Mary C. Casey
JPMorgan Private Bank vice chair and longtime banker whose documented work for Jeffrey Epstein included client management, due diligence, account approvals, young women’s accounts, credit decisions, residence visits, internal risk discussions, and the 2010 transfer of the relationship to Paul Morris.
Snapshot
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Full name | Mary Clare Casey |
| Earlier name in records | Mary Clare Rieth |
| Current role | Vice Chair and Managing Director, J.P. Morgan Private Bank in Miami |
| Epstein connection | Principal JPMorgan private banker and relationship manager for much of the period from 2001 until March 2010 |
| Employer | JPMorgan Chase Bank and J.P. Morgan Securities |
| JPMorgan tenure | Employment reported from December 1996; securities registration reported from August 1999 |
| Direct residence visits | JPMorgan identified two or three visits to Epstein’s Manhattan townhouse between 2000 and his 2006 arrest |
| Main documented functions | Relationship management, due diligence, account approval, credit escalation, entity onboarding, account restructuring, risk discussions, and transfer of coverage |
| Major internal concern | Records show Casey discussed moving Epstein, questioned new credit shortly before his plea, and later said she no longer wanted to cover him |
| Major accountability question | Why the relationship and many connected accounts continued despite documented criminal, reputational, and trafficking indicators |
| Criminal status | No identified criminal charge connected to Epstein |
| Civil status | Not identified as an individual defendant in the principal survivor or United States Virgin Islands cases against JPMorgan |
| Regulatory status | FINRA BrokerCheck reports no disclosure events and shows current registrations through J.P. Morgan Securities |
Mary C. Casey, formerly Mary C. Rieth, served as Jeffrey Epstein’s principal private banker at JPMorgan during a critical period. The released record places her near the center of the bank’s relationship with Epstein before and after the Palm Beach investigation became public. She reviewed or approved due diligence, managed connected entities, handled account requests for young women referred by Epstein, escalated concerns about his criminal case, and eventually transferred the relationship to Paul Morris.
The evidence is mixed in an important way. Casey did not simply defend Epstein without reservation. Emails and JPMorgan’s later litigation response show that she discussed moving him, questioned additional credit, and told Jes Staley that she no longer wanted to cover him. JPMorgan has publicly said she advocated ending the relationship years before the bank terminated it. Yet the same documentary record shows continued approvals, account servicing, and an optimistic 2010 message that the bank hoped Epstein’s relationship would grow. An accurate profile must include both sets of facts.
Key Takeaways
- JPMorgan selected Casey for the Epstein relationship in December 2001 because a senior banker described her as smart, aggressive, and able to interact well with him. Jes Staley personally approved the choice.
- Casey approved or managed due diligence for Epstein, Ghislaine Maxwell, multiple Epstein controlled companies, aircraft entities, trusts, foundations, properties, and employees or associates.
- In 2004, Casey initiated due diligence for two young women described internally as New York models and friends of Epstein. Epstein guaranteed their credit cards. A related due diligence record said he often supported emerging models.
- By 2007 and early 2008, Casey and risk executive Lisa Waters were discussing Epstein’s anticipated plea and the possibility of moving him. Casey then asked senior executives whether the bank was comfortable providing a new $1 million letter of credit shortly before his plea.
- Casey participated in restructuring Epstein’s relationship in 2009 by closing brokerage execution accounts while leaving custody accounts open. The bank continued providing banking and custody services, and Epstein’s brokerage activity moved to Bear Stearns.
- In late 2009 or early 2010, according to JPMorgan’s verified litigation response citing Casey’s deposition, she told Jes Staley that she no longer wanted to cover Epstein. Lisa Waters urged Staley to end the bank’s relationship, but he defended Epstein.
- Casey transferred the relationship to Paul Morris in March 2010. Five days later, she told Staley that Paul Barrett and Jeff Matusow were covering Epstein on the investment desk, Morris was his banker, and the bank hoped the relationship would grow.
- Casey remains a senior JPMorgan employee. The 2026 Senate Finance Committee Democratic staff report said further investigation was needed regarding Casey and other employees and noted no known individual financial consequence or regulatory discipline for her role.
- No public record reviewed for this article shows that Casey participated in Epstein’s sexual abuse or trafficking, received a criminal charge, incurred an individual civil judgment, or was sanctioned by a regulator in connection with Epstein.
Overview
Casey’s importance comes from her duration, authority, and proximity to decisions. She was not merely copied on occasional messages. JPMorgan’s systems repeatedly identify her as Epstein’s banker, client adviser, approver, or owner of due diligence records. Her approvals appear across a cluster of individuals and entities linked to Epstein. Her emails reached senior figures including Jes Staley, Mary Erdoes, Catherine Keating, Stephen Sonnick, and risk executive Lisa Waters.
This record spans several distinct stages. First came active expansion, referrals, and due diligence from 2001 through 2005. Then came mounting criminal and reputational information from 2006 through 2008. JPMorgan responded by limiting some services, but it retained Epstein as a banking and custody client. Finally, Casey transferred primary coverage to Paul Morris in 2010 while the larger relationship continued until JPMorgan says it ended Epstein’s client status in 2013.
The central question is therefore not whether Casey ever voiced concern. The documents show that she did. The harder question is how those concerns interacted with her approvals, the authority of senior management, the commercial value of Epstein’s relationship, and the bank’s decision to continue serving him.
Identity, Education, and Career
Public professional records identify Casey as Mary Clare Casey and also list the name Mary Clare Rieth. The name change explains why earlier JPMorgan emails and due diligence documents refer to Mary Rieth while later records refer to Mary Casey. Both names identify the same banker.
The FINRA BrokerCheck report for CRD 3169703 shows that Casey has worked at JPMorgan Chase Bank since December 1996 and has maintained securities registrations with JPMorgan entities since August 1999. The report shows current registration through J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, including broker and investment adviser status, and reports no disclosure events.
Casey’s Catalyst Miami biography identifies her as a Vice Chair and Managing Director of the J.P. Morgan Private Bank in Miami. It says she leads professionals providing capital markets, investment, and wealth advisory services to South Florida families. Before JPMorgan, she spent four years at the World Bank developing projects in Ecuador and Brazil. She earned a bachelor’s degree in economics from Dartmouth College and a Master of Public Affairs from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School.
BrokerCheck also reports nonprofit board roles with the Thrive for Life Prison Project and Catalyst Miami. It lists her as a Catalyst Miami board member and notes that she became board chair. These present roles are relevant to her public profile but do not alter the historical Epstein evidence.
Selection as Epstein’s Banker
Casey’s direct connection to the relationship is documented by EFTA02817807. On December 7, 2001, a JPMorgan executive asked Jes Staley to approve assigning Mary Rieth to help cover Epstein. The executive described her as “smart, aggressive” and likely able to interact well with Epstein. Staley replied, “Mary would be great.”
The message shows deliberate selection. Epstein was already a significant client, and his relationship was discussed alongside Leslie Wexner’s. Casey was chosen not by accident or through routine automated assignment, but because senior personnel believed her temperament fit the client.
JPMorgan’s later due diligence audit histories show her as Epstein’s banker for most of the following years. There were short automated reassignment entries involving Jeffrey Matusow and Robert Baynard during June and July 2006, but the field repeatedly returned to Casey. On March 4, 2010, the formal banker assignment moved from Casey to Paul Morris. See EFTA01480930, EFTA01482084, and EFTA01594255.
Early Due Diligence and Epstein’s Commercial Value
In May 2003, Casey handled a due diligence review of Epstein and Financial Trust Company. In EFTA02810791, she told another JPMorgan managing director that she had received the due diligence report and expected to approve it that afternoon. She also planned to send a copy of the March 2003 Vanity Fair profile of Epstein.
The resulting review described Epstein as a money manager with an estimated net worth of $300 million. It said his checking and large trading accounts produced one of the largest annual revenue flows among private bank clients and that JPMorgan wanted to expand its business with him. Casey, then Rieth, approved his acceptance as a client. See EFTA02811623.
The Vanity Fair article contained financial and reputational questions and described a social environment involving young foreign models. The article did not disclose the full sexual abuse allegations that reporter Vicky Ward later said had been removed before publication. The fact that Casey circulated the published article shows awareness of reputational information, but it does not prove she knew the unpublished reporting.
Casey also handled referrals from Epstein. In November 2003, she wrote that a managing partner had been referred by Epstein for banking services and asked that the lead be entered into JPMorgan’s system. See EFTA02816293. Referral value was a major feature of Epstein’s importance to the private bank, which treated him as both a client and a source of wealthy prospects.
Accounts for Young Women and Models
One of the most consequential records is EFTA02816139. On January 28, 2004, Casey asked JPMorgan security services to begin due diligence reports on two young women described as models in New York and friends of Epstein. Epstein’s office requested checking accounts and credit cards for them. The credit limit for each card was $2,500, guaranteed by Epstein, and the initial deposit into each account was to be $3,000.
Related due diligence records described one young woman as having arrived from Slovakia for modeling work and stated that Epstein often provided support to emerging models. See EFTA01594169, EFTA01582810, and EFTA02811060. Later litigation characterized one applicant as 18. The released records redact identifying details, and this article does not name the women.
These documents matter because later investigations identified recruitment through modeling opportunities, financial dependency, immigration vulnerability, housing, and patronage as features of Epstein’s wider system. That later context makes the bank records significant. It does not establish that Casey knew either applicant was being exploited or that opening an account was itself unlawful.
The records nevertheless raise serious compliance questions. The bank knew Epstein was arranging and guaranteeing accounts for young foreign or aspiring models with limited independent information. The due diligence process documented that pattern rather than treating each request as unrelated. Whether the bank escalated those combined facts beyond ordinary client review remains unclear.
Ghislaine Maxwell and Connected Accounts
Casey’s responsibilities extended beyond Epstein’s personal accounts. Records under both Rieth and Casey identify her as banker or approver for Ghislaine Maxwell and numerous entities in the Epstein network.
An early due diligence report described Maxwell as Epstein’s companion or longtime friend and said she was opening a checking account after being referred by him. Casey approved the relationship in March 2003. In April 2005, she approved Maxwell’s continued acceptance as a client after a refreshed review. See EFTA02816120, EFTA01594255, and EFTA01582862.
In 2009, Casey approved or participated in due diligence for Air Ghislaine, an aircraft entity associated with Maxwell. She also approved multiple Epstein controlled entities and trusts. These approvals occurred after the Palm Beach investigation, after Epstein’s 2008 guilty plea, and while the bank was formally treating him as a controversial or high profile client.
| Entity or relationship | Documented Casey role | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Jeffrey Epstein and Financial Trust Company | Client approval and continuing relationship management | EFTA02811623, EFTA01482084 |
| Ghislaine Maxwell | Banker and client approval under the name Mary Rieth | EFTA02816120, EFTA01594255 |
| Two young women described as models | Requested due diligence for checking accounts and guaranteed credit cards | EFTA02816139, EFTA01594169 |
| 116 East 65th Street LLC | Banker approval in February 2009 | EFTA01582851 |
| HBRK Associates Inc. | Banker approval in October 2008 | EFTA01480635 |
| Darren K. Indyke PLLC | Banker approval in October 2008 | EFTA01480646 |
| Darren K. Indyke as an individual client | Banker approval in February 2010 | EFTA01480739 |
| Air Ghislaine Inc. | Banker approval in May 2009 | EFTA01481361 |
| Hyperion Air Inc. | Banker approval in May 2009 | EFTA01480551 |
| Jege Inc. | Banker approval in May 2009 | EFTA01480591 |
| 2007 Jeffrey E. Epstein Insurance Trust Number 2 | Banker approval in December 2008 | EFTA01480718 |
| 2007 Jeffrey E. Epstein Insurance Trust Number 3 | Banker approval in December 2008 | EFTA01481760 |
| MAX Foundation | Banker approval in December 2009 | EFTA01594119 |
An approval in JPMorgan’s system does not necessarily mean Casey alone decided whether the bank would retain Epstein. Many records also show senior manager, area head, risk, security, or quality review approvals. The table establishes her operational responsibility within a larger approval chain.
Criminal Case and Internal Risk Concerns
By December 2007 and January 2008, Casey and Lisa Waters were discussing news about Epstein’s expected plea and sentence. In EFTA02807930, Casey wrote that she planned to speak with a senior colleague about “moving him” and asked when Stephen Cutler would make a decision. Waters responded that the bank needed to know the felony to which Epstein would plead and added, “No one wants him.”
This exchange is evidence that Casey was not oblivious to the criminal case. It also shows that the bank was considering a change to the relationship before Epstein’s plea. The phrase “moving him” is not fully defined. It could mean transferring the account, changing business units, reducing services, or ending part of the relationship.
On February 29, 2008, Epstein’s office requested a new $1 million letter of credit. Casey escalated the request to Mary Erdoes, Steven Sonnick, Catherine Keating, and Lisa Waters. She noted that the bank was weeks from Epstein’s court date, that the letter would remain outstanding for a year, and that it would be cash collateralized. She asked whether the bank was comfortable taking on additional credit exposure just before his pending plea arrangement. Sonnick answered that because the bank had already issued one, he did not see how it could turn down another. See EFTA02816183.
The email shows Casey raising a concrete risk question rather than approving the request silently. It also shows that the concern was framed primarily through exposure, timing, and precedent. The record does not show Casey asserting unilateral authority to reject the request.
Epstein pleaded guilty on June 30, 2008 to felony solicitation of prostitution and procuring a person under 18 for prostitution. After the plea, JPMorgan classified him as a controversial or high profile client but continued the relationship.
Restrictions, Account Closures, and Continued Banking
JPMorgan did not immediately sever all services. Instead, it restricted parts of the relationship. A February 6, 2009 email shows Casey instructing staff to close brokerage execution accounts for Epstein and Financial Trust Company, while moving asset only accounts to a custody fee schedule. Lisa Waters clarified that linked brokerage accounts should close while the custody account remained open. See EFTA01584505 and EFTA01585084.
A later due diligence record explained the structure. JPMorgan retained Epstein for banking and custody, while Bear Stearns held the brokerage relationship. It said Jes Staley had conferred with General Counsel Stephen Cutler and that the decision was to keep Epstein as a Private Bank client. See EFTA01480544.
The same record described cash withdrawals of $20,000 to $40,000 as not unusual for an aircraft entity because cash was said to be needed for foreign fuel expenses. The 2012 approval history identifies Paul Morris, Mary Casey, William Sheridan, and Bonnie Perry. Because the record postdates Casey’s transfer of primary coverage, it shows that she remained within an approval or ownership chain for at least some connected due diligence.
The restriction therefore reduced certain brokerage services but did not end banking, custody, entity accounts, credit support, or the broader private bank relationship. That distinction is essential when evaluating claims that the bank acted after Epstein’s conviction.
Casey’s Effort to Leave the Relationship
JPMorgan’s verified supplemental response in EFTA02817409 says that in late 2009 or early 2010, Casey and Lisa Waters met with Jes Staley about Epstein. Citing Casey’s July 6, 2023 deposition, the bank said Casey told Staley that she “no longer wanted to cover Mr. Epstein.” Waters asked why Epstein remained a client and urged Staley to end both his personal and the firm’s relationship with Epstein. According to JPMorgan, Staley replied that he knew and trusted Epstein and would trust him with his daughters. JPMorgan later told the Financial Times that Casey had advocated terminating Epstein years before the bank exited him.
This is among the strongest pieces of evidence in Casey’s favor. It supports JPMorgan’s later public statement that she had advocated terminating Epstein as a client years before the bank finally exited him. It also places the decision to retain Epstein above the individual relationship manager.
The evidence still leaves questions. The public response does not reproduce Casey’s full deposition testimony or specify every recommendation she made. It does not explain why she continued approving connected accounts or why her later transition email expressed hope for growth. Her attempt to leave coverage should be recognized without treating it as a complete answer to the earlier and continuing record.
The 2009 “Buddy” Email
On July 22, 2009, the day Epstein was released from county custody, Jeff Matusow forwarded Casey an article titled “Billionaire freed from jail on sex charges” and asked, “Will you be my buddy on this one??” See EFTA02816180.
Casey’s response, if any, is not included in the released exhibit. The email does not define what Matusow meant by “buddy.” It may have concerned joint coverage, internal support, or a control process. The 2026 Senate Finance Committee Democratic staff report cited the message and said further investigation was needed to determine whether Matusow, Casey, or others advocated reduced monitoring, oversight, or reporting. The report did not find that Casey had done so.
Transfer to Paul Morris and the Growth Message
JPMorgan’s banker history shows that Paul Morris replaced Casey as Epstein’s formal banker on March 4, 2010. Five days later, Casey sent Jes Staley an update in EFTA02817809. She wrote that Epstein was set up for Private Bank business, including an International Swaps and Derivatives Association agreement, on the Global Investment Opportunities desk. She said Paul Barrett and Jeff Matusow would co cover him on that desk and Morris would be his banker.
Casey concluded that Epstein was “well covered” and that the bank hoped the relationship would grow. This language sits uneasily beside her earlier concerns and her statement that she no longer wanted to cover him.
Several explanations are possible. Casey may have been carrying out a senior management decision she opposed. She may have wanted personal responsibility transferred while still supporting the business. Her view may have changed after services were restructured. Or the language may have been routine client transition language. The documentary record does not resolve motive.
What it does establish is that the March 2010 transfer was not a termination. JPMorgan staffed the relationship with a new banker and investment team and sought additional business.
Townhouse Visits and Direct Contact
JPMorgan’s verified 2023 response identified Casey as having visited Epstein’s Manhattan townhouse on two or three occasions between 2000 and his 2006 arrest. The bank characterized the purpose as routine account servicing. See EFTA02817409.
These visits confirm direct, in person professional contact. They also place Casey inside Epstein’s private residence during the period when later witnesses described extensive abuse occurring there. The visits do not establish that Casey witnessed abuse, saw victims, or knew criminal conduct was taking place. No reviewed survivor statement identifies Casey as present during an assault or recruitment event.
Evidence and Accountability Chart
| Period | Documented conduct | Evidence strength | What it establishes | What remains unresolved |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2001 | Selected to help cover Epstein with Staley’s approval | Primary email | Deliberate assignment based on perceived fit with Epstein | What briefing she received at assignment |
| 2003 | Approved Epstein after due diligence and reviewed the Vanity Fair article | Primary email and due diligence | Knowledge of financial and reputational questions; commercial value of relationship | Whether unpublished allegations reached the bank |
| 2003 to 2005 | Approved Maxwell and managed Epstein referrals | Due diligence and email records | Coverage extended to Epstein’s network | Scope of enhanced review across connected clients |
| 2004 | Initiated reviews for two young women described as models, with Epstein guaranteeing cards | Primary email and due diligence | Bank knew Epstein financially supported young models | Whether vulnerability or trafficking indicators were escalated |
| 2006 to 2008 | Remained banker as criminal investigation and plea developed | Banker history and emails | Direct knowledge of criminal risk | Exact recommendations Casey made to senior management |
| Early 2008 | Discussed moving Epstein and questioned a $1 million letter of credit | Primary emails | Casey raised risk and timing concerns | Who made final decisions and on what basis |
| 2008 to 2009 | Approved connected entities after conviction | Due diligence records | Continued operational support under enhanced scrutiny | Whether approvals could have been refused or escalated further |
| 2009 | Closed execution accounts but preserved custody services | Primary email | Partial restriction rather than termination | Whether restrictions reduced relevant risk |
| Late 2009 or early 2010 | Told Staley she no longer wanted to cover Epstein | Verified bank response citing deposition | Casey sought to leave account coverage | Whether she explicitly demanded full client termination |
| March 2010 | Transferred relationship to Morris and said the bank hoped it would grow | Primary email | Continuity and business development after transfer | How this statement aligned with her earlier objections |
| 2012 | Appeared in approval history for an Epstein aircraft entity | Due diligence record | Continued presence in account control records | Whether role was substantive or administrative |
| 2023 | Deposed in litigation | Court filings and bank response | Direct testimony was taken under oath | Full public transcript remains limited |
| 2026 | Named in Senate staff report | Congressional staff report | Continuing institutional scrutiny | Whether regulators or Congress will pursue individual review |
Chronology
| Date | Event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| December 1996 | Casey begins reported employment at JPMorgan Chase Bank | Establishes long institutional tenure |
| August 1999 | Securities registration begins with a JPMorgan entity | Establishes regulated brokerage role |
| December 7, 2001 | Jes Staley approves selecting Casey to cover Epstein | Formal start of documented relationship management |
| March to May 2003 | Casey approves Maxwell and Epstein due diligence | Expands and formalizes the relationship cluster |
| November 4, 2003 | Casey records a new prospect referred by Epstein | Shows referral value |
| January 28, 2004 | Casey initiates due diligence for two young women described as models | Documents Epstein sponsored accounts for young women |
| April 2005 | Casey approves Maxwell’s refreshed client review | Continuing coverage of Maxwell |
| 2006 | Palm Beach investigation and arrest become public | Major reputational and criminal risk point |
| December 2007 to January 2008 | Casey and Waters discuss plea news and moving Epstein | Shows active internal concern |
| February 29, 2008 | Casey questions a new $1 million letter of credit | Escalates credit and reputational risk before plea |
| June 30, 2008 | Epstein pleads guilty to two Florida offenses, including procuring a person under 18 for prostitution | Public criminal milestone |
| October to December 2008 | Casey approves several Epstein related entities and trusts | Continued service after conviction |
| February to May 2009 | Casey approves additional property, aircraft, employee, and entity relationships | Continuing network wide account administration |
| February 6, 2009 | Casey directs closure of execution accounts while custody remains | Partial restriction of services |
| July 22, 2009 | Matusow sends Casey the “buddy” email after Epstein’s release | Unresolved internal meaning highlighted by Senate staff |
| Late 2009 or early 2010 | Casey says she no longer wants to cover Epstein | Direct evidence of opposition to continuing personal coverage |
| February 2010 | Casey approves Darren Indyke as a client | Final located approval shortly before transfer |
| March 4, 2010 | Paul Morris becomes Epstein’s banker | Formal transfer of primary coverage |
| March 9, 2010 | Casey tells Staley the bank hopes the relationship will grow | Confirms continuity and new team structure |
| June 2012 | Casey appears in approval history for an Epstein aircraft account review | Continued control record after transfer |
| 2013 | JPMorgan says it terminates Epstein as a client | End of acknowledged client relationship |
| 2017 | Casey relocates from New York to Miami, according to later reporting | Career shift away from prior New York management responsibilities |
| April and July 2023 | Casey is deposed in JPMorgan related Epstein litigation | Sworn examination of her role and knowledge |
| August 2023 | JPMorgan files verified response describing her concerns and townhouse visits | Major public summary of her testimony and contact |
| August 4, 2026 | Senate Finance Committee Democratic staff releases banking report | Renewed scrutiny of Casey and other JPMorgan personnel |
Direct EFTA Appearance Index
The released corpus contains original emails, duplicate productions, monthly statements, due diligence copies, deposition exhibits, expert reports, motions, and congressional materials. A raw mention count would treat many reproductions as new events. This index groups the principal records by function and identifies the most probative originals or complete copies.
| Category | Principal EFTA records | Contents |
|---|---|---|
| Assignment and banker history | EFTA02817807, EFTA01480930, EFTA01482084, EFTA01594255 | Selection in 2001, repeated banker assignments, and 2010 transfer to Morris |
| Epstein due diligence and revenue context | EFTA02810791, EFTA02811623, EFTA01480928, EFTA01480936 | 2003 review, approval, revenue significance, and later copies |
| Young women’s accounts | EFTA02816139, EFTA01594169, EFTA01582810, EFTA02811060 | Models, checking accounts, guaranteed credit cards, and “emerging models” language |
| Maxwell records | EFTA02816120, EFTA01594255, EFTA01582862 | Maxwell’s account, due diligence, and approvals |
| Risk and plea discussions | EFTA02807930, EFTA02818087, EFTA02816183 | “Moving him,” “No one wants him,” and the $1 million letter of credit question |
| Brokerage restrictions | EFTA01584505, EFTA01585084 | Closure of execution accounts and continuation of custody services |
| Post release internal message | EFTA02816180 | Matusow’s “buddy” email to Casey |
| 2010 transfer and new team | EFTA02817809, EFTA02817624 | Morris assignment, Barrett and Matusow coverage, and growth language |
| Residence visits and opposition to coverage | EFTA02817409 | Verified bank response describing townhouse visits and Casey’s request to stop coverage |
| Epstein entities and trusts | EFTA01480635, EFTA01480646, EFTA01480718, EFTA01481760, EFTA01480551, EFTA01480591, EFTA01481361, EFTA01594119, EFTA01582851 | Banker approvals for properties, businesses, aircraft companies, trusts, Maxwell linked entities, and associates |
| Aircraft cash review | EFTA01480544 | $20,000 to $40,000 cash explanation, retained banking status, and 2012 approval history |
| Fee and linkage administration | EFTA01583743, EFTA01594981 | Account linkage, service fees, and related entity lists |
| Litigation and expert analysis | EFTA02809392, EFTA02810334, EFTA02810827, EFTA02815793, EFTA02815839 | Party arguments, expert opinions, statement of facts, and reproductions of underlying records |
The EFTA014 and EFTA015 series includes many near duplicate due diligence reports and statement copies. Their repetition confirms Casey’s recurring role across the account cluster, but each duplicate should not be presented as an independent interaction.
Litigation and Depositions
Casey was deposed during the 2023 litigation involving a survivor class action, the United States Virgin Islands, JPMorgan, and Jes Staley. Public filings indicate an April 2023 deposition and a later July 6, 2023 examination. Lawyers for survivors sought additional testimony from Casey and Jamie Dimon after new documents emerged. JPMorgan opposed what it called duplicative depositions.
The litigation produced the most detailed public evidence about Casey because emails, due diligence files, approval histories, and portions of testimony were attached to motions and expert reports. The parties interpreted those materials differently. Plaintiffs and the Virgin Islands argued that JPMorgan’s personnel saw red flags and continued a profitable relationship. JPMorgan emphasized senior advocacy by Staley and stated that Casey had wanted to stop covering Epstein and had advocated termination.
JPMorgan agreed to pay $290 million to resolve the survivor class action and $75 million to resolve the Virgin Islands case. These were institutional settlements and did not create an individual judgment against Casey. The bank did not admit liability in the Virgin Islands settlement.
Senate Finance Committee Findings
The August 2026 Senate Finance Committee Democratic staff report identifies Casey as a former Epstein relationship manager who remains a Vice Chair of the Private Bank. It cites Matusow’s 2009 message to her and says further investigation is needed to determine whether Matusow, Casey, or others advocated reduced monitoring, oversight, or reporting.
The report also names Casey among senior or significant JPMorgan personnel connected to the bank’s handling of Epstein. It says that, apart from Jes Staley, the identified bankers were not known to have experienced financial consequences or regulatory discipline related to the failures described by the committee staff.
The report is an investigative staff document, not a criminal charge, court judgment, or regulatory adjudication. Its language about Casey’s possible role in reduced oversight is expressly framed as a question requiring further investigation.
Legal and Regulatory Status
As of the article’s September 2026 review date, no located public source showed that Casey had been charged with a crime, sued individually by a survivor in the principal JPMorgan cases, found civilly liable, or sanctioned by a financial regulator for conduct connected to Epstein.
Her current FINRA BrokerCheck report lists no customer complaint, arbitration, regulatory action, employment termination disclosure, bankruptcy, criminal proceeding, or civil judicial disclosure. It shows active registration through J.P. Morgan Securities in numerous jurisdictions.
This status does not resolve questions of judgment, compliance, or institutional accountability. It defines the current public legal and regulatory record.
What the Evidence Establishes
The evidence establishes that Casey was a central relationship manager for Epstein and parts of his network. It establishes that she knew about reputational questions by 2003, handled accounts for young women sponsored by Epstein in 2004, knew about the criminal case by 2007 and 2008, questioned added credit, administered service restrictions, approved connected entities, visited Epstein’s residence, and eventually sought to leave coverage.
It also establishes that her transfer message supported continuity and possible growth. Casey’s role cannot accurately be described as either wholly oppositional or wholly promotional. The record reflects both concern and continued institutional execution.
What the Evidence Does Not Establish
The located records do not establish that Casey participated in sexual abuse, recruitment, grooming, or trafficking. They do not show that she personally handed cash to victims, structured withdrawals to avoid reporting, suppressed a suspicious activity report, or witnessed misconduct at Epstein’s residence.
The records do not prove that every young woman with an Epstein supported account was a victim. They do not show that Casey knew the full significance of modeling, immigration, housing, or credit arrangements at the time. They also do not establish that Casey had unilateral authority to terminate Epstein over Staley and other senior decision makers.
The Senate staff report’s call for further investigation is not a finding that Casey sought reduced monitoring. JPMorgan’s statement that she advocated termination is supported by its verified response, but the complete public record of all her internal advocacy remains incomplete.
Why Mary Casey Matters
Casey matters because her records reveal how the Epstein relationship functioned in ordinary banking systems. Due diligence forms, credit cards, letters of credit, entity accounts, fee linkages, custody arrangements, and approval chains may appear routine in isolation. Together, they formed the financial infrastructure around Epstein and his network.
She also matters because her actions expose a structural problem. A relationship manager can identify risk, ask questions, and seek reassignment while the institution continues serving the client. Casey’s record therefore directs scrutiny upward as well as inward: toward senior executives, legal leadership, risk committees, business incentives, and the division of authority inside a global bank.
Finally, her continued senior status makes accountability questions current. She remains registered, employed, and publicly identified as a leader of the Private Bank. That does not imply guilt. It makes the absence of a full public accounting of who decided what, and why, especially consequential.
Unresolved Questions
- What information did Casey receive when she was selected to cover Epstein in 2001?
- Did she know of any allegations removed from the published 2003 Vanity Fair article?
- What enhanced review, if any, followed the pattern of Epstein sponsoring accounts and cards for young models?
- Did Casey meet the young women whose accounts she initiated, and what did those meetings reveal?
- Which Epstein related individuals and entities did Casey personally approve, reject, or escalate?
- What did Casey mean by “moving him” in January 2008?
- Did she recommend full termination before or after Epstein’s June 2008 guilty plea?
- Who made the final decision to issue or deny the requested $1 million letter of credit?
- What specific restrictions did Casey believe were sufficient after the plea, and why were custody and banking services preserved?
- Did Casey review the scale and pattern of Epstein’s cash withdrawals, payments to women, tuition, housing, travel, and credit support?
- Did she ever request or review a suspicious activity report concerning Epstein or connected accounts?
- What exactly did Matusow mean by asking Casey to be his “buddy” after Epstein’s release?
- Did Casey expressly ask Staley to terminate Epstein as a client, or only to remove her from coverage?
- Why did her March 2010 transition message express hope that the relationship would grow after she had raised concerns and sought to leave coverage?
- What responsibilities did Casey retain after Paul Morris became Epstein’s banker?
- Why did her name remain in approval histories for connected accounts as late as 2012?
- What did Casey tell JPMorgan, regulators, or congressional investigators after Epstein’s 2019 arrest?
- Will her full 2023 deposition transcripts and exhibits be released without improper redaction of nonvictim information?
Related Pages
Jeffrey Epstein; Ghislaine Maxwell; Jes Staley; Paul Morris; Jeff Matusow; Paul Barrett; Lisa Waters; Mary Erdoes; Stephen Cutler; Catherine Keating; Justin Nelson; Financial Trust Company; Air Ghislaine; Hyperion Air; HBRK Associates; MAX Foundation; JPMorgan Chase; United States Virgin Islands v. JPMorgan Chase Bank.
Sources
- EFTA02817807, 2001 email selecting Mary Rieth to cover Epstein
- EFTA02810791, 2003 due diligence email and Vanity Fair article
- EFTA02811623, Epstein due diligence and revenue record
- EFTA02816139, 2004 email concerning accounts for two models
- EFTA02807930, 2007 and 2008 risk discussion
- EFTA02816183, 2008 letter of credit escalation
- EFTA01584505, 2009 brokerage account restriction email
- EFTA02816180, Matusow’s July 2009 “buddy” email
- EFTA02817809, March 2010 coverage transition email
- EFTA02817409, JPMorgan’s verified response concerning visits and Casey’s request to leave coverage
- FINRA BrokerCheck report for Mary C. Casey, CRD 3169703
- Catalyst Miami biography for Mary Casey
- Senate Finance Committee Democratic staff report, August 4, 2026
- DOJ Epstein Library
- Financial Times, “JPMorgan and Jeffrey Epstein: the long goodbye,” March 12, 2026