an internal suspicious activity report and a SAR filed with FinCEN.
Hill McFadden said she was never directly told that she could not write an internal SAR. However, she and colleagues felt that internal reports often produced pushback or failed to progress.
She described Quigley requiring a case narrative before deciding whether an internal SAR should be created. Hill McFadden believed that process departed from the written manual and displaced the compliance officer’s judgment.
She also said Quigley sometimes issued instructions outside written policy. Hill McFadden documented those instructions in emails. She recalled being told not to do that again.
According to her account, Doug Sloan and/or Wayne Salit ultimately determined whether to submit a SAR to FinCEN.
Compliance officers did not know whether their internal reports reached the government.
The key distinction: An internal report documents a concern within the bank. Its existence alone does not establish that the bank filed a corresponding SAR with FinCEN.
The interview contains no attached FinCEN filing confirmation.
The 102 Deferred Reviews
Pages 3 and 4 describe Hill McFadden discovering 102 politically exposed persons whose reviews were pending in deferred status.
Around December 2015, Delafuente provided her with a formula for checking case status. Hill McFadden used it while examining related cases from previous months.
She said all 102 clients were existing customers.
According to her account:
- Salit reviewed new politically exposed clients.
- Quigley reviewed existing politically exposed clients.
- Deferred status required someone to change the status in the system.
- A justified deferral should generally last only a few days.
- All 102 entries appeared to have been placed into deferred status by Wang.
- Delafuente included deferred cases in reporting totals, while Quigley did not.
Hill McFadden said she initially assumed the situation was an oversight. She emailed Quigley to ask how it should be addressed.
The report does not provide the underlying list, case histories, deferral dates or explanations.
It therefore does not establish:
- Who the 102 clients were.
- How long every individual review had been deferred.
- Whether Epstein was among them.
- Whether the clients were involved in unlawful activity.
- Whether management deliberately deferred the reviews to protect particular clients.
Hill McFadden expressly said she did not know whether Kushner or Trump belonged to that group.
Her Allegation of Retaliation
Pages 4 through 6 record Hill McFadden’s account of workplace retaliation.
She said Quigley began rejecting her work approximately two hours after she questioned the deferred reviews.
In Hill McFadden’s view, those rejections reduced her productivity figures and affected her bonus.
Approximately one month later, she emailed Salit about the treatment. She said he did not respond.
She then contacted Francesca Benson in human resources. An investigation began in early 2016.
According to Hill McFadden, HR determined approximately a year later that no wrongdoing had occurred.
She said she had previously received strong performance reviews, awards and honors. Her 2016 review included unfavorable language she considered unusual.
She also said Joseph Acedebo, an AFC director, continued allowing Quigley to write her performance reviews despite knowing about her complaints.
These statements describe her allegation and interpretation. The interview does not attach the performance reviews, rejected work, bonus calculations or HR findings.
Transfer Requests and Dismissal
Pages 5 and 6 describe Hill McFadden’s attempts to leave the department.
She said she applied for between 12 and 16 positions during 2016 without success.
She wanted to return to KYC work. Her former manager reportedly told her that he had not received her résumé.
She also raised her concerns and transfer requests with director Josh Blazer.
In April 2017, she moved into an AFC compliance officer role. She said Acedebo rejected her request to work in KYC.
The report names Marla Liconte as head of AFC and SAR work. Hill McFadden believed the transfer kept her within substantially the same group and formed part of a plan to dismiss her.
She was terminated in 2018.
At the termination meeting, Blazer and a person identified only as Erin cited low productivity and performance.
Hill McFadden said she requested the document from which they read. She received the benefits section, but not the section explaining the reasons for termination.
The report does not contain the termination document or an independent finding that the dismissal was retaliatory.
The Kushner Related Account Review
Pages 5 and 6 describe an account the report calls “REAL CONTRAD, LLC.”
Hill McFadden identified the entity as owned by Jared Kushner.
She said she reviewed July and/or August 2016 activity during a case she encountered around late 2016.
According to her account:
- Most of the transactions involved cryptocurrency.
- She could not validate the origin or recipient of the funds.
- The account appeared to be paying an employee in cryptocurrency.
- One recipient was a Russian individual.
- Internet research produced a website she considered suspicious.
- The website used an avatar rather than a photograph.
- Its employment description appeared questionable to her.
- She could not find the individual listed as an employee on a Kushner website.
Hill McFadden submitted a narrative to Quigley. She said Quigley considered the concerns unfounded.
She continued pressing the issue and was directed to a relationship manager identified only as “ROSE.”
The interview records Hill McFadden’s observations. It does not attach transaction records, wallet addresses, corporate ownership documents or the websites she reviewed.
The entity name remains unresolved: The printed name “REAL CONTRAD” should not automatically be replaced with another company’s name. The report alone does not establish that it refers to Cadre or any particular legal entity.
Contact With the Client and Closure of the Case
Page 6 states that Rose contacted Kushner’s company and obtained information about the person receiving the payments.
Hill McFadden believed relationship managers were supposed to examine existing information rather than contact a client about potentially suspicious activity in that situation.
She said the contact and information were documented.
She recommended closing the associated accounts. Salit and Quigley participated in the email discussions.
The report then says the case was closed.
That wording does not establish that the accounts were closed.
A few days after she raised the Kushner concerns, Hill McFadden attended an HR meeting. Quigley participated by telephone, and Erica Prada attended in person.
Hill McFadden said she was questioned about her productivity and whether she was happy. She believed the meeting showed that Quigley knew about her original HR complaint.
Epstein’s Payments to Young Women
Pages 6 and 7 contain the interview’s central Epstein specific account.
Hill McFadden said Epstein appeared to send wire transfers to young women, possibly in their twenties.
She also described payments to a woman in France who owned an art gallery. She said she gathered information through Google searches.
The report provides no recipient names, transaction amounts, transfer dates or underlying bank statements for these payments.
It also does not establish that the recipients were minors or that particular transfers paid for abuse.
Hill McFadden told investigators that the Jacksonville team wanted the bank to terminate its relationship with Epstein. This is her account of the team’s position.
In 2015, she emailed Quigley about her concerns and asked to have Epstein related work reassigned.
She recalled Quigley responding that “EPSTEIN served his time.”
The accounts were not closed at that point.
Who Was “Rose”?
Page 7 identifies Epstein’s relationship manager as “ROSE.”
The same name appears earlier in the Kushner related account discussion.
The report supplies no surname.
It does not establish that Rose was Rosemary Vrablic. It also does not identify Rose as Paul Morris or Stewart Oldfield.
Paul Morris and Stewart Martin Oldfield have separate documented roles in Epstein’s banking relationships. Those histories cannot resolve this interview’s incomplete identification by themselves.
The Internal Report on Epstein’s Lawyer
Page 7 says an internal SAR was filed around late 2016 concerning Epstein’s lawyer.
The report prints the name as “DARIN MCINKE.”
Hill McFadden remembered learning about the report while Federal Reserve personnel were at the bank with Quigley.
The document does not include the internal report, a filing number or confirmation of submission to FinCEN.
Donny Evans’s February 2026 investigation examines separate records concerning Darren Indyke, including internal bank communications and Quigley’s FBI interview. That research provides a relevant comparison, but it does not correct the name printed in Hill McFadden’s report. iamdonnyevans.substack.com
The possible relationship between those records should remain a research question until supporting documents establish the connection.
Trump’s Old Post Office Portfolio
Page 7 records Hill McFadden reviewing cases involving Trump’s old post office portfolio.
She said Deutsche Bank’s systems did not communicate with one another. As a result, she could not determine a reliable origin for the funds.
She described funds being drawn from different places and moved for payments.
The report does not provide amounts, account identifiers or transaction histories.
Her description establishes a concern about visibility and tracing. It does not establish that the funds were unlawful or connected to Epstein.
Complaints and Responses
Page 7 states that Hill McFadden filed complaints with:
- The Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
- The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
- The Securities and Exchange Commission.
She said she had not filed a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank as of the interview.
The report does not attach those complaints or their outcomes.
The Lever’s February 13, 2026 reporting revisited the interview. It reported that Deutsche Bank declined comment and that its reporters could not reach Hill McFadden.
The article also reproduced earlier responses to her 2019 allegations. Deutsche Bank denied preventing investigators from escalating suspicious activity and denied reassigning or dismissing employees to suppress client concerns. Kushner Companies denied allegations involving money laundering. These responses concerned the earlier allegations, rather than a detailed answer to every passage of this FBI report. And Lost Her Job
What Regulators Independently Found
The July 2020 New York consent order supplies independent regulatory context.
The Department of Financial Services found failures in Deutsche Bank’s handling of its relationship with Epstein and related entities.
The order describes a relationship beginning in August 2013 and a decision to terminate it in December 2018. Epstein, associated entities and related individuals eventually opened more than 40 accounts.
The bank classified the relationship as high risk. Regulators nevertheless found that monitoring was inadequately tailored to Epstein’s particular risks.
The $150 million penalty covered the Epstein relationship and separate correspondent banking relationships with FBME and Danske Bank. It was not exclusively an Epstein penalty.
These findings establish broader compliance failures. They do not independently verify every allegation in Hill McFadden’s interview or decide her employment dispute. dfs.ny.gov
EpsteinWiki’s Deutsche Bank article provides further background on the bank’s relationship with Epstein.
Related Interviews and Independent Research
The Cherie Quigley interview, EFTA00128968, is a separate released banking interview.
Hill McFadden’s report uses the spelling “SHERI QUIGLEY.” Related reporting identifies the compliance manager interviewed in October 2019 as Cherie Quigley. The spelling difference should remain visible when comparing the documents.
Document Zero’s March 2026 article directs attention to Quigley’s account of Trump becoming a covered client whose profile required special access. That is a separate issue from Hill McFadden’s account of disconnected monitoring systems. Neither statement alone proves unlawful activity. rhowardstone.substack.com
EpsteinWiki’s Amanda Kirby article offers another banking witness comparison.
Independent investigations are useful for finding related records. Their interpretations should remain distinguishable from the contents of the underlying evidence.
Is This the Interview Wyden Was Seeking?
Senator Ron Wyden’s September 30, 2026 letter states that his investigators learned of an unreleased FBI report documenting an interview with a banker tied to Epstein.
The letter does not name the banker, identify the interview date or provide a document number.
Hill McFadden’s report is publicly available. There is therefore no basis to identify this released document as the unreleased report Wyden described.
The letter also does not establish that the missing interview was with Paul Morris, Jes Staley or another particular banker. finance.senate.gov
EpsteinWiki’s Senate Finance report article provides broader context for Wyden’s financial investigation.
Evidence Guide by Page
- Page 1, EFTA00128987: Interview details, lawyers present, banking experience and KYC responsibilities.
- Page 2, EFTA00128988: Account opening pressure, reporting relationships, outsourcing, private banking compliance staff and monitoring systems.
- Page 3, EFTA00128989: Alert handling, internal SAR procedures, management approval and the formula used to examine case status.
- Page 4, EFTA00128990: The 102 deferred reviews, alleged work rejection, bonus effects and HR investigation.
- Page 5, EFTA00128991: Performance review concerns, transfer applications and the “REAL CONTRAD” account review.
- Page 6, EFTA00128992: Client contact, case closure, HR meeting, AFC transfer, termination account and Epstein related wires.
- Page 7, EFTA00128993: The response to Epstein concerns, Rose, the lawyer’s internal SAR, Trump portfolio reviews and regulatory complaints.
The complete seven page report should be read as a single document.
Unanswered Questions
- Who were the 102 politically exposed clients, and what do their case histories show?
- What reasons were recorded for placing those reviews in deferred status?
- Do the underlying emails corroborate Hill McFadden’s account of rejected work and escalation?
- Which internal reports resulted in SARs filed with FinCEN?
- Who was the relationship manager identified as Rose?
- What legal entity did the report mean by “REAL CONTRAD, LLC”?
- What underlying records support the cryptocurrency description?
- Were the associated accounts closed, or only the investigation case?
- Who was the lawyer identified as “DARIN MCINKE”?
- What did Hill McFadden’s OSHA, FINRA and SEC complaints conclude?
- What do the original HR investigation and termination records show?
- Who was interviewed in the unreleased banker report identified by Wyden?
Sources
- FBI interview of Tammy Hill McFadden, EFTA00128987. Interview conducted July 12, 2019. Primary source for the document analysis.
- FBI interview of Cherie Quigley, EFTA00128968. Related banking interview.
- New York Department of Financial Services consent order. July 2020 regulatory findings concerning Deutsche Bank.
- The Lever’s investigation. February 13, 2026. Reporting on Hill McFadden’s interview and earlier responses to her allegations.
- Donny Evans’s Deutsche Bank investigation. February 15, 2026. Research connecting separate internal bank records and the Quigley interview.
- Document Zero’s institutional record discussion. March 3, 2026. Related research concerning Deutsche Bank compliance records.
- Wyden’s letter seeking unreleased FBI interviews. September 30, 2026.
- EpsteinWiki: Deutsche Bank. Internal background.
- EpsteinWiki: Amanda Kirby. Internal banking witness profile.
- EpsteinWiki: Paul Morris. Internal banker profile.
- EpsteinWiki: Stewart Martin Oldfield. Internal banker profile.
- EpsteinWiki: Senate Finance report. Internal investigation background.